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Thread: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

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  1. #41
    Elite Member contract killer's Avatar
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    India Mozambique
    Quote Originally Posted by ajtr View Post
    Indian leadership like indian men dont have spine to press the button.Their mardanigi works only in Raping women in bus and on roads or beating the anti Rape protesters with lathis.but when they meet their equals on border they squeak and hide into their holes.
    Troll........

  2. #42
    Senior Member Wajid47's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by contract killer View Post
    Troll........
    CK you an ajtr have been at it hammer and tong for long enough. I have been watching and I think you guys should join us on other treads lols

  3. #43
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by contract killer View Post
    Troll........
    Kaka its a truth that when you get in front of a mard you throw dossiers and you internet hindus keep on showing your namardangi on hapless women like pholan devi and nirbhayas.Go grow some spine earth worms.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  4. #44
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen remains a sore point in Indo-Pak relations

    Despite Track-2 efforts, India and Pakistan find it hard to untie the Siachen knot

    It was code named Operation Meghdoot. On April 13, 1984 the Indian Army in a secret airborne operation scaled the heights around the Siachen Glacier before Pakistan could move its troops into the area. That temporary summer operation to prevent Pakistan from capturing the Siachen ultimately turned into a long-drawn-out saga, with both armies remaining entrenched in the world’s highest battlefield, in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. A large number of soldiers have lost their lives because of Siachen’s extreme weather conditions. More than 140 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an avalanche in April last year and another avalanche, on December 16, claimed the lives of six Indian soldiers. The human toll of the Siachen conflict has led to a renewed debate on how to end the deadlock and demilitarise the glacier.

    The initiative is led by military veterans of the two countries who are engaged in a Track-2 initiative for the past 12 months. The delegates had meetings in Dubai, Bangkok and Lahore. Smaller meetings in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Palo Alto (California) have also featured in the back-channel process. What makes the initiative noteworthy is its composition. The Pakistani team is led by former army chief Gen. Jehangir Karamat, and he is aided by former generals, admirals, air chiefs and seasoned diplomats. Former defence secretary, Lt-Gen. (retd) Tariq Ghazi, who was in charge of a series of Indo-Pak negotiations under President Pervez Musharraf, is also in the Pakistan team. The Indian side is led by former Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi. Among the retired officers assisting him are Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, Lt-Gen. B.S. Pawar, Lt-Gen. Aditya Singh, Lt-Gen. Arvind Singh Lamba and Vice Admiral A.K. Singh. They were brought together by the Washington-based think-tank Atlantic Council and the University of Ottawa.

    “It is a very important initiative,” said Kanwal. “The question before us is whether we want continuous military confrontation with Pakistan. We want to resolve the differences and conflicts, and we want to have peace in our neighbourhood. That is why it is important that we sit together and narrow down the differences so that we are able to demilitarise the glacier.”

    Since 1984, there have been repeated efforts by India and Pakistan to resolve the conflict. But despite 13 rounds of talks, there has been no breakthrough. Pakistan does not agree to the authentication of the border line, known as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), where troops from both countries are deployed. India has insisted that Pakistan should officially acknowledge India’s higher positions in Siachen and mark them on a map before any withdrawal. New Delhi believes that without the authentication there is no guarantee that Pakistan will not move its troops into the glacier after India’s withdrawal. The fact that India has established control over the entire 70km-long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge, has led many experts to question the wisdom of withdrawal and demilitarisation.
    “I don’t know why there is so much fuss over Siachen,” said Lt-Gen. (retd) Prakash Katoch. “We have sacrificed enough to protect that strategically important area. Why should we pull out from our own area and that, too, when we are in a better position to deal with the logistics?” He said a withdrawal from Siachen would only weaken India’s position on Kashmir.

    Pakistan insists that there should be no authentication of ground positions. Maleeha Lodhi, a Pakistani diplomat, who is part of the Track-2 initiative, said Pakistan’s reluctance to authenticate the border was mainly due to two reasons. “For Islamabad, authentication means legitimising India’s claim over Jammu and Kashmir [of which Siachen is a part]. Second, it believes that authentication will provide India the basis for a legal claim in negotiations later to delineate the area beyond NJ 9842 [the northernmost point of the Line of Control],” said Lodhi. “Authentication has, over the years, served as an alibi for the Indian Army to resist military disengagement.”

    Since the authentication has become a sticking point, the Track-2 report submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office late last year has recommended that both countries should establish a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842. “Notwithstanding the claims of each country, both sides should agree to withdraw from the conflict area, while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege on the commitments,” reads the Track-2 report. In the first phase, according to the report, both countries will withdraw medium artillery located near the base camps [Camp Dzingrulma for India and Camp Gyari for Pakistan] followed by withdrawal of troops and field artillery from northern, central, and southern battalion sub-sectors of Siachen, followed by the forward posts, and, finally, from the base camps.

    According to the proposal, present military positions can be jointly recorded and the records exchanged as a prelude to the disengagement and demilitarisation process. “While this falls short of the Indian demand for demarcation, it is workable and should be acceptable,” said Kanwal. He said if both sides agreed on joint monitoring, the re-occupation of positions within the demilitarised zone was most unlikely because of logistics. “The small-scale intrusions will be neither significant nor sustainable.”
    With India already in control of most of the high positions, Pakistan has never looked so weak. Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, mooted the idea of troops pullout from Siachen after the deadly avalanche in April. In India, many believe that Pakistan has lobbied for the intervention of the Atlantic Council, which is facilitating and funding the Track-2 negotiations. However, that has not stopped India from being a part of the process. Sources in the ministry of defence said the government had endorsed the talks. Prior to the talks, the Indian delegation sought and received briefings from the foreign ministry as well the Army. That an influential delegation which included generals, diplomats and a former senior official of the R&AW was allowed to join the talks underlines the government’s desire to end the stalemate. “If the government did not want the Track-2 negotiations, it would have not given any briefing to the Indian delegation,” said a senior defence ministry official.

