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  • Historical Analysis of Israel’s Claims on Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

    Historical Analysis of Israel’s Claims on Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

    Three Decades of Warnings and Enduring Tensions

    1. Introduction: Intersecting Geopolitical Challenges

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    This report provides a comprehensive analysis of two pivotal and interconnected geopolitical challenges defining the Middle East: Israel’s long-standing warnings regarding Iran’s nuclear program and the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For over three decades, Israel’s assertions about Iran’s imminent nuclear weapon capability have profoundly shaped international policy and regional dynamics. Simultaneously, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a central source of instability, marked by complex historical grievances, cycles of violence, and contentious international responses. This analysis aims to dissect the historical patterns, motivations, and implications of Israel’s recurring warnings about Iran, while also examining the justifications for Israeli military actions in the Palestinian territories, the multifaceted drivers of international support for Israel, and the documented human rights concerns. By exploring the interplay between these two critical issues, this report seeks to offer a nuanced, evidence-based understanding of their historical trajectories and contemporary consequences.

    2. Historical Analysis of Israel’s Claims on Iran’s Nuclear Program: Three Decades of Warnings

    This section meticulously examines the history of Israel’s warnings concerning Iran’s nuclear program, tracing their evolution, evaluating their accuracy against intelligence assessments, and analyzing their strategic and political underpinnings.

    2.1 Origins and Early Assertions (1990s)

    Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions began to solidify in the early 1990s, a period characterized by major geopolitical shifts following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. This era marked a fundamental transformation in relations between Israel and Iran, shifting from a “cold peace” to overt hostility. The apprehension regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations took concrete form during this time, setting the stage for decades of recurring warnings.

    The public emergence of these claims is strongly linked to Benjamin Netanyahu. In February 1993, then a member of the Israeli Knesset, Netanyahu authored a column in Yedioth Ahronoth titled “The greatest danger,” where he explicitly warned of the threat of a “Muslim bomb”.1 He predicted that Iran would develop its first nuclear bomb by 1999, citing alleged statements from Iranian officials, including then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani, to substantiate his assertions.1 This early pronouncement established a consistent and urgent narrative regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Netanyahu’s use of phrases like “greatest danger” and his specific timeline for Iran’s nuclear acquisition indicated an intentional strategy to imbue the threat with existential urgency from its inception.1 The fact that these early predictions did not materialize by 1999, yet the rhetoric persisted, pointed to a deeper, more strategic function of these warnings beyond mere intelligence reporting. This early pattern suggested that the “imminent threat” narrative was not solely reactive to intelligence but a foundational element of Israel’s long-term foreign policy and a tool for shaping international perceptions of Iran.

    By 1995, Netanyahu further formalized these warnings in his book “Fighting Terrorism,” where he claimed Iran was “between three and five years away from possessing the prerequisites required for the independent production of nuclear weapons”.2 This established a pattern of specific, short-term predictions that would become characteristic of his subsequent warnings. In his 1996 address to the U.S. Congress, he reiterated the urgency of the situation, stating that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it “could presage catastrophic consequences, not only for my country, and not only for the Middle East, but for all mankind,” adding that “the deadline for attaining this goal is getting extremely close”.2 He called for “immediate and effective prevention” rather than relying solely on deterrence, emphasizing that “time is running out”.4

    2.2 Evolution and Intensification of Warnings (2000s-2010s)

    Netanyahu’s warnings gained significant international prominence during his 2002 testimony before the U.S. Congress. During this testimony, he advocated for military action against Iraq while simultaneously raising alarms about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He asserted that “the two nations that are vying, competing with each other who will be the first to achieve nuclear weapons is Iraq and Iran”.5 This testimony, which later proved to be based on false premises regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, established a precedent for linking regional threats and advocating for preemptive military intervention.5

    Perhaps the most memorable instance of Netanyahu’s nuclear warnings occurred during his September 2012 address to the United Nations General Assembly. He famously used a cartoon-like drawing of a bomb with a lit fuse to illustrate his claims, drawing a “red line” at 90 percent uranium enrichment and warning that Iran was rapidly approaching this critical threshold.2 He declared that “by next spring, at most by next summer, at current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the final stage,” leaving “only a few months, possibly a few weeks before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb”.2 This visual prop was highly effective in capturing global media attention and making a complex issue accessible, even if oversimplified, thereby garnering significant interest on social and traditional media platforms.7 This active public diplomacy, aimed at drumming up interest and shaping international public opinion, suggested a deliberate effort to pressure foreign governments. The repeated invocation of “imminent” threats, even when previous timelines failed, indicated a persistent strategy to maintain a sense of crisis and influence the urgency with which the issue was perceived by policymakers and the public, irrespective of the underlying intelligence.

    2.3 Divergence with Intelligence Assessments

    A notable aspect of Israel’s warnings about Iran’s nuclear program is the consistent divergence between Netanyahu’s public statements and the assessments of intelligence agencies, including Israel’s own Mossad. In a remarkable contradiction, leaked documents revealed that Mossad’s assessment directly contradicted Netanyahu’s public warnings in 2012. A classified cable from October 22, 2012—just one month after Netanyahu’s dramatic UN speech—stated that Iran was “not performing the activity necessary to produce weapons” and “doesn’t appear to be ready to enrich uranium to the higher levels needed for a nuclear bomb”.8 Mossad’s assessment indicated that Iranian scientists were working to close gaps in areas that appeared legitimate, such as enrichment reactors, which would reduce the time required to produce weapons if an instruction was given, but they were not actively building one.8

    This Mossad assessment aligned with the 2012 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which also found no evidence that Iran had decided to use its nuclear infrastructure to build weapons or had revived warhead design efforts shelved in 2003.8 A former senior U.S. intelligence official confirmed that Israeli and U.S. spy agencies largely agreed on the facts regarding Iran’s nuclear program.11 This consistent and explicit contradiction between Netanyahu’s public warnings and the assessments of both Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies demonstrated a significant disconnect. This suggested that Netanyahu’s public rhetoric was not solely driven by intelligence findings but served a distinct political and strategic agenda.

    The divergence continued into the 2020s. Following the 2025 Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Netanyahu claimed Iran could produce a nuclear weapon “in a very short time” and be “weeks away” from achieving nuclear capability.12 However, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified in March 2025 that the intelligence community “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003”.14 Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) May 2025 report found “no credible indications of ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme” in Iran, although it noted rapid advancement in uranium enrichment.16 The fact that the DNI in 2025 explicitly stated Iran was “not building a nuclear weapon” while Netanyahu maintained an “imminent” threat highlighted a deliberate choice in political messaging that prioritized alarm over nuanced intelligence. This pattern raised fundamental questions about the transparency and integrity of political communication in high-stakes security matters, implying that the “threat” was, at least in part, a constructed narrative designed to achieve specific policy outcomes rather than a direct reflection of intelligence consensus.

    2.4 Patterns, Motivations, and Outcomes

    A comprehensive review of Netanyahu’s claims reveals a remarkable consistency in the “imminent threat” narrative, despite the actual outcomes consistently diverging from the predicted timelines. For example, his 1993 prediction of a bomb by 1999 did not materialize 1, nor did the 3-5 year timeframe from his 1995 book.3 The 2012 “months to weeks away” warning was publicly contradicted by Mossad.8 Even after the 2025 strikes, claims of Iran being “weeks away” persisted despite U.S. intelligence disagreement.12

    The consistent failure of specific timelines to materialize, coupled with the intelligence contradictions, strongly suggested that the “imminent threat” rhetoric was instrumentalized. Critics and analysts argue that these repeated warnings served multiple political and strategic purposes beyond genuine security concerns.19

    • Domestic Political Advantage: The Iran threat has consistently boosted Netanyahu’s security credentials, particularly during election periods.19 It allowed him to appeal to the “tough on security” electorate and diverted public attention from internal issues such as corruption charges or economic downturns.22
    • International Attention Diversion: Emphasizing the Iranian threat helped deflect international attention from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of Palestinian territories.19 This strategy aimed to sideline the Palestinian cause and reframe regional instability around Iran.19
    • Policy Influence: The warnings have been instrumental in shaping international sanctions and military policies against Iran.14 Netanyahu’s rhetoric has been a key factor in pushing for a tougher stance on Iran’s nuclear program, even influencing U.S. presidential administrations.15

    The motivations outlined (domestic politics, attention diversion, policy influence) revealed a deliberate strategy to leverage the perceived Iranian nuclear threat for broader geopolitical and internal political gains. By portraying Iran as an existential danger, Israel could rally international support, justify its own actions, and deflect criticism from other contentious issues. The ability to “sidelined the war in Gaza” through focus on Iran was a clear example of this.23 This instrumentalization created a self-reinforcing cycle: the warnings generated international pressure (sanctions, military readiness), which then provided a rationale for continued warnings, regardless of the actual intelligence. This also impacted Iran’s own calculus, potentially pushing it towards seeking a deterrent.20

    Table 1: Timeline of Netanyahu’s Iran Nuclear Warnings vs. Actual Outcomes

    YearContextNetanyahu’s ClaimActual Outcome/Intelligence Assessment
    1992-1993Knesset memberIran will have bomb by 1999 1No nuclear weapon by 1999 13
    1995Book publication3-5 years to nuclear capability 3No nuclear weapon by 2000 13
    1996Congress speech“Extremely close” deadline 4No nuclear weapon materialized
    2002Congressional testimonyIran racing toward nuclear weapons 5No evidence of active weapons program 8
    2009WikiLeaks cables1-2 years from capability 2Timeline did not materialize
    2012UN General AssemblyMonths to weeks away 7Mossad contradicted publicly 8
    2025Recent strikes“Very short time,” weeks away 12U.S. intelligence disagrees 14

    2.5 Regional and Global Implications

    Israel’s warnings about Iran must be understood within the broader context of regional nuclear dynamics. Israel itself maintains an undeclared nuclear arsenal, estimated at 80-400 warheads, centered at the Dimona facility in the Negev Desert . Unlike Iran, which has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allowed IAEA inspections 18, Israel remains outside international nuclear oversight mechanisms . This asymmetry is a critical, often unstated, backdrop to Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

    The sustained campaign of warnings has had significant real-world consequences:

    • International Sanctions: Multiple rounds of economic sanctions have been imposed against Iran, severely impacting its economy.14 These sanctions are often linked to concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities and its perceived lack of cooperation with the IAEA.17
    • Military Operations: This includes cyberattacks like Stuxnet (2010) and direct military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and personnel, such as those in 2025.17 These strikes aim to “set back or weaken Iran’s nuclear capabilities”.25
    • Diplomatic Isolation: The warnings have contributed to Iran’s international isolation and complicated nuclear negotiations, with Iran often portrayed as unwilling to cooperate.26
    • Regional Tensions: The rhetoric has escalated the broader Israel-Iran confrontation across multiple theaters, risking wider conflict.12

    The consistent warnings, even when contradicted by intelligence, have successfully generated international policy responses, including sanctions and military actions. These actions, in turn, reinforce the perception of Iran as a dangerous proliferator, justifying further warnings and interventions. This creates a self-reinforcing cycle where the perceived threat, rather than being solely based on verifiable intelligence, is actively constructed and maintained through political rhetoric and subsequent policy actions. The nuclear asymmetry, where Israel maintains an undeclared arsenal while Iran is a signatory to the NPT, adds a layer of complexity that further complicates international non-proliferation efforts.26 This cycle risks perpetual conflict and instability, diverting resources and attention from other regional challenges. It also makes genuine diplomatic solutions more difficult, as the “threat” narrative often precludes negotiation or compromise, potentially pushing Iran towards a more defiant stance or even a decision to pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent.20

    3. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Understanding International Support and Human Rights Concerns

    This section delves into the historical roots, justifications, international support mechanisms, and documented human rights impacts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    3.1 Historical Context and Origins

    The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deeply rooted in competing national movements—Zionism and Palestinian nationalism—and their claims to the same territory.38 The 1917 Balfour Declaration, which promised British support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” intensified Zionist aspirations and set the stage for future tensions.39 The 1947 UN Partition Plan, which sought to divide Mandatory Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, was rejected by Arab nations who argued it disproportionately favored the Jewish population despite their smaller numbers.39

    The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, following Israel’s declaration of independence, resulted in Israel’s victory and the displacement of approximately 750,000 Palestinians. This event is known in the Arab world as the “Nakba” (Catastrophe).38 This established the foundational narrative of displacement and dispossession for Palestinians, while for Israelis, it represented their War of Independence. This fundamental difference in historical understanding continues to inform contemporary claims, justifications, and resistance. Subsequent Arab-Israeli wars, including the 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1982 Lebanon War, and 2006 Second Lebanon War, further shaped the conflict, leading to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.40 The first and second Intifadas (1987, 2000) marked widespread Palestinian uprisings against Israeli occupation.40 This deep-seated historical divergence means that any peace process must contend with not just current political realities but also deeply ingrained historical grievances and competing claims to land and identity, making reconciliation exceptionally challenging.

