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Thread: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

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    Pakistan India

    India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    India’s interest compromised in Siachen

    By Prakash Chandra Katoch on October 24, 2012

    The Indian government is acting against the interests of the country by surreptitiously agreeing to a deal with Pakistan according to which it will withdraw troops from Siachen Glacier, the command of which gives India immense strategic advantages.

    India is committing a strategic blunder by quietly agreeing to Pakistan’s demand for withdrawing from Saltoro Ridge in Siachen glacier. The Indian public and Parliament have been kept in the dark. A backroom deal has been concluded through questionable intermediaries with close ties to Pakistan.


    Since November 2011, militaries of both India and Pakistan have held several rounds of talks to boost confidence-building measures. These meetings were held in Dubai (20-21 November 2011), Bangkok (23-25 February 2012) and Lahore (23-25 September 2012). Additionally, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai (21 April 2012) and Palo Alto (30-31 July 2012). In the Track 2 round held in Lahore in September 2012, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to demilitarise Siachen despite the grave reservations of some members of the Indian delegation. The members who expressed reservations include a former ambassador, a former intelligence officer and two former officers from the Army and the Navy.

    The decision to demilitarise, or rather withdraw from Siachen has been taken arbitrarily at the highest political level disregarding strong objections by successive army chiefs including the current chief, General Bikram Singh. He has even made a statement to the media opposing demilitarisation of the glacier. The agreement mainly includes setting up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, the map coordinate south of the incompletely demarcated disputed territory; joint authentication of present ground positions; determination of places for redeployment; disengagement and demilitarisation in a mutually acceptable time frame, and cooperative monitoring of activities to ensure transparency. The agreement states that reoccupation cannot be done speedily. This is absurd as it negates India’s ability to use helicopters for a lightning occupation. This gives Pakistan a huge advantage because the western flanks and glacial valleys of the Saltoro ridge are controlled by Pakistan. They do not have snow during summer and can be reached under cover of darkness and on foot in bad weather. The provision for technical surveillance is a red herring because of the tough terrain and extreme weather. It is important to remember that because of these conditions even the US with all its technical resources was surprised by India’s nuclear tests of 1998.

    The Indian Government briefed the Lahore Track 2 team to keep in mind the Army’s stand that further talks would only be taken up after positions of both sides were authenticated on ground. The Indian Army’s concerns have clearly been ignored. The strategic importance of the Saltoro Ridge, especially in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan, Northern Areas, Shaksgam and Wakhan Corridor has been systematically obfuscated by a Government that retains far too much of power over electronic and print media. The Government has carried out a massive public relations exercise using gullible television channels to transmit the message that Siachen has no strategic significance. At one point, one so-called expert claimed that India holds the Karakoram Pass, which is a blatant lie. National dailies have refused to publish articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen. Similarly, this issue has not been debated on national television. There are rumours that the media is muffling any discussion on Siachen on the instructions of the Government.

    The selection of Indian delegates who visited Lahore was incongruous. None of them had served in Siachen, not even the six army officers who were part of the delegation. The negotiating team did not bother to visit the conflict zone despite months of parleys with Pakistani officials at beautiful locations. Two former military officers in the delegation are infamous for their political connections. It is rumored that the Air Force four star officer is to be rewarded with an ambassadorship or governorship while the one star army officer is to be given another bag of carrots for towing the official line.

    It is surmised that the Government is aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize to recover the legitimacy that it has lost after a succession of scandals. The Indian military has been castrated and is not allowed to state its views. Veterans who oppose demilitarisation are denied media forums. It is inconceivable that any other major power would shut its military out of the decision-making and discourse the way India is doing at the moment.

    Jehangir Karamat, the former army chief heading the Pakistani delegation, understands the strategic significance of Saltoro unlike his Indian counterparts. Under his leadership, Pakistan has grabbed the strategic opportunity to attain all its key goals. The Atlantic Council of Canada that acted as the peace broker has promptly put out the news on the net. Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani strategic analyst who heads the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the US, has close relations his Canadian counterparts. More worryingly, he has close ties with the Pakistani military and is said to be a trusted advisor to both Genaral Kayani and General Musharraf. Indians have long distrusted the Atlantic Council, which is perceived to be in bed with the Pakistani military and which has never really concluded its cold war love affair with Pakistan. It is incredible that India should agree to the Atlantic Council as a mediator as it is unlikely to be a disinterested party and, as per the old adage, Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion.