    Top military commanders, in private, agree on the futility of confrontation in Siachen, which has cost many precious lives and huge amounts of money. Most of the deaths have been because of extreme weather and not actual combat. While Pakistan refuses to disclose its casualties, Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Parliament last year that India had lost 846 soldiers and hundreds had been amputated in 28 years of the Siachen conflict. Manmohan Singh, who was the first prime minister to visit Siachen, is keen to resolve the dispute. The glacier, in his own words, should be turned into a “peace mountain”. Army chief Gen. Bikram Singh has briefed the government about the Army’s stand on the issue. Unlike his predecessor, Gen. Singh is not vehemently opposed to the pullout. He, however, feels that no decision should be made in a hurry and that India should make its decision from a point of strength.

    Divergent positions

    India
    * Wants Pakistan to acknowledge India’s higher positions and mark them on a map before any withdrawal.
    * Without the authentication, India fears Pakistan could send its troops into the glacier after the pullout.
    * Since India controls most of the area in Siachen, there is also some opposition to pullout and demilitarisation.

    Pakistan
    * Accuses India of illegally occupying the Siachen Glacier by violating the 1972 Shimla agreement.
    * Wants India to withdraw without insisting on authentication of ground positions.
    * Opposes authentication as it means legitimising India’s claim over J&K.

    Track-2 proposals
    * A joint commission will be established to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842.
    * Instead of authentication, present ground positions will be jointly recorded and records exchanged.
    * Both countries will retain the option of punitive action if the other side reneges.
    * Withdrawal of troops will start with the removal of medium artillery located at base camps followed by withdrawal of troops and field artillery from forward positions.
    * Base camps will be removed and monitoring and verification of the demilitarisation will be completed during the establishment of the demilitarised zone.

    By Syed Nazakat
    SPEARHEAD RESEARCH
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  5. #45
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Indo- Pak Track II: ‘Redeeming Our Tryst with Destiny'
    September 3, 2012 ·
    This visit of Pakistani parliamentarians has been jointly organized by Jinnah Institute and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) as part of a Track 2 dialogue to suggest ways and means to bolster ongoing peace efforts. Pakistan-India ties enter transformational phase
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  6. #46
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India

    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    TARGET SIACHEN:A Glacial Intent:Gen Aziz’s expose ensures one thing: no troop-free Siachen


    Indian artillery barrage during Kargil war

    A three-month-long bitter war fought between India and Pakistan in the icy heights of Jammu and Kashmir’s Kargil region, claiming the lives of several hundred soldiers on both sides, is perhaps a fading memory for most Indians today. But recent revelations by a retired Pakistani top general, backroom negotiations between opinion-makers of the two sides and last month’s tension along the Line of Control show that the political and military establishments in neither India nor Pakistan have been able to fully exorcise the ghosts of Kargil even after 14 years. One reason for this is that the nub of the problem, which prompted the Kargil operation, stays with us as a live issue: the Siachen glacier.

    ‘Operation Badr’—as Pervez Musharraf, who was then the army chief of Pakistan, had codenamed the Kargil operation—was aimed at severing India’s supply lines to Siachen and force it to vacate the glacier and enter into negotiations with Pakistan on the fate of Kashmir.

    The revelations of Lt Gen Shahid Aziz (see interview) show how close Pakistan had come to meeting its objective by stealthily sneaking in its soldiers inside the Indian territory in the garb of Afghan and Kashmiri mujahideen and how the Indians were caught napping before getting into rearguard action to throw out the infiltrators.

    Much of what Aziz said is already known to us. But still a disclosure by someone of his rank is definitely significant.”Lt Gen (Retd) V.R. Raghavan, Centre For Security Analysis
    Since 1984, when India launched its Operation Meghdoot to beat the Pakistani army in taking control of the 70-km-long Siachen glacier and the important tributary glaciers in the area, Pakistan has made several attempts to dislodge Indian troops from their vantage position. Indian strategic planners maintain that its position on the glacier gives it the advantage of straddling Pakistan on the one side and China on the other. Any attempts to withdraw its troops from the glacial heights, described by many as the highest battleground in the world, could deprive India of a locational advantage, beyond the symbolism of ownership. Forfeiting it, according to this view, would detract from India’s legal claim on Jammu and Kashmir and allow Pakistan to dictate the pace of negotiations on the region. The Kargil operation was perhaps one of the most audacious adventures on the Pakistan army’s part to force India to withdraw its troops from Siachen.
    So, how should one see Shahid Aziz’s public disclosure of Musharraf’s Kargil operations? There is no unanimity in India about the timing of his disclosure. “Much of what he has said was already known to us,” Lt Gen (retd) V.R. Raghavan of the Chennai-based Centre for Security Analysis told Outlook. “But the disclosure of someone of his rank on some of the details on Kargil is definitely significant.”

    Like some others, Raghavan feels that Aziz’s public pronouncement could be a reflection of the existence of various factions within the Pakistani military establishment and their attempt to dissociate themselves post facto from the emb*arrassment of the misadventure. “Let’s not forget that the US pressure, forcing Pakistan to withdraw troops from Kargil, was a very humiliating experience for many in the Pakistani army establishment,” says Raghavan.

    There are yet others in India who feel that Aziz has decided to wash Musharraf’s dirty linen in public to stop him from staging a political comeback in Pakistan. With impending elections in the country and no clear leader, Musharraf may have fancied his chance of making a re-entry into the political theatre to offer himself as a future democratic leader.