    3.2 Justifications for Israeli Military Actions

    Israeli officials consistently frame military operations as necessary for national security and self-defense.17 They argue that Israel faces genuine threats from militant groups, particularly Hamas in Gaza, which has launched thousands of rockets at Israeli civilian areas.17 Israel maintains that its military actions target “terrorist infrastructure” and that militants deliberately operate from civilian areas, making civilian casualties an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence.44 Recent Israeli military actions, such as the 2025 strikes against Iran, have also been justified as preemptive self-defense against “existential and imminent threats”.17

    Israeli officials contend their actions comply with international law under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognizes the right to self-defense.17 They assert that military operations adhere to principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack, though these claims are heavily disputed by international bodies.45 The Israeli government also points to the UN’s 2011 Palmer Report, which found Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza to be “a legitimate security measure” under international law, implemented “to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea”.46 While Israel consistently invokes self-defense and international law to justify its military actions, the extensive documentation of civilian casualties and human rights violations by international bodies suggests a significant gap between stated legal adherence and actual impact. The argument that civilian casualties are “unavoidable” due to militants operating in civilian areas is a recurring justification, but it is often challenged by human rights organizations who point to disproportionate force and indiscriminate effects.45 This contested narrative of self-defense, particularly when juxtaposed with documented outcomes, fuels international criticism and undermines Israel’s international legitimacy in the eyes of many, contributing to the “accountability gap” discussed later in this report.

    3.3 Factors Behind International Support for Israel

    The United States has been Israel’s most significant supporter, providing approximately $310 billion in military and economic aid since Israel’s founding in 1948, with over $22 billion in military support since October 2023 alone.47 This support stems from several factors. Israel is viewed as a democratic ally in a strategically important and volatile region, serving U.S. interests in countering regional threats and maintaining stability.48 It is designated a “major non-NATO ally,” granting it privileged access to advanced U.S. military platforms and technologies.48 Much U.S. aid requires Israel to purchase American weapons, thereby supporting the U.S. defense industry.47 This includes advanced systems like Iron Dome missiles, precision-guided bombs, and F-35 fighter jets.47 Furthermore, the Israel lobby, particularly AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), has been highly effective in maintaining Congressional support through campaign contributions and advocacy, organizing trips for legislators and ensuring politicians “profess their identification with Israel”.50

    European support for Israel, while more nuanced than U.S. backing, also has deep roots. Germany’s support, for instance, is explicitly linked to Holocaust guilt, seen as a “permanent obligation,” extending to providing advanced military equipment including submarines and weapons systems.51 Analysis suggests Western support for Israel follows historical patterns of supporting settler colonial projects.52 The same Western powers that initially supported apartheid South Africa, French Algeria, and Rhodesia have consistently backed Israel, shielding them from international condemnation and sanctions.52 Additionally, the Middle East’s energy resources and strategic location, particularly for oil transit routes like the Strait of Hormuz, continue to influence Western policy calculations.53

    International support for Israel, particularly from the U.S. and key European nations, is not monolithic but built upon a convergence of strategic, economic, historical, and political factors. The U.S. views Israel as a vital strategic asset, while also benefiting economically from arms sales. The influence of the Israel lobby further institutionalizes this support within the U.S. political system. For European nations like Germany, historical guilt over the Holocaust plays a significant, almost moral, role in their commitment. The broader historical pattern of Western support for settler-colonial states provides a critical lens, suggesting that Israel’s case is not exceptional but rather fits a long-standing geopolitical tendency. This deep and varied support network provides Israel with significant diplomatic and military leverage, often enabling it to act with less fear of international repercussions, even in the face of widespread criticism regarding human rights. This robust support system is a primary reason for the limitations of international accountability.

    3.4 Documented Human Rights Violations and International Legal Findings

    In July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a landmark advisory opinion declaring Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories a violation of international law.55 The court found that Israeli policies constitute “systemic discrimination based on, inter alia, race, religion or ethnic origin”.55 Multiple breaches of international law were identified, including forcible evictions, extensive house demolitions, the transfer of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, failure to prevent settler attacks, restricting Palestinian access to water, and extending Israeli law to occupied territories.55 Several judges explicitly stated that Israel’s separation measures between Palestinians and Israeli settlers breach Article 3 of the UN treaty prohibiting racial discrimination, constituting apartheid.56

    Major human rights organizations have also documented systematic violations. Human Rights Watch concluded in 2021 that Israeli authorities commit “the crimes of apartheid and persecution” against Palestinians, based on an overarching policy to maintain Jewish Israeli domination over Palestinians.57 The organization found evidence of “systematic oppression of Palestinians and inhumane acts committed against them”.57 Amnesty International reached similar conclusions in 2022, stating that Israel enforces “a system of oppression and domination against the Palestinian people wherever it has control over their rights”.58 Their report documented “massive seizures of Palestinian land and property, unlawful killings, forcible transfer, drastic movement restrictions”.58

    Recent UN reports further document severe civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction in Gaza. The UN Human Rights Office reported that since March 2025, at least 506 Palestinians were killed in resumed Israeli bombardment, including 200 children and 112 women.45 The office noted that “using explosive weapons with wide-area effects in such densely populated areas will almost certainly have indiscriminate effects,” likely violating international humanitarian law.45 A separate UN Commission found that Israel has “obliterated Gaza’s education system and destroyed over half of all religious and cultural sites” in the Gaza Strip.45

    The findings from the ICJ, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International demonstrated a converging international legal and human rights consensus that Israeli policies in the occupied territories amounted to systemic discrimination and, in some cases, the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution. This was not merely a political accusation but a legal determination based on extensive documentation of practices like forcible evictions, settler transfers, movement restrictions, and land confiscation.55 The UN Human Rights Office’s detailed reports on civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction further underscored the severity and systematic nature of the impact.45 This legal consensus provided a strong normative framework for international action and accountability. However, the gap between these findings and concrete policy changes by major powers highlighted the limitations of international law when it confronted entrenched strategic interests.

    Table 2: Key International Legal and Human Rights Findings on Israeli Actions in Palestinian Territories

    Issuing BodyYear of Report/FindingKey Conclusion/FindingSpecific Practices Cited
    International Court of Justice (ICJ)July 2024Occupation of Palestinian territories violates international law; systemic discrimination; breaches of UN treaty prohibiting racial discrimination (apartheid) 55Forcible evictions, house demolitions, transfer of settlers, failure to prevent settler attacks, restricting Palestinian access to water, extending Israeli law to occupied territories, separation measures 55
    Human Rights Watch (HRW)2021Israeli authorities commit “crimes of apartheid and persecution” against Palestinians 57Overarching policy to maintain Jewish Israeli domination, systematic oppression, inhumane acts (sweeping movement restrictions, land confiscation, denial of building permits, denial of residency rights, suspension of civil rights, discriminatory resource allocation) 57
    Amnesty International2022Israel enforces “a system of oppression and domination” against Palestinians; crime of apartheid 58Massive seizures of Palestinian land and property, unlawful killings, forcible transfer, drastic movement restrictions, denial of nationality/citizenship 58
    UN Human Rights OfficeMarch 2025Severe civilian casualties; use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas likely violates international humanitarian law 45Airstrikes and artillery shelling hitting homes, schools, shelters; 506 Palestinians killed (200 children, 112 women); mass forced displacement orders; blocking of humanitarian aid 45
    UN Commission2025Obliteration of Gaza’s education system; destruction of religious and cultural sites 45Over 90% of school/university buildings damaged/destroyed; over half of religious/cultural sites destroyed; 658,000 children without schooling for 20 months 45

    3.5 Impact on Palestinian Civilians

    Palestinian civilian casualties have been extensive throughout the conflict. Since October 7, 2023, Palestinian health authorities report over 55,000 deaths in Gaza, with approximately one-third being children.43 The broader Palestinian refugee population has grown to an estimated 9.17 million displaced worldwide as of 2021 42, with about 2 million displaced within Gaza alone since October 2023.59 The statistical data on casualties and displacement provided a quantitative measure of the immediate human cost.

    Beyond immediate casualties, international organizations document broader systematic effects. Over 9,700 Palestinians were held in Israeli custody by July 2024, including more than 4,781 under administrative detention orders, which allow for indefinite incarceration without charge or trial.60 This practice has increased significantly since October 2023.60 Reports from UNRWA, the UN, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International in 2024 detail “widespread abuse, torture, sexual assault and rape” against Palestinian detainees.62 Whistleblowing prison staff corroborated reports of severe physical violence, forced stress positions, and inhumane conditions.62 Tragically, at least 54 Palestinian detainees died in custody during 2024.62

    Israeli attacks have systematically targeted educational, medical, and religious infrastructure.45 More than 90 percent of school and university buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed, and over 658,000 children in Gaza have had no schooling for 20 months.45 The World Health Organization (WHO) documented 498 attacks on healthcare facilities in Gaza between October 2023 and July 2024.63 The documentation of administrative detention, torture and abuse, and systematic infrastructure destruction revealed a deeper, qualitative impact that extended beyond direct combat. These were not isolated incidents but patterns of harm that cumulatively affected the entire Palestinian population, undermining their social fabric, economic viability, and future prospects. The high number of administrative detainees and reports of torture indicated a systemic approach to control and repression. This systematic impact suggested that the conflict was not merely about security but involved the sustained imposition of conditions that severely degraded Palestinian life and self-determination, highlighting the long-term humanitarian crisis and the profound challenges to any future peace or reconstruction efforts.

    3.6 International Community Response and Limitations

    The United States has repeatedly used its Security Council veto power to block resolutions critical of Israel.64 In June 2025, the U.S. vetoed a resolution calling for an “immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire” in Gaza, with 14 other council members voting in favor.64 U.S. officials justified the veto by stating they “would not support any measure that fails to condemn Hamas”.64 This pattern has historically prevented Security Council action on Israeli violations of international law.64

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, alleging “criminal responsibility” for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including starvation as a method of warfare.65 However, Israel and its allies, including the United States, do not recognize the court’s jurisdiction.65

    While many countries have criticized Israeli actions, concrete consequences remain limited. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion calling Israel’s occupation illegal has not translated into enforceable sanctions.55 Many Western nations continue military and economic cooperation with Israel despite documented violations.47 The consistent use of the U.S. veto in the UN Security Council and the non-recognition of the ICC’s jurisdiction by Israel and its allies created a significant “accountability gap.” Despite mounting evidence from international legal bodies and human rights organizations regarding violations, the political and strategic interests of major powers often overrode legal and moral concerns. This demonstrated that international law, while providing a normative framework, had limited enforceability when it conflicted with the realpolitik of state-to-state relations and geopolitical alliances. This gap perpetuated the cycle of violence and impunity, as the lack of meaningful consequences for documented violations reduced incentives for compliance with international law. It also undermined the credibility of international institutions and exacerbated Palestinian grievances, contributing to ongoing instability.

    4. Conclusion: Assessing the Record and Future Considerations

    After more than three decades of warnings that Iran is on the verge of nuclear weapons capability, the historical record presents a complex picture. While Iran has undoubtedly advanced its nuclear technical capabilities and uranium enrichment levels, the repeated predictions of imminent weaponization have not materialized as forecasted. The consistency of these warnings—spanning different U.S. administrations, changing regional circumstances, and evolving Iranian governments—suggests they reflect a deeply embedded strategic calculus rather than solely reactive intelligence assessments. The fact that Israel’s own intelligence services have at times contradicted the urgency of public warnings adds another layer of complexity to evaluating these claims.

    The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, concurrently, remains a core geopolitical challenge, marked by historical displacement, ongoing occupation, and cycles of violence. Despite extensive documentation by international legal bodies and human rights organizations detailing systemic violations, including findings of apartheid and persecution, concrete international accountability has been consistently limited. This is largely due to robust international support for Israel, particularly from the United States, driven by strategic alliances, economic interests, and historical factors, which often manifest as diplomatic protection within international forums like the UN Security Council.

    A critical overarching observation is the strategic intertwining of Israel’s Iran nuclear warnings with its management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The analysis reveals that Netanyahu’s emphasis on the Iranian threat has consistently served as a tool to “distract attention from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”.19 By elevating the Iranian nuclear program to an existential global threat, Israel effectively shifts the international agenda, diverting focus from the occupation and human rights concerns in Palestinian territories. This allows Israel to gain diplomatic victories, such as “separating Iranian nuclear issues from Palestinian concerns in European strategic thinking”.23 This is a deliberate rhetorical strategy that leverages one crisis to mitigate pressure on another. This strategic diversion creates a dynamic where international pressure on Israel regarding the Palestinian issue is diffused or lessened, while simultaneously bolstering support for a more aggressive stance against Iran. It means that addressing one conflict effectively may require acknowledging its interconnectedness with the other, as policy decisions in one arena inevitably impact the other.