    But there is no doubt that what the former Pakistani general has revealed is significant and is likely to shape India’s stand on Pakistan, and particularly its decision on whether troops should be withdrawn from Siachen. For, among other things, Aziz makes it clear that all those who took part in the Kargil operation were regular Pakistani soldiers and not mujahideen, as Musharraf and the Pakistani government had claimed. He also stresses that the entire planning of the operation was done by Musharraf in complete secrecy by taking only four senior army officials into confidence. Thirdly, Aziz emphasises that the operation was aimed at cutting off Indian supplies to Siachen and forcing its troops to withdraw from the glacier.

    “There’s no question of demilitarising Siachen. We hold advantage over Pakistan, that’s how it should be.”Gen (Retd) S. Roychowdhury, Former Cabinet Secretary
    The question, therefore, remains: can India take Pakistan at face value and does it have any leverage with the Pakistani government to ensure that it would enforce any agreement in future were India to withdraw its troops from Siachen? For what Aziz has reaffirmed is that Pakistan can yet again sneak in its army regulars in the garb of Kashmiri mujahideen and claim to have no role in the illegal occupation or violation of proposed treaty terms. This is especially significant as retired Indian army officials and bureaucrats, who were part of a Canada-initiated Track II initiative, had recently courted controversy and strong criticism from the Indian army establishment for agreeing with their Pakistani counterparts on the ‘doability’ of withdrawing troops from Siachen. The current mood definitely scuttles any such move.
    “There is no peace dividend in going for a troop pullout from Siachen. There is no justification for it. After Kargil, it has become difficult and the latest developments make it almost impossible. A goodwill gesture has no place now as things stand in the present ambience,” says Raghavan, pointing to last month’s tension along the LoC with the subsequent beheading and mutilation of Indian soldiers by the Pakistani side as a cautionary note.

    Though optimistic, strategic affairs commentator and former Indian army brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal also advises caution in dealing with the Siachen issue. “While the demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone is doable, the political climate is not right at present,” he told Outlook. “The government cannot afford to alienate people during an election year.”

    Interestingly, though Aziz claims that he all along thought Musharraf’s ambitious operation was doomed to failure, he also points out that the weakness of the Indian intelligence-sharing mechanism was one of the key elements that had allowed Pak troops their initial success in Kargil.

    The armed conflict that engaged the two sides in the summer of 1999 had managed to catch the attention not only of Indians and Pakistanis, but also that of the world at large. For this was a conventional war being fought by two countries barely a year after they had conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear powers.


    Enemy fire Pak troops firing at Indian troops in Dras sector. (Photograph by Reuters, From Outlook 18 February

    The months of condemnation that followed the twin nuclear tests of May 1998, with demands that both India and Pakistan dismantle their nuclear programmes, had stopped only in the early part of 1999. In February of that year, Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had boarded the peace bus to Lahore to hold talks with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, and sign the Lahore Declaration to normalise bilateral ties. Ominously, Musharraf, the then Pakistani army chief, probably busy in hatching the Kargil operation, remained absent from all the meetings of the two prime ministers. Within months, the peace initiative between the two sides was reduced to tatters as it became known that Pakistani armed infiltrators had managed to sneak in and take control of key peaks in Kargil, in the area through which the important NH-ID highway linking Srinagar and Leh runs. The vantage position that the Pakistanis succeeded in controlling had made it extremely difficult for the Indians to launch a counter-offensive to dislodge the intruders.

    “It is doable only if Pakistan agrees to extending the LoC to formally acknowledge Indian position on Siachen.”Kanwal Sibal, Former Foreign Secretary
    This also corroborates to a large extent the Outlook expose of 1999 when it detailed how the then Indian army chief, Gen V.P. Malik, and some of his key aides, including northern army commander Lt Gen H.M. Khanna, commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lt Gen Kishan Pal, and GoC, 3 infantry division Major Gen V.S. Budhwar—all key players in the Indian military establishment at the time—had ignored or downplayed initial warnings about the presence of Pak infiltrations in Kargil (see infographic and accompanying stories). But Gen Malik, who was roundly criticised for going on a trip to Poland while reports of Pak infiltrators were being made available to senior army officials, in a recent interview with The Sunday Guardian deftly laid the blame on the doors of the intelligence agencies. He said they had continued to claim that a large part of the infiltrators from across the border were mujahideen and not army regulars. The key members of the intelligence agencies who were then in service have, however, in turn made it clear that though the primary task of such intelligence-gathering lies with the army’s own outfit, the IB had informed the Indian authorities of plans and preparations of a possible Pakistani operation across the LoC almost a year before the Kargil infiltration took place.
    Irrespective of where the blame lies, Gen Aziz’s current revelations have diminished the chances of India thin*king of a possible troop withdrawal from Siachen quite a bit. Sections in the Indian establishment were always divided on this contentious issue and there are indications that in 2006—when the Indo-US nuclear deal negotiations were at a crucial stage—the Indian leadership was seriously weighing the option of demilitarisation in Siachen, something that the George W. Bush administration in the US was keen on. However, following strong resistance from the armed forces and some of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s close aides, the plan was abandoned.

    Retired Indian army chief Gen Shankar Roychowdhury told Outlook, “I don’t know the fate of my proposal to build a parallel road out of Pakistani artillery range.” In fact, he says, a secondary road does exist but he is not sure whether it can take the weight of regular military traffic. But, he adds emphatically, “There is no question of demilitarising Siachen—our Saltoro ranges to be precise. We hold the advantage over Pakistan and that’s the way it should remain.”