    As the Middle East continues to grapple with nuclear proliferation concerns and unresolved territorial disputes, the three-decade pattern of Israeli warnings about Iran’s nuclear program remains a central factor in regional politics and international policymaking. Whether these warnings represent genuine intelligence-based concerns about an imminent threat or serve broader political and strategic objectives continues to be a subject of significant debate among policymakers, intelligence professionals, and regional experts. The historical analysis suggests that while the Iranian nuclear program poses legitimate concerns for regional stability, the specific claims of imminent weapons capability have followed a remarkably consistent pattern that transcends changes in Iranian leadership, international agreements, and regional circumstances—a pattern that merits careful consideration in future policy deliberations. The gap between documented violations and meaningful international consequences illustrates the limitations of international law when it conflicts with major powers’ strategic interests. Until these underlying political calculations change, the cycle of violence and international acquiescence is likely to continue despite mounting evidence of civilian harm and legal violations.

    5. Recommendations

    To foster greater stability, accountability, and adherence to international law in the Middle East, the following recommendations are proposed:

    • For International Actors (especially the U.S. and European Powers):
    • De-link Iran Nuclear Policy from Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Actively resist the strategic diversion of attention from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by consistently addressing human rights concerns and the occupation, rather than allowing the Iranian threat to overshadow these issues.
    • Consistency in International Law Application: Apply international law and human rights standards consistently across all actors, ensuring that strategic interests do not perpetually override accountability for documented violations. This includes supporting the jurisdiction of international legal bodies like the ICC.
    • Re-evaluate Aid and Arms Sales: Condition military and economic aid on adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights, ensuring robust oversight mechanisms are in place to prevent complicity in violations.
    • Support for Diplomatic Pathways with Iran: Prioritize and actively pursue comprehensive diplomatic solutions for Iran’s nuclear program, based on verifiable agreements and international oversight, rather than relying solely on coercive measures or military threats. This requires acknowledging and addressing legitimate security concerns of all parties while avoiding rhetorical escalation.
    • Pressure for a Just Resolution in Palestine: Increase diplomatic pressure for a just and lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one that respects international law, ends the occupation, and ensures self-determination and equal rights for Palestinians.
    • For Regional Actors:
    • Transparency in Nuclear Programs: Encourage greater transparency and adherence to international non-proliferation norms across the entire Middle East, including universal adherence to the NPT and comprehensive safeguards.
    • De-escalation Mechanisms: Establish regional dialogue mechanisms to de-escalate tensions and build confidence among states, particularly between Israel and Iran, focusing on shared security interests rather than zero-sum competition.
    • Prioritize Civilian Protection: All parties to conflicts must prioritize the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, adhering strictly to international humanitarian law.
    • For International Legal and Human Rights Bodies:
    • Continued Documentation and Reporting: Maintain rigorous documentation and reporting of human rights violations and breaches of international law, ensuring that evidence is collected and preserved for future accountability.
    • Advocacy for Universal Jurisdiction: Advocate for states to exercise universal jurisdiction over serious international crimes, ensuring that perpetrators cannot evade justice.

    By adopting a more integrated, principled, and consistent approach, the international community can move beyond the current cycles of conflict and limited accountability, fostering conditions for greater stability and respect for human rights in the Middle East.

    Works cited

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  • Challenges and Strategic Pathways for the Australian Liberal Party Post-Election Defeat

    Challenges and Strategic Pathways for the Australian Liberal Party Post-Election Defeat

    Executive Summary

    The 2025 federal election marked a significant turning point for the Australian Liberal Party, culminating in a substantial electoral defeat that saw the party transition into opposition. This comprehensive analysis identifies the multi-faceted challenges underpinning this outcome, encompassing deep-seated internal divisions, policy positions perceived as out of step with evolving public sentiment, and an ineffective campaign strategy. The interconnectedness of these issues is a central finding, revealing how internal discord on critical policy areas, such as climate change, directly undermined the party’s ability to present a cohesive vision and effectively engage with a diverse electorate.

    The report details how a perceived lack of relevance on contemporary social and environmental issues, combined with a defensive campaign approach and a weak digital presence, contributed to a significant erosion of public trust and electoral support. The analysis underscores that the party’s traditional strengths, particularly in economic management, were insufficient to counteract these broader perceptions of ideological rigidity and a disconnect from mainstream values.

    To address these profound challenges, strategic imperatives for rebuilding are presented. These include a comprehensive policy renewal that embraces contemporary Australian values and addresses critical issues like climate change with nuanced, forward-looking solutions. Organizational reform is vital to foster internal unity, resolve factional disputes, and enhance diversity and representation across all party structures. Crucially, a fundamental shift towards enhanced public engagement, transparent communication, and genuine grassroots connection is required to rebuild trust and re-establish the party’s relevance across diverse demographics. The path to resurgence is contingent upon a disciplined commitment to profound change, adaptation, and a renewed sense of purpose, offering a viable route back to electoral competitiveness and public confidence.

    2. Introduction: Context of the 2025 Election Defeat

    The 2025 federal election represented a pivotal moment in the Australian political landscape, culminating in a significant electoral defeat for the Liberal Party. This outcome resulted in the party losing its majority and transitioning into opposition, notably experiencing a substantial decline in its primary vote. The defeat was characterized not only by a swing towards the Labor Party but also by the unprecedented rise of ‘teal’ independents, who successfully contested and won traditionally safe Liberal seats, primarily on platforms emphasizing climate action and integrity. This electoral setback necessitates a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the underlying factors that contributed to the Liberal Party’s diminished appeal.

    This report delves into the immediate implications of this defeat, setting the stage for a detailed examination of the party’s internal dynamics, its policy relevance in a changing society, the efficacy of its campaign strategies, and the critical pathways required for its long-term rebuilding. The imperative task of regaining public trust forms a central theme throughout this analysis, recognizing that electoral success is inextricably linked to the party’s perceived integrity, responsiveness, and capacity to connect with the aspirations of the Australian people.

    3. Analysis of Core Challenges Post-Defeat

    The Liberal Party’s 2025 electoral defeat was not attributable to a single factor but rather a confluence of interconnected challenges spanning internal dynamics, policy positioning, and campaign execution. A thorough examination of these areas reveals the depth of the party’s predicament and the systemic issues requiring urgent attention.

    3.1. Internal Divisions and Leadership Dynamics

    The Liberal Party has been persistently plagued by deep-seated internal divisions, often manifesting as a significant ideological split between its moderate and conservative factions. This internal discord has proven to be a major impediment, leading to what has been described as “policy paralysis” and persistent “factional infighting”. The severe internal disagreements on climate policy, for instance, were explicitly characterized as “warring factions”, which directly undermined the party’s ability to formulate and present a credible and unified stance on a critical public issue. The post-election period further exacerbated these divisions, characterized by a “blame game” rather than genuine “introspection”, thereby delaying the necessary collective effort towards a cohesive path forward.

    Former Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s “net negative approval rating” by the time of the election was a significant contributing factor to the party’s struggles. This sustained negative sentiment indicated a broader disconnect with the electorate that extended beyond typical political cycles. The subsequent transition to new leadership under Peter Dutton immediately presented the challenge of uniting these disparate factions and embarking on the complex task of “redefining the party’s image” while navigating the legacy of past leadership decisions and perceptions.

    A critical challenge identified is the party’s “lack of female representation” and broader “gender issues” and “diversity challenges”. This highlights an internal structure that may not adequately reflect or appeal to the increasing diversity of the Australian population, particularly women, younger demographics, and culturally diverse communities. This demographic misalignment within the party’s ranks can lead to a disconnect in understanding and addressing the concerns of a significant portion of the electorate.

    The persistent internal discord, characterized by “warring factions” and a pronounced “ideological split” within the Liberal Party, extends beyond mere internal management issues. This internal friction directly translates into “policy paralysis” and a fundamental inability to articulate a clear, consistent, and forward-looking vision to the public. If the party cannot achieve internal consensus on critical policy areas, particularly on issues like climate change where public sentiment is strong and evolving, it is inherently unable to present a unified, credible, and coherent policy platform to the electorate. This internal disagreement leads to perceived inconsistency, equivocation, or a complete lack of strong policy direction, as evidenced by the struggle to adopt a nuanced climate policy. This internal disunity and the resulting policy incoherence erode public trust and make the party appear unreliable, indecisive, or out of touch. Voters, especially those seeking clear leadership and solutions to complex national challenges, are likely to be disillusioned, contributing directly to a decline in electoral support and the loss of traditionally safe seats to more unified and purpose-driven alternatives like the ‘teal’ independents. The “blame game” post-election further signifies a failure to address the root causes of this disunity, perpetuating the cycle of internal strife.

    Furthermore, the declining popularity of the former Prime Minister, evidenced by a “net negative approval rating”, was not an isolated personal failing but rather symptomatic of a broader, deeper disconnect between the party’s perceived values and the evolving expectations of the electorate. This was significantly exacerbated by the party’s perceived stance on issues such as gender and diversity. A political leader’s popularity is intrinsically linked to the public’s perception of the party’s core values, policy positions, and overall image. If the party is widely perceived as being out of step on crucial social issues, such as gender equality and broader diversity, it can alienate significant segments of the electorate, particularly women, younger voters, and urban professionals. This alienation, in turn, reflects negatively on the leader’s approval rating, as the leader becomes the embodiment of the party’s perceived shortcomings. This combination of a declining leader approval and an unaddressed perception of being culturally out of touch on social issues creates a reinforcing negative feedback loop. It makes it increasingly difficult for the party to attract new voters, retain existing ones in key demographics, and ultimately contributes to the loss of traditionally strongholds to candidates who better align with these evolving societal values. Consequently, the party’s brand suffers a comprehensive erosion, extending beyond specific policies to its fundamental appeal.

    3.2. Policy Debates and Ideological Positioning

    The Liberal Party’s approach to climate change was a decisive factor in its electoral defeat. The party was widely perceived as “out of step with evolving public sentiment” on this critical issue, leading directly to the loss of “traditionally safe seats to climate-focused ‘teal’ independents”. Internal disagreements severely hampered the development of a coherent and forward-looking climate policy, preventing the party from articulating a “nuanced climate policy” that could effectively balance environmental imperatives with economic considerations and technological solutions. This perceived inaction or ambivalence left the party vulnerable to criticism and appeared unresponsive to a major public concern.

    While the Liberal Party has traditionally positioned itself as strong on “economic management”, this historical strength proved insufficient to counteract the pervasive voter concerns about the “cost of living”. This indicates a failure to translate broad economic rhetoric into tangible solutions or effective reassurances for everyday Australians grappling with rising expenses, suggesting that the party’s economic narrative did not resonate with the immediate financial pressures faced by many households.

    The party’s “perceived conservatism on social issues” created a significant “disconnect with mainstream values”, particularly among younger, urban, and more progressive voters. This includes issues beyond gender representation, encompassing broader social progress, inclusivity, and contemporary values. This ideological rigidity on social matters limited the party’s appeal to a broader cross-section of the electorate. The cumulative effect of these policy stances is a profound perceived lack of relevance and appeal to “diverse demographics”. The party’s existing base appears to be “aging”, suggesting a systemic failure to attract and engage “young voters” and a broader cross-section of the contemporary Australian electorate. This demographic challenge poses a significant long-term threat to the party’s electoral viability.

    The consistent failure to adapt and modernize its policy platform, particularly on critical issues like climate change and social progress, suggests a deeper underlying issue of ideological rigidity or an inability to accurately gauge and respond to the rapidly evolving values and priorities of the Australian public. This is not merely about specific policy failures but signifies a broader trend where the party’s core ideological framework, its internal decision-making processes, or its leadership’s perception of the electorate is failing to keep pace with significant societal shifts. The emergence and success of ‘teal’ independents directly challenging the Liberal Party on these very issues in their traditional strongholds serve as compelling evidence of this disconnect. This ideological stagnation leads to a continuous shrinking of the party’s voter base and a pervasive perception of irrelevance among key demographics. It makes it increasingly difficult to attract new members, engage younger generations, and ultimately threatens the party’s long-term viability and its capacity to form government in a progressively diverse and value-driven society.