    Is it goodbye then to any future negotiation on demilitarising Siachen? Former Indian foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal remains cautiously optimistic. “It is doable only if Pakistan agrees on an agreement to extend the LoC to formally acknowledge the Indian position on Siachen.” But he too hastens to point out that the Aziz revelations have exposed “Pakistani duplicity”, making it difficult for the Indian leadership to seriously think of withdrawing troops from Siachen in the near future.

    14 Years Ago

    1998

    May India conducts five nuclear tests, Pakistan matches it with six tests of its own within weeks. The twin tests alarm the world; demands rise for India & Pakistan to dismantle nuclear programmes forthwith.
    Dec Pakistani army starts preparing for ‘Operation Badr’ to send in soldiers across LoC by stealth to take control of key peaks in the Kargil sector

    1999

    Feb 20 Vajpayee takes “peace bus” to Lahore; holds talks with counterpart Nawaz Sharif
    Feb 21 India and Pakistan sign Lahore Declaration; vow to have peaceful and normal relations. Pak army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf conspicuously stays away from all meetings.
    Feb-March Pak army starts amassing soldiers and acclimatising them for high-altitude warfare
    April Pakistan sends soldiers dressed as mujahideen across LoC to Kargil
    May 3 Local shepherds inform Indian authorities of presence of Pak intruders in Kargil; India sends advanced patrol to investigate, five soldiers captured and killed by Pak
    May 15-20 India starts mobilising troops from different parts for Kargil
    May 26 India decides to use air power to dislodge intruders after a CCS meeting
    June 8 Pak returns mutilated bodies of five Indian soldiers, sparking off national outrage and demands for escalating offensive against intruders
    June 13 India releases intercepts of a conversation between Musharraf and senior Pak official to prove involvement of Pak army
    June 13 After three weeks of fighting, India captures Tololing in Dras
    June 15 US President Bill Clinton asks Sharif over telephone to pull back Pakistani troops from Indian territory
    June 29 India captures two key posts—point 5060 and 5100—and retakes Tiger Hill five days later after 11 hours of fighting
    July 5 Sharif announces withdrawal of Pak troops after a meeting with Clinton in Washington, India takes control of Dras
    July 11 Pak begins pullout, India captures key peaks in Batalik
    July 14 Vajpayee declares ‘Operation Vijay’ a success; sets condition for talks
    July 26 Kargil conflict officially comes to an end as India claims successful eviction of all Pak intruders. Indian toll 527 dead; 1,363 wounded.
    Sep-Oct NDA coalition wins the next election.
    ***



    Dramatis Personae

    India

    Atal Behari Vajpayee The Indian prime minister took the peace initiative to normalise and improve relations with Pakistan. Boarded the bus to Lahore in February; Kargil followed in May.
    Gen V.P. Malik The chief of army staff is accused of having ignored earlier warnings of enhanced Pak activity; went on a trip to Poland though aware of intrusions along LoC
    Lt Gen H.M. Khanna Northern Army Commander who is claimed to have told his superiors that the “handful of intruders” would be thrown out in 48 hours
    Lt Gen Kishan Pal Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps, who dismissed reports of intrusion as a “local affair” to be dealt locally. Now says India won a tactical war, but lost strategically.
    Maj Gen V.S. Budhwar The GoC Leh-based 3 Infantry division gave the go-ahead for withdrawal of a winter post in Kaksar area that is said to have facilitated the intrusion
    Brig Surinder Singh The Commander 121 Brigade based in Kargil alerted the army top brass on “increased threat perception and possibility of incursions” by Pakistan, between August 1998 and March 1999.
    Pakistan

    Nawaz Sharif The then Pakistani prime minister responded to Vajpayee’s peace overtures and claims he was in the dark about his army’s Kargil plans. Was dislodged in a coup by Gen Pervez Musharraf.
    Gen Pervez Musharraf The Pak army chief masterminded the adventure, keeping most of his colleagues out of the loop. A key aide says Musharraf crossed the LoC in a chopper on March 28, 1999, and spent a night on the Indian-controlled side to boost troop morale.
    Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz Khan The chief of general staff and former ISI director as a close confidant of Musharraf during Kargil and supervised military intelligence work
    Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad The 10 Corps chief was a close member of Musharraf’s inner circle and helped plan the Kargil operation; later became DG, ISI
    Maj Gen Javed Hassan Chief of the Force Command, Northern Areas and another trusted aide of Musharraf, also a key member in planning Kargil
    Lt Gen Shahid Aziz Director of analysis, ISI, then, the now retired army officer, has blown Musharraf’s claim that mujahideen were involved in Kargil, says Siachen was a key objective of the war.



    US

    Bill Clinton The then US president read the riot act to Nawaz Sharif and forced him to withdraw Pakistani troops from Indian territory.
    ***


    Grinning general V.P. Malik tells media of Op Vijay’s success. (Photograph by AFP, From Outlook 18 February 2013)

    Lessons The New Admissions Teach Us

    Watch India cannot take Pakistan at face value at any time. There are wheels within wheels, within the Pakistani government, army and ISI, often working at cross-purposes, which can spring a surprise and catch us on the wrong foot.
    Wait Easy talk of Siachen’s ‘demilitarisation’, a favourite topic of drawing room chatter in political, think-tank and other comfortable circles, has to be tempered with the reality of Gen Aziz’s admissions, regardless of his motives.
    Trust The revelations, 14 years after the war, which specifically validate Brig Surinder Singh’s alerts at the time, show the need for greater coordination at every level between government and army, and within the forces.
    Caution For all the backroom negotiations, especially after the controversy generated by the beheading of an Indian soldier last month, the nub of India-Pakistan border ties continues to be Siachen, via which Pakistan eyes Kashmir.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  7. #47
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India

    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    The Wages Of Peace
    Kargil was actually about Siachen. India must remember that.


    Last July, sitting in Dras in the middle of a two-day celebration of India’s 1999 Kargil military victory, I was interviewing Lt Gen K.T. Parnaik, who leads the Indian army’s northern command. Among other issues, the general, one of the seniormost military leaders of the nation, spoke candidly of the 2010 unrest in Kashmir, the presence of Chinese troops in northern parts of Pakistan, India’s ongoing efforts to improve infrastructure along the China border and, towards the end of the interview, about the growing demands for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Siachen glacier, the world’s highest battleground.

    One sentence in the general’s elaborate answer to the question on Siachen struck me as particularly significant. “Don’t forget, Kargil happened because of Sia*chen. Why did they do Kar**gil?” he asks. “If you per**use their records, which are now out in the public, one of the major objectives of what they did in Kargil was to force us to vacate the Siachen glacier. Now, if that is their intent and that is their credibility, it is up to you to judge whether we should be really vacating the glacier or not.”

    Seven months down the line, a former general of the Pakistani army, Lt Gen Shahid Aziz, who headed the analysis wing of Pakistan’s spy agency, the infamous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in the summer of 1999 when the Kargil conflict was playing out, has confirmed what Parnaik said last July. Aziz has also blamed former president and military dictator Pervez Musharraf for having kept the nation in the dark on his pet project, the Kargil incursions. Undeterred, Musharraf has described the Kargil conflict as a huge military success. He says the Pakistani army would have “conquered” 300 square miles of Indian territory if then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif “had not visited the US and succumbed to pressure from then US president Bill Clinton to withdraw Pakistani troops from Indian territory”.

    Musharraf, unwanted in his own country and shunned by most senior military and political leaders there, is now using his erstwhile aides and confidants to shore up some support for his favourite operation. Col Ashfaq Hussain, a former aide to Musharraf, writes in his book Witness to Blunder that Musharraf himself crossed the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in a helicopter on March 28, 1999. He spent a night on the India-controlled side to boost the morale of his troops.

    In a recent conversation, Gen V.P. Malik, who was India’s chief of army staff during the Kargil conflict, admitted that Indian troops had received reports of Pakistani patrols crossing over into Indian side of the LoC sometime in February 1999 even as prime ministers Atal Behari Vaj*payee and Nawaz Sharif were discussing the peace process and Vajpayee was taking the bus ride to Lahore. He reckons that Musharraf, who had already planned the incursions into Kargil by irr**e*gulars and troops, thought it fit to visit the forward areas immediately thereafter to reassure the troops that the operation he had enga*ged them in was indeed to continue as planned.

    Whatever the reality, recent revelations from Pakistan have ensured that the Kargil conflict is back in the headlines again. The revelations have also triggered a new debate on who gained what and who lost what in the longest military engagement between India and Pakistan so far.

    During Kargil, the Pakistanis had the advantage of high positions. Our troops had to throw them out inch by deadly inch.
    Pakistan’s military planners are now weighing the real cost of the Kargil operation. For months, indeed years after Pakistani troops were evicted by the Indian army and the air force from the rugged heights of Kargil, the Pakistan’s military leadership has been in denial. It tried to maintain the facade that the intruders were mujahideen, freedom fighters really, trying to liberate Kashmir from India’s clutches and that the Pakistani military was merely providing those motley groups some moral support. In trying to keep up with the fiction, the Pakistani army even disowned its soldiers, refusing to receive their bodies. Irrefutable evidence, in the form of paybooks of regular Pakistani soldiers, their photographs and letters written by them to families, however, forced Pakistan to grudgingly accept that soldiers of its Northern Light Infantry were also involved in the intrusion into Kargil.
    That a professional army could abandon its own soldiers so callously was shocking, but more embarrassing was the folly of launching an operation that seemed without any tangible political objective. Musharraf’s reckless and seemingly aimless military misadventure dented the Pakistani army’s stock considerably in global circles.

    The Indian army, and indeed all other agencies tasked with providing intelligence, were initially caught unawares by the intrusion despite advance warnings and inputs by its frontline commander (see Outlook, Aug 2, 1999, and the subsequent coverage, right up to September 2000). That its young officers and soldiers fought back valiantly and wrested control of all the heights and peaks that the intruding Pakistanis had occupied is well documented. What is however not sufficiently discussed is the fact that even through his misadventure, Musharraf managed, in the long run, to extract quite a cost out of the Indian army.

    Till the conflict broke out and ratcheted up the tension, the Kargil-Dras sector was held by a single brigade, of some 3,000 men.

    Today, a full mountain division is deployed to keep vigil on the sector. The 8 Mountain Division, which will be celebrating its golden jubilee this year, was raised in the Northeast for counterinsurgency operations, before it was moved to the Kashmir Valley in the 1990s. It was rushed to the Kargil-Dras sector in the May-June 1999. Since then it has stayed on. Before the Kargil conflict happened, during the harsh winter months, the weather meant that many posts there would be vacated; the assumption was that the enemy troops would face the same problem and would prefer to withdraw. No longer.

    Now, even in the severest of winter, the Indian army has to compulsorily hold those posts by stationing men there. Lt Gen Kishan Pal, who was the 15 Corps commander based in Srinagar and technically the man who led the Indian field formations during the Kargil conflict, believes that India may have won a tactical battle but lost strategically. In an interview to me in May 2010, Pal said, “Well, for 11 years I did not speak at all...I did not speak because I was never convinced about this war, whether we really won it.... We did gain some tactical victories, we regained the territories we lost, we lost 587 precious lives. I consider this a loss of a war, because whatever we gained from the war has not been consolidated, either politically or diplomatically. It has not been consolidated militarily.” In a way, the Pakistani military achieved an unintended result in tying down a full Indian army division in Kargil. The original Pakistani objective of cutting off communication and supply lines to Siachen, the Shyok and Nubra valleys in Ladakh, however, remains unfulfilled.