    While the Liberal Party has traditionally been seen as strong in “economic management”, this perceived strength proved insufficient to secure electoral victory. This indicates that for a significant portion of the electorate, other policy areas, particularly climate action and social values, have become equally, if not more, salient and influential in voting decisions. While economic stability and cost of living are always important, the 2025 election demonstrated a crucial shift: for a growing segment of the electorate, especially in affluent urban and suburban seats, social and environmental values have ascended to become decisive factors. The perception of a party being regressive or unresponsive on these values (e.g., climate change, gender equality) can significantly negate or even overshadow its perceived competence in other areas like economic management. This implies that a purely economically focused platform is no longer sufficient for the Liberal Party to win broad electoral support. To regain power, the party must develop a comprehensive and credible policy platform that genuinely addresses contemporary social and environmental concerns, even if it requires challenging traditional ideological comfort zones. Failing to do so will continue to limit their appeal and prevent them from forming a broad enough coalition to govern.

    3.3. Campaign Effectiveness and Messaging Failures

    The Liberal Party’s 2025 campaign notably employed a “small target strategy”, which was characterized by a distinct “lack of clear vision” and an inability to articulate a compelling narrative for the future. This cautious approach, intended to minimize risks and avoid controversy, inadvertently created a vacuum that was effectively filled by Labor and the ‘teal’ independents, who presented clearer, more aspirational policy agendas. The absence of a strong, positive Liberal vision left voters uninspired and unsure of the party’s direction.

    The party’s campaign messaging was widely perceived as “ineffective” and “out of touch”. A predominant focus on “negative campaigning” against opponents, rather than a proactive articulation of positive policy proposals, alienated a significant portion of the electorate seeking constructive solutions and a forward-looking vision for the nation. This approach failed to resonate with the public’s desire for positive change.

    A critical weakness in the campaign was the Liberal Party’s “weak digital presence” and its lagging position “behind on social media”. In an increasingly digitally-driven political landscape, this represented “missed opportunities” to effectively engage with voters, particularly younger demographics, disseminate its message, and counter misinformation in real-time. The inability to effectively utilize modern communication channels limited its reach and impact.

    The campaign struggled significantly with direct “voter engagement” and appeared disconnected from “local issues”, reinforcing a pervasive perception of the party operating within a “Canberra bubble”. This indicates a systemic failure to connect with grassroots sentiment, mobilize local support effectively, and demonstrate genuine understanding of the everyday concerns of communities across Australia.

    The adoption of a “small target strategy” was not merely a tactical misstep but a profound symptom of deeper strategic paralysis within the party, where avoiding controversy and minimizing risk were prioritized over articulating a bold, positive, and inspiring vision for the nation. A defensive or “small target” strategy in a dynamic political environment often signals a lack of confidence in one’s own platform, an inability to generate excitement, or a fear of alienating segments of the electorate. By not offering a compelling alternative or a clear narrative, the Liberal Party effectively allowed its opponents to define the electoral debate and fill the policy and vision vacuum, making the party appear reactive, uninspiring, and devoid of a strong sense of purpose. This strategic timidity, compounded by a reliance on “negative campaigning”, not only failed to win over undecided voters but likely alienated existing supporters and moderate voters who sought a more inspiring, positive, and forward-looking political discourse. This contributed to voter apathy, a shift towards more aspirational alternatives (like the ‘teals’), and ultimately, a significant loss of electoral ground.

    Furthermore, the Liberal Party’s “weak digital presence” and being “behind on social media” are not merely technical or superficial oversights but represent a fundamental and growing barrier to effectively engaging with modern electorates, particularly “young voters”, and shaping contemporary political discourse. For increasingly large segments of the population, especially younger demographics, digital platforms are primary sources of news, political information, and social engagement. A weak or absent digital presence means the party is effectively invisible, irrelevant, or unable to effectively communicate its message, counter misinformation, or build direct relationships with these crucial voter segments. This creates a significant communication gap that traditional media cannot fully bridge. This profound digital disconnect contributes directly to the “aging base” and declining party membership, posing a serious long-term existential threat to the party’s ability to renew itself, attract future generations of supporters, and remain electorally competitive. It signifies a failure to adapt to modern communication paradigms, which is essential for any political entity seeking to maintain broad public relevance and appeal.

    The following table summarizes the key challenges and their manifestations post-election:

    Table 1: Key Challenges and Manifestations Post-Election

    Challenge CategorySpecific ManifestationsObserved Impacts
    Internal DivisionsFactionalism and Ideological RiftsPolicy Paralysis, Inability to Present Unified Stance, Blame Game Post-Election
    Leadership Challenges and Succession PlanningNegative Leader Approval, Difficulty Redefining Party Image
    Representation and Diversity IssuesDisconnect with Diverse Demographics, Lack of Female Representation
    Policy RelevanceClimate Change Policy InadequacyLoss of Safe Seats to ‘Teal’ Independents, Perceived Out of Step with Public
    Economic Management vs. Cost of LivingTraditional Strength Insufficient, Failure to Address Everyday Concerns
    Social Issues and Perceived ConservatismDisconnect with Mainstream Values, Limited Appeal to Progressive Voters
    Relevance to Diverse DemographicsAging Voter Base, Failure to Attract Young Voters
    Campaign Effectiveness‘Small Target’ Strategy BackfireLack of Clear Vision, Uninspired Voters, Vacuum Filled by Opponents
    Ineffective Messaging and CommunicationReliance on Negative Campaigning, Alienation of Electorate
    Digital Strategy WeaknessMissed Opportunities for Engagement, Lagging on Social Media
    Voter Engagement and Ground-Level IssuesDisconnected from Local Issues, Perceived ‘Canberra Bubble’

    4. Strategic Pathways for Rebuilding and Regaining Public Trust

    Addressing the profound challenges faced by the Liberal Party necessitates a multi-pronged and integrated strategic approach. Rebuilding and regaining public trust will require significant shifts in policy, organizational structure, and engagement methodologies.

    4.1. Policy Renewal and Modernization

    A fundamental and urgent shift is required for the Liberal Party to develop a “bold policy agenda” that decisively moves beyond the cautious and ineffective “small target” approach. This necessitates a comprehensive and honest re-evaluation of existing policy stances across the board and the proactive development of new policies that genuinely “resonate with contemporary Australian values and challenges”. Critically, this includes addressing climate change with a “nuanced climate policy” that responsibly acknowledges environmental imperatives while simultaneously considering “economic impact” and promoting “technology-driven solutions”. Such an approach would demonstrate responsiveness, pragmatism, and forward-thinking. Furthermore, policies must more directly and tangibly address pressing “cost of living concerns”, offering concrete solutions that resonate with the everyday financial pressures faced by Australian households, rather than relying solely on abstract economic rhetoric.

    Beyond policy substance, the party must articulate a “clear and compelling vision” for Australia’s future. This involves a strategic pivot away from “negative campaigning” towards a proactive and positive narrative that inspires confidence, outlines a clear path forward, and genuinely engages the aspirations of the Australian people. The vision must be consistently communicated across all platforms.

    The imperative to develop a “bold policy agenda” and a “nuanced climate policy” is not merely about winning the next election; it is fundamentally about ensuring the Liberal Party’s long-term ideological and electoral relevancy in a rapidly evolving societal and global context. The previous policy failures, particularly on climate and social issues, indicate that the party’s existing ideological framework or its internal policy generation process is no longer adequately addressing modern challenges or meeting the evolving expectations of the Australian public. Therefore, policy renewal transcends specific issues; it demands a fundamental recalibration of the party’s core approach to governance, societal needs, and its place in contemporary Australia. Without a credible, forward-looking, and adaptable policy platform, especially on issues that resonate deeply with younger generations and urban voters (like climate and social progress), the Liberal Party risks being permanently relegated to a niche appeal. This would make it incapable of attracting the broad middle ground of voters necessary for government formation, thereby threatening its very survival as a major governing party. Policy modernization is thus a strategic imperative for long-term political viability, not just a short-term electoral tactic.

    4.2. Organizational Reform and Unity

    Addressing the pervasive “factional infighting” and the debilitating “ideological split” is paramount for the party’s recovery. This requires strong, unifying leadership that is deeply committed to fostering genuine internal cohesion, encouraging open and constructive dialogue, and establishing effective mechanisms for consensus-building on contentious issues, particularly climate change. Furthermore, any post-mortem review must transcend a counterproductive “blame game” to embrace genuine “introspection” and a collective commitment to learning from past mistakes and charting a unified future.

    Reversing the concerning trend of “declining party membership” and an “aging base” is crucial for the party’s long-term vitality. This necessitates active and targeted recruitment of “new blood” and a concerted focus on engaging “young voters” through modernized outreach programs, digital engagement, and relevant policy platforms. A strong emphasis on “talent development” and achieving “broader representation” within party structures, particularly increasing “female representation” and diversity, is vital to ensure the party truly reflects and appeals to the multifaceted diversity of the Australian nation.

    The persistent “factional infighting” and deep “ideological split” within the Liberal Party are not merely internal nuisances; they project an undeniable image of disarray, indecision, and a lack of shared purpose externally, fundamentally undermining the party’s credibility and its perceived capacity to govern effectively. A political party that is perceived by the public as constantly fighting internally cannot convincingly present itself as a stable, unified, and competent alternative government. This internal disunity makes it exceedingly difficult to formulate clear, consistent, and implementable policies (as evidenced by the climate policy struggles, S_S2) and to execute effective, cohesive election campaigns. Public perception of internal chaos breeds distrust. Voters are inherently less likely to trust or support a party that appears to be at war with itself, as this signals instability and an inability to prioritize the nation’s interests over internal squabbles. Therefore, achieving genuine internal cohesion and presenting a united front is a non-negotiable prerequisite for regaining external credibility, rebuilding public trust, and demonstrating a return to disciplined governance and a shared, national purpose. Without internal unity, any external messaging or policy reform efforts will likely be undermined.

    4.3. Enhanced Public Engagement and Communication

    Regaining “public trust” is paramount and demands an unwavering commitment to “transparency” and “accountability”, particularly in proactively addressing “integrity concerns”. This involves clear, honest communication, a willingness for genuine self-assessment, and a demonstrable commitment to being held responsible for actions and decisions. It means moving beyond spin to authentic engagement.

    The party must make a concerted effort to “listen to the community” and engage in authentic “grassroots engagement”, actively moving beyond the perceived “Canberra bubble”. This entails immersing itself in local issues, genuinely understanding voter concerns directly, and demonstrating tangible responsiveness to community needs. Actively engaging “diverse voices” and community groups is essential to broaden the party’s appeal and ensure that its policies and messages reflect a wider spectrum of Australian perspectives.

    Overcoming the identified “weak digital presence” is critical for future electoral success. This necessitates the development and implementation of a robust, modern digital strategy, including effective and authentic utilization of “social media” to reach “young voters”, disseminate its message, and proactively counter misinformation. Communication must be “authentic” and resonate deeply with the public, moving decisively away from “ineffective messaging” and a reliance on “negative campaigning”.

    The consistent emphasis on “authenticity”, “transparency”, and “accountability” indicates a crucial recognition that the party’s trust deficits stem not solely from policy disagreements but from a deeper perceived lack of sincerity, integrity, and genuine connection with the public. The demand for these qualities suggests that the public perceived a significant deficit in the previous government or campaign’s sincerity and integrity. This could be due to perceived spin, unfulfilled promises, or a failure to directly address integrity concerns. Trust, unlike policy agreement, is built on consistent, honest communication, predictable behavior, and a willingness to admit and rectify mistakes. This implies a fundamental and enduring shift in the party’s communication and operational strategy is required. It means moving beyond purely controlled messaging to embrace genuine dialogue, active listening, and a willingness to be vulnerable and admit failings. Prioritizing these trust-building behaviors over short-term electoral tactics is essential, as long-term political viability and public acceptance are inextricably linked to a strong foundation of public confidence and perceived integrity.

    The urgent call to move beyond the “Canberra bubble” and engage in profound “grassroots engagement” highlights a critical and damaging disconnect between the party’s leadership and the everyday concerns, lived experiences, and priorities of local communities across Australia. A pervasive perception of being confined to a “Canberra bubble” suggests that the party’s policy decisions, legislative priorities, and campaign messaging were not sufficiently informed by, or responsive to, the real-world experiences and immediate priorities of voters outside the political elite. This leads to policies that miss the mark, communication that feels irrelevant or tone-deaf, and a general sense of being out of touch with the concerns of everyday Australians. Rebuilding trust and re-establishing relevance requires a sustained, genuine, and visible effort to listen to, understand, and act upon the concerns of local communities. This means more than just ceremonial visits; it involves embedding local concerns into policy development, empowering local branches, and demonstrating tangible action on issues that directly impact people’s daily lives. This deep, authentic local engagement is crucial for winning back disillusioned voters, rebuilding a strong and active local party base, and ultimately, ensuring the party’s policies and platform resonate nationally.