    Having failed to wrest control of the Saltoro ridge, which dominates the Siachen glacier and acts as a wedge between the Chinese-controlled Shagsham valley and Pak-occupied Kashmir, a Track II attempt is being made to “resolve” and “demilitarise” Siachen and get India to withdraw troops from the Saltoro ridge.

    By involving senior and not-so-senior retired Indian military officials in a backchannel dialogue and getting them to agree that Siachen, along with the Sir Creek dispute, is a low-hanging fruit in the India-Pakistan bilateral dialogue, a perfidious effort is currently on to get Siachen vacated through non-military means. The principle on which Musharraf launched Kargil operations has thus not been abandoned completely. The Indian establishment has, however, repeatedly failed to see through the Pakistani army’s designs. Many civil society activists in Pakistan, however, say all stakeholders, including the Pakistani army, now genuinely want peace with India. The question is: is the shift in the Pakistan mil*itary’s thinking a tactical or strategic one?

    Hopefully, Indian political and military decision-makers, having learnt their lesson from the 1999 conflict, will wait to get a clear answer before reciprocating the peace overtures from Islamabad. This is the least that New Delhi owes to the young officers and men who sacrificed their lives through those months to reclaim the icy heights from intruding Pakistani forces and irregulars.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  8. #48
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    Siachen: Possible New International Moves for ‘Mediation’ - IDSA

    The back channel parleys over Siachen sponsored by some international think tanks were in the news a few months back. A wide section of India’s strategic community took exception to what was purportedly agreed to by Indian participants in these parleys. These confabulations, held under the aegis of the Atlantic Council and other US/NATO linked think tanks, gave an impression to many to be promoting a demilitarization of the glacier and the adjoining ridges without settling the issue of territorial jurisdiction or proper and adequate authentication of the current position of the Indian and Pakistani troops in the region. In addition, no measures appeared to be on the table to ensure confidence building and an honest implementation of the proposed agreement. Since then, however, the din and the dust raised by these Indo-Pakistani contacts have subsided and on the surface things seem to be back to square one again. Or, are they really?

    There are indications that some US think tanks, believed to be close to the US Administration, are working assiduously behind the scenes to revive India-Pakistan contacts on Siachen, both at the official as well as non-governmental levels. The US Administration’s interest in this seems to be driven by the desire to continue to engage Pakistan, as also to use the expectations of a US sponsored ‘settlement’ on Siachen as one of the levers to manipulate Pakistan in the period leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and thereafter. In September 2012, when the US made overtures to Pakistan to mend ties frayed by the raid on Osama bin-Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad earlier that year, the US Sate Department prepared a package of “various acts of goodwill” for Pakistan. One of those “acts of goodwill” was stated to be an offer to encourage mediation between India and Pakistan through US NGOs like the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), a State Department supported entity given to researching and promoting the negotiated resolution of various international disputes. Other US NGOs linked with the project are the US National Laboratory at Sandia, linked with the US Department for Energy, and the Atlantic Council. These organisations have been studying the issue of mediation on Siachen for quite some time. IMTD is not an entirely new player in Indo-Pak relations; it claims to have conceptually developed the proposal to start the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and has been working behind the scenes to promote Indo-Pakistani relations in other fields.

    The key argument developed by IMTD and its associate institutions to pressure India, and Pakistan, through an international campaign if necessary, is the impact of the military conflict in the Siachen region on the ecology of the glacier. The military presence, it is propounded, is maximizing the impact of global warming on the glacier, which is fast shrinking. This would affect the flow of water in the Indus river with its potentially devastating implications for South Asia’s increasing population. Starting from Siachen, IMTD seeks to increase awareness about the protection of the entire Himalayan ecosystem – its forests, wet lands, biodiversity and cryosphere – as a means to ensure the availability of adequate water in the long term. Dealing with this looming crisis would require combined efforts by all the nations in the Himalayan basin, the US NGO contends.

    On Siachen, the IMTD wants to bring the focus of international study on the fate of Himalayan glaciers and the impact of global warming on them. IMDT envisions cooperation of the Indian and Pakistani governments to establish international ‘science centers’ on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Initially it toyed with the idea of having these centres in Muzaffarabad under the ‘Azad Jammu & Kashmir University’ and in Srinagar under the Sher-e-Kashmir University. These centres were expected to eventually supplant the current military presence on the Siachen glacier with an international scientific one. The Sandia National Laboratory is said to have been studying the demilitarization of the glacier for the last 20 years and seeks to have the area declared a ‘peace park and science center’. The two NGOs have somewhat modified the initial working proposal and now seek to locate the Siachen science centres in Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir at the base of the Saltoro ridge, and at Kargil on the Indian side. In order to facilitate movement between the two centres, the IMTD and Sandia intend to work with the Indian and Pakistani military establishments and governments to open the Skardu-Kargil road for their journey back and forth. In fact, the opening of the Science Centres and the Skardu-Kargil road would be the starting point of multilateral contacts, which these NGOs seek to initiate with the Indian and Pakistan governments as well as academics from the two countries (three from each side). IMTD is also toying with the idea of associating the Chinese with these discussions. Various UN agencies would also be there to, what may amount to, totally undercutting India’s approach of bilateralism in dealing with its neighbours.

    The IMTD and its associate American NGOs on the Siachen project have formulated:

    Bi-lateral approval to establish the science centres which can become a mediation bracket as India and Pakistan strain their arguments for and against surrendering hardened positions of military advantage. IMTD’s approach would moot: (a) the repeated demands of both militaries for troop deployment verification; (b) tactical and superior advantages for either Army; (c) the toxic ‘lack of trust’ on both sides; (d) fear of ulterior motives; and, (e) possible infiltration by foreign armies. Of equal or greater importance, it would shift the focus from confrontation on the Siachen Glacier and allow Pakistan and India to see it for its real value as their water tower. IMTD will urge a bilateral agreement that the Line of Control terminates at coordinate NJ9842 and from that point on two lines would be drawn north to Sia Kangri and east to the Karakoram Pass. Distance between the two presumed end points is about 100 km following the China border. This is the compromise IMTD seeks to interject into the demilitarization negotiation.
    Using the northern China border, a huge triangle would come into being and become the object of a Pakistan-India joint proposal to the United Nations to designate that area as an International Peace Park with access measures similar to those of the Antarctic Treaty. A Siachen International Treaty would prohibit any form of military intrusion on the glacier. Both armies would disengage and vacate the designated site and have access to international monitoring data to assure that their territories are not being encroached. And, scientists (as well as mountain climbing expeditions and tourists) would have secure access to the Siachen glacier region while joint military contingents would be available for logistical assistance, transport and rescue.
    A map of the ‘Siachen International Peace Park’ has also been drawn as shown below:


    Placing monitoring equipment, inviting Pakistan to join the US-India Monsoon Desk, measuring snowpack, monitoring weather patterns, mapping glacier volume and creation of glacial lakes would be just a few of the cooperative science projects and tasks the IMTD envisions the science centres to be providing. It contends that these would be to the benefit of India and Pakistan to have better information, forecasts, early warning and trust in each other’s capabilities and willingness to share their findings.

    The entire project is to be funded by various US governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as by UN and international financial institutions. For example, the US State Department’s funding has been sought for initial spade work in the form of organizing international seminars and meetings (including those of Indian and Pakistan scientists and security analysts) to work out a concrete strategy to start the project. The US Department of Energy has been approached for funding of Sandia’s contribution to working out the nuts and bolts of the demilitarization proposal. Multi-lateral banks and UN agencies would be approached in the next phase of this project to underwrite the construction, installation of equipment and hiring of scientists and technicians during the start up and incubation periods. However, IMTD is conscious of the fact that due to changes in personalities and other budgetary constraints, while the State Department may extend political support for the Siachen project but no funding may come forth. Therefore, as a fall back option the IMTD seeks to rope in international and multi-lateral banks and financial institutions, UN agencies and other foreign aid givers to fully bankroll the project.

    How should India deal with this initiative led by US-sponsored NGOs? There could be a view that we have to sit firmly on the Glacier and force the Pakistanis, in due course, to settle the issue of demarcation of the Actual Ground Position Line and territorial claim as per our interests. But it has to be realized that stonewalling on the Siachen issue would not go far. In the globalised environment of 21st century diplomacy, no country can shut the door on negotiations by putting forth rigid and uncompromising demands, except as an initial bargaining move. The Indian nation has to come to a clear understanding of what should be its defined position on the issue and speak with one voice on that. On the flip side, visions of international acceptance and assistance could convince some Indians to readily water down the country’s stand on Siachen. But India can also not just surrender its sovereign and territorial rights on a territory that belongs to it de facto and de jure.

    Therefore, India must develop comprehensive and workable proposals to not just tone down the present Indo-Pak standoff on the glacier and the international attention it may be inviting, but also to ensure reasonable security arrangements against treachery by any third country. This can be ensured through demilitarization of not just the Siachen Glacier, but the entire Karakoram-Western Himalayan-Shaksgam watershed though negotiations, may be a multilateral one, covering the entire north-west part of the sub-continent that is basically part of the same eco-system. India has also to evolve a road-map and respond positively to any multilateral moves for facilitating international interaction in this geographically unique region.

    Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India

    ================================================== ============
    Above report clearly suggests that usa in order to appease pakistan to get co-operation in Afghanistan want to grab siachin from bacdoor by involving china and UN on it.On thing india has to make sure that more the time it allows usa in subcontinent more trouble it will face from it.so better think about kicking out usa uk and nato entierly out of subcontinent and middle east.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  9. #49
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    in the other news...


    Dialogue on hold

    The Ottawa Dialogue is a back-channel diplomatic exercise for retired Indian and Pakistani military officials and diplomats and is funded by the USA, UK and Canada. Usually, there are some 20 participants from each side and they debate defence issues from conventional CBMs to the Siachen dispute. The Ottawa Dialogue has held conferences in a number of cities. The most recent meeting was scheduled for New Delhi, but there is a hitch. Former air chief S P Tyagi heads the India chapter and is being investigated in the AgustaWestland helicopter deal. As a consequence, the Ottawa Dialogue has been temporarily put on hold.
    Hero’s welcome - Indian Express Mobile


    So every scam has silver lining tooto unmask people like ACM tyagi and their back channel.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  10. #50
    Member wolverine's Avatar
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    16 Things You Should Know About India’s Soldiers Defending Siachen

    The highest combat zone on planet earth, Siachen glacier is one place where fewer soldiers have died on the line duty due to enemy fire than because of the harsh weather conditions.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    For Indian forces deployed in Siachen, it is less of a challenge to watch out for the Pakistani forces but to just stay atop this 76 kilometers long glacier at 5, 400 meters altitude (nearly twice the altitude of Ladakh and Kargil) in itself means you have to defy all of your physical, mental and spiritual limits.

    You have to be a super soldier, a hero.

    And that’s what each one of our soldiers out there at Siachen glacier and on posts at even greater heights really is!