    The following table outlines the strategic recommendations and their anticipated outcomes:

    Table 2: Strategic Recommendations and Expected Outcomes

    Strategic PillarKey ActionsAnticipated Outcomes
    Policy RenewalRe-evaluate and develop contemporary policiesIncreased voter relevance, Alignment with contemporary values, Broader appeal
    Develop nuanced climate policyRegain trust on environmental issues, Attract climate-conscious voters
    Address cost of living concerns directlyResonate with everyday Australians, Demonstrate tangible solutions
    Communicate a clear and compelling visionInspire confidence, Shift from negative campaigning, Provide clear direction
    Organizational ReformFoster internal cohesion and resolve disputesStronger internal unity, Reduced policy paralysis, Cohesive public image
    Strengthen party structures and membershipRenewed vitality, Attract new blood, Engage young voters
    Increase female representation and diversityBroader appeal, Better reflection of Australian demographics, Enhanced talent pool
    Public EngagementRebuild trust through transparency and accountabilityImproved public confidence, Address integrity concerns, Authentic connection
    Active listening and genuine community engagementMove beyond ‘Canberra bubble’, Understand local issues, Grassroots support
    Leverage diverse media channels and direct voter outreachEffective communication, Reach young voters, Counter misinformation

    5. Recommendations for Future Direction

    The comprehensive analysis of the Australian Liberal Party’s post-election challenges underscores the necessity of a multi-faceted and integrated approach to rebuilding and regaining public trust. The strategic pathways outlined in this report—policy renewal, organizational reform, and enhanced public engagement—are not isolated initiatives but interconnected pillars essential for sustainable recovery and future electoral competitiveness.

    Immediate and long-term recommendations for the party’s future direction include:

    1. Establish Cross-Factional Policy Working Groups: To overcome “policy paralysis” and “factional infighting”, the party should immediately establish dedicated working groups composed of representatives from all ideological factions. These groups must be mandated to collaboratively develop and agree upon contemporary policy positions, particularly on contentious issues like climate change, ensuring that solutions are nuanced, economically sound, and environmentally responsible. This fosters internal cohesion and presents a united front.
    2. Implement Diversity and Inclusion Targets: To address the “lack of female representation” and broader “diversity challenges”, the party must implement concrete targets for increasing female and diverse representation within its parliamentary ranks, party executive, and candidate selection processes. This includes active mentorship programs and recruitment drives aimed at attracting “new blood” and “young voters”.
    3. Invest Significantly in Digital Infrastructure and Training: Recognizing the “weak digital presence” and being “behind on social media”, the party must make a substantial investment in modern digital infrastructure, data analytics capabilities, and comprehensive training for members and candidates. This will enable effective online engagement, targeted messaging, and proactive communication with diverse demographics, particularly younger generations.
    4. Launch a Sustained, Authentic Grassroots Engagement Campaign: To bridge the perceived “Canberra bubble” divide, the party should initiate a continuous, genuine grassroots engagement campaign. This involves senior party figures and local members actively listening to communities, participating in local events, and demonstrating tangible action on “local issues”. This approach emphasizes “authenticity” and a commitment to understanding and addressing the everyday concerns of Australians.
    5. Prioritize Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms: To rebuild “public trust” and address “integrity concerns”, the party must commit to enhanced transparency in its operations, funding, and decision-making processes. This includes a clear stance on integrity measures and a willingness to be held accountable for past actions and future commitments.
    6. Develop a Clear and Positive National Vision: Moving beyond the “small target strategy” and “negative campaigning”, the party must articulate a compelling, positive, and forward-looking national vision. This vision should inspire confidence, address future challenges, and outline a clear path for Australia’s prosperity and social progress, communicated consistently across all platforms.

    These recommendations require a sustained commitment to introspection, adaptation, and a willingness to challenge established norms. Mechanisms for ongoing review and adaptation, such as regular internal performance audits and public sentiment tracking, will be crucial to ensure responsiveness to evolving political and social landscapes.

    6. Outlook for the Liberal Party’s Resurgence

    The 2025 federal election presented the Australian Liberal Party with a profound set of challenges, stemming from deep internal divisions, a perceived policy disconnect with evolving public sentiment, and an ineffective campaign strategy. The analysis presented herein underscores that these issues are not isolated but intricately linked, contributing to an erosion of public trust and a significant decline in electoral support.

    Despite the formidable nature of these challenges, a disciplined and courageous commitment to the outlined strategic pathways offers a viable route back to electoral competitiveness and public confidence. The path to resurgence hinges on the party’s willingness to embrace genuine introspection, moving beyond the “blame game” to foster collective learning and a unified purpose. Overcoming internal divisions and the debilitating “ideological split” is paramount, as internal cohesion is a non-negotiable prerequisite for external credibility and effective governance.

    Furthermore, modernizing its policy platform to align with contemporary Australian values, particularly on critical issues like climate change and social progress, is essential for re-establishing relevance and broadening its appeal beyond an “aging base”. This requires a bold policy agenda that is both forward-looking and responsive to the immediate “cost of living concerns” of everyday Australians. Crucially, re-establishing authentic connections with the electorate through enhanced transparency, genuine grassroots engagement, and a robust digital presence will be vital for rebuilding trust and demonstrating a renewed commitment to serving the broader Australian community.

    The journey to resurgence will be arduous, demanding sustained effort, adaptability, and a fundamental shift in approach. However, by embracing these strategic imperatives, the Liberal Party has the opportunity to redefine its identity, renew its purpose, and ultimately regain its position as a compelling and trusted voice in Australian politics. The future viability of the party rests on its capacity for profound change and its unwavering commitment to the nation’s evolving aspirations.

  • Egypt unveils newly discovered chamber inside Great Pyramid

    مصر کے نوادرات کے حکام نے جمعرات کو قاہرہ کے بالکل باہر، گیزا کے عظیم اہرام میں سے ایک کے اندر ایک نئے دریافت شدہ، سیل بند چیمبر کی نقاب کشائی کی، جو تقریباً 4500 سال پرانا ہے۔

    وہ کوریڈور، اہرام خوفو کے شمالی جانب، جدید سکیننگ ٹیکنالوجی کا استعمال کرتے ہوئے دریافت کیا گیا تھا۔

    یہ تقریباً 30 فٹ لمبا اور چھ فٹ سے زیادہ چوڑا ہے، جو اہرام کے مرکزی دروازے کے اوپر کھڑا ہے۔

    آثار قدیمہ کے ماہرین نہیں جانتے کہ اس چیمبر کا کیا کام تھا، جو باہر سے قابل رسائی نہیں ہے۔

    بند کریں

    2BJA3GC Giza کے عظیم اہرام پر گھوڑے اور اونٹ (Pyramid of Khufu or Pyramid of Cheops)، قاہرہ، مصر میں گیزا مرتفع

    2017 میں، سائنسدانوں نے ایک اور سیل بند راہداری کی دریافت کا اعلان کیا، ایک 98 فٹ چیمبر بھی، اہرام خوفو کے اندر۔

    مصری ماہر آثار قدیمہ زاہی حواس اور ملک کے وزیر برائے سیاحت احمد عیسی نے اہرام کے باہر ایک نقاب کشائی کی تقریب میں اس دریافت کا اعلان کیا۔

    اسکین پیرامڈس پروجیکٹ، ایک بین الاقوامی پروگرام جو قدیم ڈھانچے کے غیر دریافت شدہ حصوں کو دیکھنے کے لیے اسکینوں کا استعمال کرتا ہے، کو اس تلاش کا سہرا دیا گیا۔

    2015 میں شروع ہونے والے پروجیکٹ کے سائنسدانوں نے اس کی نقاب کشائی میں شرکت کی۔

    ٹیکنیکل یونیورسٹی آف میونخ میں غیر تباہ کن ٹیسٹنگ کے پروفیسر اور پراجیکٹ کے ایک سرکردہ رکن کرسچن گروس کے مطابق، چیمبر کو تلاش کرنے کے لیے مختلف سکیننگ تکنیکیں تعینات کی گئی تھیں، جن میں الٹراساؤنڈ پیمائش اور گراؤنڈ پینیٹریٹنگ ریڈارز شامل ہیں۔

    آخر حجرے میں دو بڑے چونے کے پتھر ہیں اور اب سوال یہ ہے کہ ان پتھروں کے پیچھے اور حجرے کے نیچے کیا ہے؟کرسچن گروس، ٹیکنیکل یونیورسٹی آف میونخ

    وہ امید کرتا ہے کہ یہ تکنیک اہرام کے اندر مزید نتائج کا باعث بنے گی۔

    مسٹر گروس نے کہا، \’\’آخری چیمبر میں دو بڑے چونے کے پتھر ہیں، اور اب سوال یہ ہے کہ ان پتھروں کے پیچھے اور چیمبر کے نیچے کیا ہے،\’\’ مسٹر گروس نے کہا۔

    خوفو کا اہرام، اس کے بنانے والے، چوتھے خاندان کے فرعون کے نام پر رکھا گیا ہے جس نے 2509 سے 2483 قبل مسیح تک حکومت کی، تین اہراموں میں سے ایک ہے جو گیزا کمپلیکس میں عظیم اہرام بناتا ہے۔

    یہ قدیم دنیا کے سات عجائبات میں سے واحد ہے جو آج تک زندہ ہے۔

    ماہرین اس بات پر منقسم ہیں کہ اہرام کیسے بنائے گئے، اس لیے نسبتاً معمولی دریافتیں بھی بہت دلچسپی پیدا کرتی ہیں۔

    زیادہ تر سیاحوں کو راغب کرنے کے لیے حکام اکثر عوامی طور پر دریافتوں پر زور دیتے ہیں، جو کہ نقدی کی کمی کے شکار ملک کے لیے غیر ملکی کرنسی کا ایک بڑا ذریعہ ہے۔

    2011 کی بغاوت کے بعد جس نے ملک کے دیرینہ مطلق العنان صدر حسنی مبارک کو معزول کر دیا تھا، اور کورونا وائرس وبائی امراض کے پھیلنے کے بعد مزید دھچکے لگنے کے بعد مصر کے سیاحت کے شعبے کو طویل تنزلی کا سامنا کرنا پڑا۔



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  • Landmark office building reopens after multimillion-pound refurbishment

    بیلفاسٹ سٹی سینٹر آفس کی ایک تاریخی عمارت ملٹی ملین پاؤنڈ کی تجدید کاری کے بعد دوبارہ کھل گئی ہے۔

    لینیون پلیس میں واقع ریور سائیڈ ٹاور کی عمارت میں بی ٹی گروپ کے 2,000 سے زیادہ ملازمین رہتے ہیں۔

    نئی عمارت جدید ترین ٹیکنالوجی پر فخر کرتی ہے اور بیلفاسٹ کو کمیونیکیشن کمپنی کے لیے ایک اہم طویل مدتی مقام کے طور پر نشان زد کرتی ہے۔

    بند کریں

    پریس ریلیز کی تصویر پریس آئی – بیلفاسٹ – شمالی آئرلینڈ – 21 فروری 2023BT گروپ نے آج بیلفاسٹ اور شمالی آئرلینڈ کے لیے اپنی وابستگی کا اعادہ کیا، کیونکہ اس نے باضابطہ طور پر شہر کے وسط میں واقع لینیون پلیس میں واقع اپنی ریور سائیڈ ٹاور کی عمارت کو دوبارہ کھول دیا، جس کے بعد ملٹی ملین پاؤنڈ کی تزئین و آرائش۔ کمپنی کے مستقبل کے منصوبوں میں ایک اہم مقام کے طور پر، اہم تجدید کاری نے ایک شاندار، جدید کام کی جگہ بنائی ہے، جو اب BT گروپ کے تقریباً 2,000 ساتھیوں کا گھر ہو گا، جس میں EE، BT بزنس اور Openreach شامل ہیں۔ ریور سائیڈ کا عمومی منظر۔ Tower.Photo by Kelvin Boyes / پریس آئی

    شمالی آئرلینڈ کے سکریٹری آف اسٹیٹ کرس ہیٹن ہیرس نے کہا: \”یہ بہت اچھی خبر ہے، بی ٹی گروپ کی بیلفاسٹ بیس میں اہم سرمایہ کاری سے ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ شمالی آئرلینڈ کاروبار کے لیے کیا پرکشش مقام ہے۔

    \”BT کا شاندار نیا دفتر مقامی معیشت کو فروغ دے گا، نوکریاں پیدا کرے گا اور شہر کے مرکز میں لوگوں کی تعداد میں اضافہ ہوگا۔\”

    BT گروپ کے پراپرٹی اور سہولیات کی خدمات کے ڈائریکٹر برینٹ میتھیوز نے کہا: \”شہر میں ایک بڑے آجر کے طور پر، ہماری موجودگی مقامی اقتصادی ترقی اور روزگار کے مواقع کو سہارا دے گی۔

    بند کریں

    پریس ریلیز کی تصویر پریس آئی – بیلفاسٹ – شمالی آئرلینڈ – 21 فروری 2023BT گروپ نے آج بیلفاسٹ اور شمالی آئرلینڈ کے لیے اپنی وابستگی کا اعادہ کیا، کیونکہ اس نے باضابطہ طور پر شہر کے وسط میں واقع لینیون پلیس میں واقع اپنی ریور سائیڈ ٹاور کی عمارت کو دوبارہ کھول دیا، جس کے بعد ملٹی ملین پاؤنڈ کی تزئین و آرائش۔ کمپنی کے مستقبل کے منصوبوں میں ایک اہم مقام کے طور پر، اہم تجدید کاری نے ایک شاندار، جدید کام کی جگہ بنائی ہے، جو اب BT گروپ کے تقریباً 2,000 ساتھیوں کا گھر ہو گا، جس میں EE، BT بزنس اور Openreach شامل ہیں۔ ریور سائیڈ کا عمومی منظر۔ Tower.Photo by Kelvin Boyes / پریس آئی

    \”ہم نے حال ہی میں 100 لوگوں کو ڈیجیٹل کرداروں میں بھرتی کرنے کے منصوبوں کا اعلان کیا ہے، جیسے کہ مصنوعی ذہانت (AI) کے ساتھ ساتھ گریجویٹس اور اپرنٹس کے کردار۔\”

    ریور سائیڈ ٹاور کی بحالی کمپنی کے کام کی جگہ کے بہتر پروگرام کے حصے کے طور پر سامنے آئی ہے۔

    پروگرام کے ڈائریکٹر سیو گلو نے کہا: \”یہ ایک بہترین مقام اور ایک مشہور عمارت ہے، ریور سائیڈ ٹاور۔\”

    بند کریں

    بی ٹی پروگرام کے ڈائریکٹر سو گلو نئے تجدید شدہ ریور سائیڈ ٹاور میں بی ٹی ملازمین کے ساتھ

    ریموٹ ورکنگ میں اضافہ کے دور میں، محترمہ Glew نے دفتر کی جگہ میں اتنی بڑی سرمایہ کاری کی اہمیت پر زور دیا۔

    \”یہاں ہم نے محسوس کیا کہ سائز کامل تھا۔ ہم سرمایہ کاری سے باز نہیں آئے ہیں۔ ہم سوچتے ہیں کہ اب اس خوبصورت جسمانی ماحول کے ساتھ اس بات پر توجہ مرکوز کرتے ہوئے کہ ساتھی کیا چاہتے ہیں اور کیا ضرورت ہے، ہمیں ساتھیوں کو آمادہ کرنے کا زیادہ موقع ملا ہے۔

    ریور سائیڈ ٹاور میں سرمایہ کاری کے فوائد BT سے آگے بڑھنے کی پیش گوئی کی گئی ہے، NI کے علاقائی سیلز ڈائریکٹر پال مرناگھن نے کہا: \”میں اکثر کہتا ہوں کہ شمالی آئرلینڈ BT کے لیے بہت اہم ہے لیکن آج BT شمالی آئرلینڈ کے لیے بہت اہم ہے۔

    \”یہ صرف ہمارے ساتھیوں کے بارے میں نہیں ہے، یہ تمام بیرونی اسٹیک ہولڈرز، کسٹمرز، پبلک اور پرائیویٹ اس سہولت کو استعمال کرنے کے بارے میں بھی ہے جو اب ہمارے لیے، بلکہ ان کے لیے بھی ہے۔\”

    کنسلٹنسی فرم ہیچ کی ایک آزاد رپورٹ کے مطابق، BT گروپ شمالی آئرلینڈ میں پیدا ہونے والے ہر £110 میں سے براہ راست £1 پیدا کرنے کا ذمہ دار ہے۔



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  • Protest in Pakistan as Afghan refugees wait 18 months for US Visas

    امریکی ویزوں کی منظوری میں انتہائی تاخیر کا سامنا کرنے والے سینکڑوں افغان مہاجرین نے اتوار کو پاکستان کے دارالحکومت میں احتجاج کیا۔

    امریکی حکومت کی ترجیح 1 اور ترجیح 2، جسے P1 اور P2 کے نام سے جانا جاتا ہے، پناہ گزینوں کے پروگراموں کا مقصد ان کے وطن میں طالبان کے قبضے کے بعد صحافیوں اور حقوق کے کارکنوں سمیت خطرے میں پڑنے والے افغانوں کے لیے ویزوں کو تیز کرنا تھا۔

    اہل افراد نے امریکی حکومت، امریکہ میں قائم میڈیا تنظیم یا افغانستان میں غیر سرکاری تنظیم کے لیے کام کیا ہو گا۔

    درخواست دہندگان پاکستان میں 18 ماہ سے زائد عرصے سے امریکی حکام کے ویزے کی درخواستوں پر کارروائی کا انتظار کر رہے ہیں۔

    ویزوں کی منظوری اور دوبارہ آبادکاری میں تاخیر نے افغان درخواست دہندگان کو انتہائی کمزور حالت میں چھوڑ دیا ہے کیونکہ وہ معاشی مشکلات اور پاکستان میں صحت، تعلیم اور دیگر خدمات تک رسائی کی کمی کا شکار ہیں۔

    محمد باقر احمدی، جنہوں نے کہا کہ انہوں نے اسلام آباد میں پاکستان کے نیشنل پریس کلب کے باہر احتجاج کو منظم کرنے میں مدد کی تھی، کہا کہ وہاں موجود بہت سے افغانوں کو پاکستان میں درخواست کے عمل کا انتظار کرنے کے لیے ویزوں کی توسیع میں مشکلات کا سامنا ہے۔

    بند کریں

    افغان مہاجرین اسلام آباد، پاکستان، اتوار، 26 فروری، 2023 میں ایک احتجاج کے دوران پلے کارڈز اٹھائے ہوئے ہیں۔ امریکی ویزوں کی منظوری میں انتہائی تاخیر کا سامنا کرنے والے سینکڑوں افغان مہاجرین پاکستان کے دارالحکومت میں احتجاج کر رہے ہیں، جو کہ خطرے سے دوچار افغانوں کی نقل مکانی میں مدد کے لیے ایک امریکی پروگرام کے طور پر ہے۔ طالبان کی حکومت سے فرار۔ امریکی حکومت کی ترجیح 1 اور ترجیح 2، جسے P1 اور P2 پناہ گزینوں کے پروگرام کے نام سے جانا جاتا ہے، کا مقصد خطرے سے دوچار افغانوں کے لیے ویزوں کو تیز کرنا تھا جن میں وہ لوگ بھی شامل ہیں جو امریکی تنظیموں کے ساتھ کام کرتے ہیں۔ (اے پی فوٹو/رحمت گل)

    مظاہرین کا کہنا تھا کہ درخواست دہندگان کو ابھی تک ویزا کی درخواست کا عمل شروع کرنے کے لیے ضروری ابتدائی انٹرویو موصول ہونا باقی ہے۔

    حسام الدین، ایک افغان جو اپنے P2 کیس کی کارروائی کا انتظار کر رہے ہیں، نے کہا کہ حکام کو چاہیے کہ وہ افغان P1 اور P2 درخواست دہندگان کو ایسے ملک میں لے جائیں جہاں ضروری آبادکاری سپورٹ سینٹرز (RSC) کھلے ہوں اور انٹرویو لینے کے قابل ہوں۔

    \”انہیں ہمیں کسی دوسرے ملک میں لے جانا چاہیے جہاں RSCs کام کر رہے ہیں اور وہاں کارروائی کر سکتے ہیں،\” انہوں نے کہا۔

    امریکی قوانین کے تحت، درخواست دہندگان کو اپنے کیسز پر کارروائی کے لیے پہلے کسی تیسرے ملک میں منتقل ہونا ضروری ہے، جہاں ابتدائی طور پر 14 سے 18 ماہ تک کا وقت لگ سکتا ہے اور کیسز پر دوبارہ آبادکاری کے امدادی مراکز کے ذریعے کارروائی کی جاتی ہے۔

    طالبان نے اگست 2021 میں امریکی اور نیٹو افواج کے انخلاء کے بعد افغانستان میں اقتدار سنبھالا۔

    بہت سے افغانوں نے طالبان کے قبضے کے فوراً بعد وہاں سے نکلنے کی کوشش کی۔

    طالبان نے رفتہ رفتہ مزید پابندیاں عائد کی ہیں، خاص طور پر خواتین پر۔



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  • Dozens of migrants die after boat breaks apart off southern Italy

    اطالوی کوسٹ گارڈ نے اتوار کے روز اٹلی کی سرزمین کے جنوبی ساحل کے قریب تارکین وطن کی ایک کشتی کے ٹوٹنے کے بعد 43 لاشیں نکال لی ہیں۔

    امدادی کارکنوں نے بتایا کہ اب تک 80 کے قریب زندہ بچ گئے ہیں۔

    اطالوی جزیرہ نما کے پیر کلابریا کے ساحلی قصبے کروٹون کے قریب نامعلوم بندرگاہی حکام کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے، RAI نے کہا کہ کشتی 120 تارکین وطن کو لے کر جا رہی تھی جب وہ صبح سویرے Ionian سمندر میں مصیبت کا شکار ہو گئی۔

    بچاؤ کی کوششوں میں شامل فائر فائٹرز کے ترجمان لوکا کیری نے کہا کہ صبح کے وسط تک، تقریباً 40 زندہ بچ جانے والوں کو تلاش کر لیا گیا تھا۔

    سرکاری ٹی وی نے کہا کہ بچ جانے والوں میں سے 27 نے بظاہر اپنے طور پر ساحل پر پہنچا۔

    اطالوی وزیر اعظم جارجیا میلونی نے کہا کہ تارکین وطن \”موسم کی خراب صورتحال\” میں 20 میٹر (66 فٹ) کشتی میں سوار تھے۔

    اپنے دفتر کی طرف سے جاری کردہ ایک بیان میں، انہوں نے \”انسانی سمگلروں کے ہاتھوں بہت سی انسانی جانوں کو چھیننے پر اپنے گہرے دکھ کا اظہار کیا\”۔

    محترمہ میلونی نے کہا کہ \”یہ غیر انسانی ہے کہ مردوں، عورتوں اور بچوں کو ایک ٹکٹ کی \’قیمت\’ کے بدلے جو ان کی طرف سے ایک محفوظ سفر کے جھوٹے امکانات میں ادا کی جائے،\”

    اس نے اس عزم کا اظہار کیا کہ وہ اپنی قیادت کو انسانی اسمگلروں کی طرف سے ترتیب دی جانے والی روانگیوں پر کریک ڈاؤن کے لیے دباؤ ڈالنے اور اس کی تلاش میں اٹلی کی مدد کرنے کے لیے یورپی یونین کے ساتھی رہنماؤں پر دباؤ ڈالنے کا عزم کیا۔

    کشتی کا ایک ٹکڑا، کٹی ہوئی لکڑی کے ڈھیروں کے ساتھ، Ionian سمندر کے ساتھ ساتھ Calabria کی ساحلی پٹی کا ایک حصہ، Steccato di Cutro کے ساحل پر بکھر گیا۔

    زندہ بچ جانے والوں میں سے کچھ نے گرم رکھنے کی کوشش کی، جو رنگ برنگے کمبل یا چادروں میں لپٹے ہوئے تھے۔

    تلاش کی کوششوں میں ایک ہیلی کاپٹر اور موٹر بوٹس کو تعینات کیا گیا تھا، جس میں ریاستی فائر فائٹرز، سرحدی پولیس اور کوسٹ گارڈ کے جہاز شامل تھے۔

    اس نے ایک بیان میں کہا کہ کوسٹ گارڈ کی ایک موٹر بوٹ نے ہائپوتھرمیا میں مبتلا دو افراد کو بچایا اور کھردرے سمندر میں ایک لڑکے کی لاش برآمد کی۔

    ریسکیو غوطہ خوروں سمیت فائر فائٹرز کی کشتیوں نے 28 لاشیں نکالیں جن میں سے تین لاشیں ملبے سے بہت دور تیز کرنٹ سے کھینچی گئیں۔

    اطالوی خبر رساں ایجنسی اے جی آئی نے بتایا کہ برآمد ہونے والی لاشوں میں ایک بچہ بھی شامل ہے۔

    پوپ فرانسس نے سینٹ پیٹرز اسکوائر میں وفاداروں سے کہا: \”میں ان میں سے ہر ایک کے لیے، لاپتہ ہونے والے اور بچ جانے والے دیگر مہاجرین کے لیے دعا کرتا ہوں۔\”