    1. In Siachen, you are at the risk of getting a deadly frostbite if your bare skin touches steel (gun trigger, for example) for just over fifteen seconds.
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    Merely touching the trigger or gun barrel with bare hands can be a mistake big enough to result in loss of toes or fingers.

    For those who don’t know about frostbite – it’s a condition resulting from abrupt exposure to extreme cold that can leave amputation of fingers or toes as the only alternative. In extreme cases, these organs may just fall off.

    2. Mountain climbers climb when the weather is at its best; soldiers serve in these treacherous terrains all year round.
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    Minus 60 degrees temperature and over 5,000 meters altitude; low atmospheric pressure and oxygen, well, you keep asking for more of it. There’s 10% of the amount of oxygen available in Siachen than it is in plains.

    It’s the weather of the kind that us mortals aren’t simply designed to bear. Not for long and not without the great risk of losing eyes, hands or legs. But these men – they do it, every day.

    Because every inch of this land belongs to India and they shall not cede it to some untrustworthy neighbors who no longer have a higher ground in Siachen.

    3. The human body just cannot acclimatize over 5,400 meters
    When you stay at that altitude for long, you lose your weight, don’t feel like eating, sleep disorders come around in no time and memory loss – that’s a common occurrence. Put simply, the body begins to deteriorate. That’s what happens at Siachen.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    Yes, it is tough.

    4. Speech blurring is as obvious as toothpaste freezing in the tube
    It’s fiercer than heaviest of gunfire any day. But our soldiers have taken up the challenge nonetheless.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    5. Snowstorms in Siachen can last 3 weeks.
    Winds here can cross the 100 mph limit in no time. The temperature can drop well below minus 60 degrees.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    6. Yearly snowfall in Siachen can be well over 3 dozen feet
    When snow storms come around, at least two to three soldiers have to keep using shovels (in snow storm). Else, the military post would become a history; in no time.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    7. The 7th Pay commission may consider the unique challenges faced by the army jawans who man the territory all through the year.
    They should.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    The forward areas in Jammu and Kashmir including Siachen were visited by the 7th Pay Commission in October, 2014.

    8. Soldiers find ways to entertain themselves when they can.
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    We are, after all, a cricket crazy nation.

    9. Fresh food – that’s rare. Very rare. At Siachen, an orange or an apple can freeze to the hardness of a cricket ball in no time.
    Rations come out of tin cans.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    10. Army pilots literally push their helicopters well beyond their optimal performance, every day!
    They drop supplies at forward posts located at an altitude of more than 20 thousand feet.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    Army pilots usually have less than a minute for dropping off the supplies at forward posts.

    Pakistani army is merely few hundred meters away and so the choppers must fly off before the enemy guns open up.

    11. In the last 30 years, 846 soldiers have sacrificed their lives at Siachen.
    In case of Siachen, deaths due to extreme climate and beyond-imagination terrain conditions are treated as battle causalities and rightly so.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    In last three years alone, 50 Indian soldiers have died in Siachen. These causalities as per the information made available by Defense Minister in Lok Sabha, were due to the very nature of the place our forces are serving. These soldiers sacrificed their lives on the line of duty while combating the floods, avalanches and floods in Siachen.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen
    The Body of Havaldar Gaya Prasad from 15 Rajput Battalion serving in Siachen was found after 18 long years.

    12. A War Memorial at the Bank of Nubra River has the names of Indian soldiers who laid their lives in Siachen.
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    13. Local saying: “The land is so barren and the passes so high that only the best of friends and fiercest of enemies come by.’
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    14. In Siachen, the Indian Army spends as much as 80% of its time preparing soldiers of deployment.
    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    15. “We do the difficult as a routine. The impossible may take a little longer”
    — So reads a plaque at the headquarters of the Indian Army formation responsible for security of the Siachen sector in Jammu and Kashmir.

    Things We Indians Should Know About the Life of Soldiers Defending Siachen

    16. When you go home, tell them of us and say, for your tomorrow we gave our today.


    A million, billion, zillion salutes to our soldiers! We remain indebted, forever
    Attached Thumbnails Attached Thumbnails s1.jpg   s2.jpg   s3.jpg   s4.jpg   s5.jpg  

    The Following User Says Thank You to wolverine For This Useful Post: Agnostic_Indian


  11. #51
    Senior Member Mohan Tiwari's Avatar
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    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper...cle7790965.ece
    Helipad in Siachen will help in troop mobilisation
    DINAKAR PERI

    India has quietly constructed and operationalised an Mi-17 helipad on the Siachen glacier near Kumar post at a height of about 16,000 ft, considerably augmenting the airlift capabilities for troop support and casualty evacuation. This comes 31 years after the Army occupied the icy heights under Operation Meghdoot in 1984.

    One officer termed the helipad a “force multiplier” on the glacier. In addition to added capacity, it also means that soldiers can have more fresh food during their long deployments. While the 2003 ceasefire between Indian and Pakistan is holding across the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), in case hostilities were to erupt, the helipad can be of great help in troop mobilisation and evacuation, another official told The Hindu .

    Helicopters play a pivotal role in sustaining the troops deployed at the height of 20,000 ft on the Siachen glacier where temperatures plummet to minus 50 degrees in winter.

    Currently only Cheetahs and their upgraded variant, Cheetals, can land on posts beyond Base Camp, but have limited capacity which further goes down due to high altitude. The indigenously built Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and Mi-17 cannot land on small helipads and are limited to air dropping supplies. Mi-17 is a medium lift helicopter of Russian origin and is operated by the Air Force in large numbers.


    Soldiers will also

    get fresh food

    during their long deployments

  12. #52
    Senior Member Express's Avatar
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    Re: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    Another win win for these two countries

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