    بند کریں

    اتوار، 26 فروری، 2023 کو جنوبی اٹلی کے کٹرو کے قریب ایک ساحل پر، ناہموار سمندر میں تارکین وطن کی کشتی ٹوٹنے کے بعد امدادی کارکن جائے وقوعہ پر پہنچے۔ ریسکیو حکام کا کہنا ہے کہ تارکین وطن کی ایک غیر متعینہ تعداد ہلاک ہو چکی ہے اور درجنوں کو ان کی کشتی کے بعد بچا لیا گیا ہے۔ جنوبی اٹلی سے الگ ہو گیا۔ (اے پی فوٹو/جیوسپی پیپیٹا)

    انہوں نے مزید کہا کہ وہ مہاجرین کو بچانے والوں کے لیے \”اور ان لوگوں کے لیے بھی دعا کر رہے ہیں جو ان کا استقبال کرتے ہیں\”۔

    یہ واضح نہیں تھا کہ کشتی کہاں سے روانہ ہوئی تھی، لیکن کلابریا پہنچنے والے تارکین وطن کے جہاز عام طور پر ترکی یا مصری ساحلوں سے روانہ ہوتے ہیں۔

    اسمگلروں کے زیر استعمال ایک اور سمندری راستہ، جسے ہجرت کے لیے سب سے مہلک سمجھا جاتا ہے، لیبیا کے ساحل سے وسطی بحیرہ روم کو عبور کرتا ہے، جہاں تارکین وطن اکثر مہینوں تک وحشیانہ حراستی حالات کو برداشت کرتے ہیں، اس سے پہلے کہ وہ ربڑ کی ڈنگیوں یا لکڑی کی ماہی گیری کی کشتیوں پر سوار ہو کر، اطالوی ساحلوں کی طرف جائیں۔

    لیبیا سے نکلنے والے زیادہ تر تارکین وطن سب صحارا افریقہ یا بنگلہ دیش اور پاکستان میں غربت سے بھاگ رہے ہیں۔



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  • Share sale reduces taxpayer stake in NatWest once again

    [

    The taxpayer’s stake in NatWest has been reduced again after the Government offloaded another tranche of shares in the banking giant.

    he Treasury’s stake in NatWest has been cut to 42.95% from 43.97% after the move which is part of its ongoing programme to sell down its stake.

    It has sought to place more of the bank in private hands after the lender was bailed out at the height of the 2008 financial crisis with £45 billion of taxpayer cash.

    Close

    NatWest chief executive Dame Alison Rose landed a £5.25 million pay package for 2022 (Matt Alexander/PA)

    In March last year, NatWest confirmed it was majority owned by private investors in a milestone for the recovery of the business.

    Shares in the bank have risen by 22% over the past six months, while it also revealed last week that profits surged by more than a third to reach £5.1 billion last year.

    It handed its boss an annual bonus for the first time since the bank’s bailout by the Government in 2008.

    Chief executive Dame Alison Rose took home a total of £5.25 million over the year including salary and bonuses.

    It also ramped up the bonus pool for its bankers by nearly £70 million in 2022, to total £367.5 million.

    NatWest likewise offered cheer for investors as its unveiled plans for a £800 million share buyback and a big hike in dividends, with a 10p final payout, up from 7.5p a year ago.

    But shares fell sharply on the day in disappointment over its 2023 outlook.



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  • Joe Biden to rally allies in Poland following surprise Ukraine visit

    جو بائیڈن منگل کو پولینڈ میں نیٹو کے مشرقی حصے کے اتحادیوں سے مشاورت کریں گے کیونکہ یوکرین پر روسی حملہ مزید پیچیدہ مرحلے کی طرف بڑھ رہا ہے۔

    کیف کا غیر اعلانیہ دورہ کرنے کے بعد، امریکی صدر نے پیر کے روز وارسا کا رخ کیا تاکہ مغربی اتحاد کو مضبوط کیا جائے کیونکہ یوکرین اور روس دونوں موسم بہار کی کارروائیوں کی تیاری کر رہے ہیں۔

    تنازعہ – دوسری جنگ عظیم کے بعد سے یورپ میں سب سے اہم جنگ – پہلے ہی دسیوں ہزار ہلاک ہو چکی ہے، یوکرین کے بنیادی ڈھانچے کے نظام کو تباہ کر چکا ہے اور عالمی معیشت کو نقصان پہنچا ہے۔

    مسٹر بائیڈن نے پولینڈ روانگی سے قبل کیف میں یوکرین کے صدر وولودومیر زیلنسکی کے ساتھ کھڑے ہوتے ہوئے کہا، ’’میں نے سوچا کہ یہ اہم ہے کہ جنگ میں یوکرین کے لیے امریکی حمایت کے بارے میں کوئی شک نہیں، کچھ بھی نہیں۔‘‘

    \”یوکرائنی عوام نے اس انداز میں قدم بڑھایا ہے جو ماضی میں بہت کم لوگوں نے دیکھا ہے۔\”

    مسٹر بائیڈن پولینڈ کے صدر آندریج ڈوڈا سے ملاقات کرنے والے ہیں اور منگل کو وارسا کے شاہی قلعے کے باغات سے خطاب کریں گے، جہاں وہ وسطی یوروپی ملک اور دیگر اتحادیوں کے یوکرین کے ساتھ پچھلے ایک سال کے دوران وابستگی کو اجاگر کریں گے۔

    بدھ کو، وہ مسٹر ڈوڈا اور نیٹو کے مشرقی ارکان کے گروپ بخارسٹ نائن کے دیگر رہنماؤں سے مشاورت کریں گے۔

    بند کریں

    وائٹ ہاؤس کو امید ہے کہ صدر کے دورہ کیف اور وارسا سے اندرون اور بیرون ملک حمایت کو بڑھانے میں مدد ملے گی (یوکرین کے صدر کا دفتر/اے پی)

    وائٹ ہاؤس کے قومی سلامتی کے مشیر جیک سلیوان نے کہا کہ مسٹر بائیڈن وارسا میں اپنے خطاب میں اس بات پر زور دیں گے کہ روسی صدر ولادیمیر پوٹن نے غلط انداز میں قیاس کیا تھا کہ \”یوکرین ڈرے گا اور مغرب تقسیم ہو جائے گا\”۔

    \”اسے پورے بورڈ میں اس کے برعکس ملا،\” مسٹر سلیوان نے کہا۔

    جب کہ مسٹر بائیڈن یوکرین اور اتحادیوں کے لیے اپنے طوفانی سفر کو یوکرین کے لیے اثبات کے لمحے کے طور پر استعمال کرنے کی کوشش کر رہے ہیں، وائٹ ہاؤس نے اس بات پر بھی زور دیا ہے کہ قریب قریب میں جنگ کا کوئی واضح خاتمہ نہیں ہے اور زمینی صورتحال تیزی سے بگڑتی جا رہی ہے۔ پیچیدہ

    اتوار کے روز انتظامیہ نے انکشاف کیا کہ اس کے پاس نئی انٹیلی جنس معلومات ہیں جس سے پتہ چلتا ہے کہ چین، جو کہ تنازع کے دوران ہی رہا ہے، اب ماسکو کو مہلک امداد بھیجنے پر غور کر رہا ہے۔

    سکریٹری آف اسٹیٹ انٹونی بلنکن نے کہا کہ اگر بیجنگ اس پر عمل کرتا ہے تو یہ ایک \”سنگین مسئلہ\” بن سکتا ہے۔

    مسٹر سلیوان نے کہا کہ مسٹر بائیڈن اور مسٹر زیلنسکی نے ان صلاحیتوں پر تبادلہ خیال کیا جن کی یوکرین کو آنے والے مہینوں میں \”میدان جنگ میں کامیاب ہونے کے لئے\” کی ضرورت ہے۔

    مسٹر زیلنسکی امریکہ اور یورپی اتحادیوں پر لڑاکا طیارے اور طویل فاصلے تک مار کرنے والے میزائل سسٹم جو ATACMS کے نام سے جانا جاتا ہے فراہم کرنے کے لیے دباؤ ڈال رہے ہیں – جسے مسٹر بائیڈن نے ابھی تک فراہم کرنے سے انکار کیا ہے۔

    جنگ کا کوئی خاتمہ نظر نہ آنے کے ساتھ، برسی مسٹر بائیڈن کے لیے ایک اہم لمحہ ہے کہ وہ یورپی اتحاد کو تقویت دینے کی کوشش کریں اور اس بات کا اعادہ کریں کہ مسٹر پوٹن کا حملہ دوسری جنگ عظیم کے بعد کے بین الاقوامی نظام پر ایک محاذی حملہ تھا۔

    وائٹ ہاؤس کو امید ہے کہ صدر کے دورہ کیف اور وارسا سے امریکی اور عالمی عزم کو تقویت ملے گی۔



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  • Average price tag on a home rose by just £14 in February – Rightmove

    پراپرٹی کی ویب سائٹ کے مطابق، فروری میں گھر کی اوسط قیمت میں ماہانہ £14 کا اضافہ ہوا۔

    ightmove نے کہا کہ یہ 2001 کے ریکارڈ میں جنوری اور فروری کے درمیان ریکارڈ کیا گیا سب سے چھوٹا اضافہ ہے۔

    اس نے کہا کہ پورے برطانیہ میں، فروری میں گھر کی مانگنے کی اوسط قیمت £362,452 ہے۔

    رائٹ موو کے پراپرٹی سائنس کے ڈائریکٹر ٹِم بینسٹر نے کہا: \”اس ماہ بڑا سوال یہ تھا کہ کیا ہم نئے فروخت کنندگان کو اپنی پوچھنے والی قیمتوں میں اضافہ کرتے ہوئے دیکھیں گے، جیسا کہ موسم بہار کی فروخت کے سیزن کے قریب آتے ہی سالانہ معمول رہا ہے۔

    \”اس ماہ کی فلیٹ اوسط پوچھنے والی قیمت اس بات کی نشاندہی کرتی ہے کہ بہت سے فروخت کنندگان روایت کو توڑ رہے ہیں اور غیر موسمی ابتدائی قیمتوں پر پابندی کا مظاہرہ کر رہے ہیں۔

    بند کریں

    رائٹ موو کا نقشہ پورے برطانیہ میں قیمتیں پوچھنے میں تبدیلیاں دکھاتا ہے (رائٹ موو/PA)

    \”قیمت پر زیادہ حقیقت پسندی کا مطالبہ کرنے والے بازار کے حالات کے علاوہ، ہم ایک سست رفتار مارکیٹ میں منتقل ہو رہے ہیں، جہاں خریداروں کو رہن کی خدمت کی زیادہ لاگت کی وجہ سے صحیح قیمت پر صحیح پراپرٹی تلاش کرنے میں زیادہ وقت لگے گا۔

    \”دوسرے اشارے ہیں کہ یہ 2022 کے آخر میں ہنگامہ خیزی کے باوجود سخت منتقلی کے بجائے نرم ہوگا۔

    \”گھر کے مالکان جو موسم بہار کے آنے والے موسم میں مارکیٹ میں آ رہے ہیں، اپنے ایجنٹ کی مہارت کو استعمال کریں اور پہلی بار صحیح قیمت حاصل کریں، جو واقعی صحیح خریدار کو زیادہ تیزی سے تلاش کرنے میں مدد کر سکتا ہے۔\”

    رائٹ موو نے کہا کہ پہلی بار خریداروں کے شعبے میں فروخت نسبتاً مضبوطی سے برقرار ہے، یہ تجویز کرتی ہے کہ جو لوگ نقل مکانی کرنے کے قابل ہیں وہ خریداری پر راضی ہونے کی ترغیب دیتے ہیں، ممکنہ طور پر کرائے کی قیمتوں میں اضافے کی وجہ سے۔

    منی بجٹ کے بعد رہن کے نرخوں میں اضافہ ہوا، لیکن حالیہ ہفتوں میں مارکیٹ کے سیٹل ہونے کے ساتھ ہی فکسڈ ریٹ سودوں پر کچھ شرحیں کم ہونے کے آثار نظر آئے ہیں۔

    بینک آف انگلینڈ کی بنیادی شرح میں اضافہ بھی عام طور پر قرض لینے کے اخراجات کو بڑھا رہا ہے۔

    مارکیٹ کے لیے یہ ایک مثبت علامت ہے کہ پہلی بار خریداروں کے شعبے میں بہت سے لوگوں کو اپنی چالوں پر چلتے ہوئے دیکھا جائے گا، حالانکہ اوسط رہن کی شرحیں کم ہونے کے باوجود، کچھ پہلی بار خریداروں کو اب بھی ان کے اصل منصوبوں سے ہٹ کر قیمت ادا کرنی پڑے گی اور ان کی ضرورت پڑ سکتی ہے۔ ایک سستی جائیداد تلاش کریں، ایک بڑا ڈپازٹ بچائیں، یا ان کے بجٹ میں ماہانہ رہن کی زیادہ ادائیگیوں کو شامل کریں۔ٹم بینسٹر، رائٹ موو

    مسٹر بینسٹر نے مزید کہا: \”ایجنٹ یہ اطلاع دے رہے ہیں کہ وہ اب تیزی سے ایسے خریداروں کو دیکھ رہے ہیں جن کے پاس زیادہ اعتماد اور زیادہ انتخاب ہے حالانکہ نظرثانی شدہ بجٹ کے ساتھ رہن کی اعلی شرحوں کو ایڈجسٹ کیا جاتا ہے۔

    \”مارگیٹ کے لیے یہ ایک مثبت علامت ہے کہ پہلی بار خریداروں کے شعبے میں بہت سے لوگوں کو ان کی چالوں کے ساتھ آگے بڑھتے ہوئے دیکھا جائے گا، حالانکہ رہن کی اوسط شرحوں میں کمی کے باوجود، کچھ پہلی بار خریداروں کو اب بھی ان کے اصل منصوبوں سے ہٹ کر قیمت دی جائے گی۔ ایک سستی جائیداد تلاش کرنے کے لیے، ایک بڑا ڈپازٹ محفوظ کرنا، یا اپنے بجٹ میں ماہانہ رہن کی زیادہ ادائیگیوں کو شامل کرنا۔\”

    رائٹ موو کی رپورٹ میں کینٹ میں اسٹیٹ ایجنٹ رابنسن مائیکل اینڈ جیکسن کے منیجنگ پارٹنر سائمن ووڈکاک کا حوالہ دیا گیا، جنہوں نے کہا: \”ہم نے جنوری میں فروخت کنندگان کی سرگرمیوں میں اضافہ دیکھا، پہلی بار خریداروں کی جائیدادیں اور آپ کا عام تین بیڈ روم والا خاندانی گھر سب سے زیادہ مقبول ہے۔ پراپرٹی کی اقسام مارکیٹ میں آرہی ہیں۔

    \”کچھ لوگوں کے لیے، 2022 میں چیلنج مانگ سے بڑھ کر سپلائی کے ساتھ خریدنے کے لیے پراپرٹیز کا فقدان تھا، اور اب جب کہ مارکیٹ طلب اور رسد کے بہتر توازن کی طرف چلی گئی ہے، ہم دیکھ رہے ہیں کہ 2022 کے کچھ ممکنہ بیچنے والے 2023 کے اوائل میں ڈوب جائیں گے۔

    \”پہلی بار خریدار جنوری میں غالب تھے، قیمتوں میں استحکام کے ساتھ ساتھ مقررہ شرح کے رہن کو کم کرنے سے جائیداد کی سیڑھی پر چڑھنا زیادہ سستی ہو گیا تھا۔

    \”بیچنے والے زیادہ تر مارکیٹ کے مطابق ہوتے جا رہے ہیں جو کہ قیمتوں کو بیچنے کے لیے اور اگلی خریداری پر اپنی بچت کرنے کے لیے زیادہ حوصلہ افزائی کرتے ہیں۔\”

    اسٹیٹ ایجنٹ نائٹ فرینک میں برطانیہ کے رہائشی تحقیق کے سربراہ ٹام بل نے کہا: \”کرسمس کے چھ ہفتے برطانیہ کی پراپرٹی مارکیٹ کے لیے گزشتہ سال کے آخری تین مہینوں سے کافی مختلف ہیں۔

    \”منی بجٹ کی وجہ سے اتار چڑھاؤ کی وجہ سے خریداروں اور فروخت کنندگان نے چھٹیوں کے لیے جلد ہی سوئچ آف کر دیا لیکن 2023 میں حیرت انگیز طور پر مضبوطی سے واپس آئے۔

    \”اہم فرق مارگیج مارکیٹ میں استحکام ہے، جس کا مطلب ہے کہ منصوبے دوبارہ فعال ہو گئے ہیں۔ فروخت کنندگان کی قیمت کی توقعات کے ساتھ، مارکیٹ کی حقیقی طاقت کو موسم بہار میں جانچا جائے گا۔ جیسا کہ بجٹ دباؤ میں آتا ہے، ہم توقع کرتے ہیں کہ اس سال قیمتوں میں تقریباً 5 فیصد کمی واقع ہو گی۔



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  • Purplebricks eyes sale after slashing costs and warning of losses

    آن لائن اسٹیٹ ایجنٹ پرپل برکس اس بات کا انکشاف کرنے کے بعد خود فروخت کے لیے تیار ہو سکتا ہے کہ اس کے ٹرناراؤنڈ کے منصوبے توقع سے زیادہ مہنگے ہیں اور یہ اس سال مزید خسارے میں ڈوبنے کے لیے تیار ہے۔

    ہی پلیٹ فارم، جو خریداروں، فروخت کنندگان اور مالک مکان کو پراپرٹی کے ماہرین سے جوڑتا ہے، لاگت میں کمی اور منافع میں واپسی کی کوششوں میں تبدیلی کے منصوبے کے ساتھ آگے بڑھ رہا ہے۔

    فرم کے پاس پہلے سے ہی ایک فالتو پروگرام موجود ہے اور اس نے پورے کاروبار میں کام کرنے والے عملے کی تعداد کو کم کرکے، دفاتر کو بند کرکے اور مارکیٹنگ کے بجٹ کو کم کرکے ابتدائی بچت کرنے کا انتظام کیا تھا۔

    اس نے جمعہ کو کہا کہ اس نے دسمبر میں £17 ملین کے نئے ہدف کا اعلان کرنے کے بعد سے مزید £4 ملین سالانہ لاگت کی بچت کی نشاندہی کی ہے۔

    لیکن اس نے سرمایہ کاروں کو متنبہ کیا کہ اس کے اقدامات سے فروخت میں اس سے زیادہ خلل پڑا ہے جتنا اس نے ابتدائی طور پر سوچا تھا، لاگت کو کم کرنے اور کاروبار کو زیادہ موثر بنانے کی کوششوں میں۔

    نتیجتاً، گروپ نے نومبر سے لے کر اب تک تقریباً £1.2 ملین کی لاگت میں کامیابی حاصل کی ہے۔

    ہاں، ہم نے جو اقدامات کیے ہیں ان کی وجہ سے ہماری تیسری سہ ماہی کی کارکردگی میں توقع سے زیادہ قلیل مدتی خلل پڑا ہے، لیکن ہم 2024 کے مالی سال کے اوائل میں مثبت نقد رقم کی پیداوار کی طرف لوٹنے کے لیے پراعتماد ہیں۔ہیلینا مارسٹن، پرپل برکس کی چیف ایگزیکٹو

    اس نے سرمایہ کاروں کو بتایا کہ وہ 30 اپریل سے سال کے لیے £60 ملین اور £65 ملین کے درمیان پورے سال کی آمدنی دیکھنے کی توقع رکھتا ہے، اور £15 ملین اور £20 ملین کے درمیان آپریٹنگ نقصانات کو ایڈجسٹ کرے گا۔

    یہ اس کے بعد سامنے آیا ہے جب اس نے اپنے مالی سال کی پہلی ششماہی میں 31 اکتوبر سے چھ ماہ کے لیے £8.4 ملین کے ایڈجسٹ آپریٹنگ نقصانات کی اطلاع دی، جو پچھلے سال رپورٹ کیے گئے £800,000 کے نقصانات سے دس گنا بڑا تھا۔

    اس اعلان کے بعد جمعہ کو کاروبار میں حصص تقریباً پانچویں گر گئے۔

    لیکن پرپل برکس نے برقرار رکھا کہ کاروبار اور برانڈ کی \”اہم قدر\” ہے، اور یہ کہ مختلف مالکان کے تحت یہ بہتر ہو سکتا ہے۔

    اس نے ایک بیان میں کہا: \”بورڈ اس بات کو تسلیم کرتا ہے کہ متبادل ملکیت کے ڈھانچے کے تحت گروپ کی صلاحیت کو بہتر طریقے سے محسوس کیا جا سکتا ہے، اور اس وجہ سے، اس نے فیصلہ کیا ہے کہ گروپ کے کاروبار کا ایک اسٹریٹجک جائزہ لیا جائے تاکہ حصص یافتگان کے لیے زیادہ سے زیادہ قیمت فراہم کی جا سکے۔ .

    اس نے کہا کہ جائزہ \”کمپنی کی فروخت کا نتیجہ ہو سکتا ہے یا نہیں\”۔

    پرپل برکس نے کہا کہ وہ فی الحال کسی ممکنہ خریدار سے بات چیت نہیں کر رہی ہے اور نہ ہی اسے کوئی پیشکش موصول ہوئی ہے۔

    بند کریں

    منی پٹ کا ایک منظر، پرپل برکس کے ذریعے کمیشن کردہ 3D آرٹ کا ایک ٹکڑا جس کا مقصد پراپرٹی بیچتے وقت ہائی اسٹریٹ اسٹیٹ ایجنٹس کے ساتھ کمیشن پر ضائع ہونے والی رقم کی نمائندگی کرنا ہے، ہائی اسٹریٹ برمنگھم (Fabio De Paola/PA)

    ہیلینا مارسٹن، چیف ایگزیکٹیو آفیسر، نے کہا: \”ہم نے اپنے سیلز کے کاروبار کو بہتر بنانے، معیارات کو بلند کرنے، پرپل برکس فنانشل سروسز کے قیام، اور لیٹنگز کو مستحکم کرنے کے لیے گزشتہ نو مہینوں میں بہت زیادہ کام کیا ہے، ان سب کا مطلب ہے کہ کمپنی نے کبھی بھی ایسا نہیں کیا۔ مستقبل کے لیے بہتر حالت میں رہا ہے۔

    \”ہاں، ہم نے جو اقدامات اٹھائے ہیں ان کی وجہ سے ہماری تیسری سہ ماہی کی کارکردگی میں توقعات سے زیادہ قلیل مدتی خلل پڑا ہے، لیکن ہم 2024 کے مالی سال کے اوائل میں مثبت نقد رقم کی واپسی پر پراعتماد ہیں۔

    \”ہم تسلیم کرتے ہیں کہ ہماری الٹا پوٹینشل فی الحال ہماری مارکیٹ ویلیو ایشن میں ظاہر نہیں ہوتی ہے، یہی وجہ ہے کہ پورے بورڈ نے اس نتیجے پر پہنچا ہے کہ ایک اسٹریٹجک جائزہ اب تمام شیئر ہولڈرز کے بہترین مفاد میں ہے۔\”

    پرپل برکس کے حصص کی قیمت پچھلے ایک سال کے دوران نصف سے زیادہ رہ گئی ہے کیونکہ اس نے نقصانات کو وسیع کرنے کا انکشاف کیا ہے۔

    یہ افسوسناک ہے کہ پرپل برکس کے ہیلم میں متعلقہ تجربے کی کمی، جسے ہم نے گزشتہ جون میں اجاگر کیا تھا، کمپنی کو اس بدقسمت موڑ پر پہنچا ہے۔لیکرام ہولڈنگز، پرپل برکس کے شیئر ہولڈر

    اس کے شیئر ہولڈرز میں سے ایک، لیکرم ہولڈنگز، جس کا کاروبار میں 5.16 فیصد حصص ہے، نے گروپ کے فروخت کے منصوبوں پر ردعمل ظاہر کیا۔

    لیکرم نے ایک بیان میں کہا: \”یہ افسوسناک ہے کہ پرپل برکس کے ہیلم میں متعلقہ تجربے کی کمی، جسے ہم نے گزشتہ جون میں اجاگر کیا تھا، کمپنی کو اس بدقسمت موڑ پر پہنچا ہے۔

    \”ہم اسٹریٹجک جائزہ کے تیزی سے نتیجہ اخذ کرنے کا مطالبہ کر رہے ہیں اور، کیا یہ کمپنی کے لیے قابل قبول پیشکش کا باعث نہیں بننا چاہیے، کہ چیئرمین فوری طور پر دستبردار ہو جائے اور بورڈ، ہمارے اور دیگر شیئر ہولڈرز کے ساتھ مشاورت سے، کسی ایسے شخص کو لاتا ہے جس کے بارے میں علم ہو۔ اور پرپل برکس کو واپس منافع کی طرف رہنمائی کرنے کی صلاحیت۔\”

    لیکرام اس سے قبل کمپنی کی قیادت اور مالی بہتری کی کمی پر تنقید کر چکے ہیں۔ اس نے پرپل برکس کے چیئرمین پال پنڈر کو ہٹانے اور رائٹ موو اور کنٹری وائیڈ کے بانی ہیری ہل کی بطور ڈائریکٹر تقرری کے لیے مہم چلائی ہے۔



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