    The Line of Control between India and Pakistan was originally drawn on a 1:250,000 map with a thick sketch pen without military advice. This has left an ambiguity as to the location of any given point on this line to the tune of about a hundred metres. Furthermore, the line does not follow ridge lines creating a source of constant and persisting hostility and acrimony. The same thick pen may be used once again in Siachen to devastating effect. A withdrawal from Siachen would facilitate further Pakistani incursions into Kashmir and put Ladadh, the Buddhist part of the state, under threat.

    Gen Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistani president and army chief, mentions in his autobiography In The line of Fire, that he was planning to put a battalion on Saltoro Ridge. Indian officers preempted his move. Since 1984, Pakistan has been trying to control Siachen. Pakistan invaded India in 1999 to control Kargil and cut off Siachen. Pakistan is attempting to eradicate its strategic disadvantage through both military and non military measures. People in Shia dominated Baltistan, the place close to Siachen Glacier, are being forcibly converted to Sunni Islam. The Pakistani state often sponsors Shia massacres. The idea is to create a strong base for Pakistani troops to advance from when they make their next move.

    If India withdraws from Siachen, the new defense line will need additional troops. The new number will be many times the number of troops holding Siachen presently and the costs to the exchequer will increase exponentially. The joint agreement innocuously says in Annexure II, “Small-scale intrusions are neither significant nor sustainable”. This is absurd. Small scale intrusions can easily take place undetected in areas devoid of snow during summer months. They can then be staging posts for infiltration. The Indian army lost the flower of its youth in 1999 when Pakistani troops intruded to take the heights in Kargil. With no defense line in Siachen, Ladakh will be open to infiltration. Irregulars and members of the Taliban will be able to cross into territory that belongs to India, while Pakistan will deny culpability for ‘non-state-actors’. General Musharraf once declared that there would be many more Kargils in the future. Withdrawing from Siachen will make the general’s declaration a reality.

    The public and the parliament have the right to ask the government why the Siachen issue has not been debated publicly and in the parliament. What exactly has Pakistan done to earn Indian trust? Has the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and ****************** Kashmir been dismantled? Has any progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks? Has the Government forgotten that Pakistan has repeatedly double crossed us? During a visit by a delegation from Pakistan to discuss confidence building measures, why was the Pakistan Army breaching the ceasefire? Why is Pakistan arming and stoking insurgencies in India? Why is the Pakistani intelligence trying to revive terrorism in Punjab? Why do American think tanks repeatedly state that Pakistan is the most dangerous place in the world? What does India gain from giving away Siachen?

    This article was first published in Fair Observer.

    (Photo Courtesy: anupkumarchaturvedi.com)
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    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  2. #2
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen: To hold or to fold?
    There have been many discussions on the need to de-militarise the Siachen Glacier. Why have India and Pakistan suddenly begun to believe that they were mistaken in holding on to the region all this while? What are the possible ramifications of de-militarising this strategic location?
    BY Brigadier (Retd.) Xerxes Adrianwalla
    CHIEF OF CIS AND GROUP SECURITY OF THE MAHINDRA GROUP



    In Siachen, the whistling winter wind can turn a temperature of −50 °C to a vicious wind chill of −80 °C where dropping gloves can mean losing fingers. Here, weather takes a far greater toll than the enemy; a man loses 10 years of his life by just being there. This is the reality of the harsh and unforgiving battlefield at the top of the world, that India and Pakistan are fighting over. Indian soldiers permanently man posts above 20,000 feet in these conditions, and have done so for almost 30 years.

    Is it worth the trouble? Recently, there has been much talk and Track II agreements on the need to demilitarise the Siachen Glacier. These moves appear to originate mainly from Pakistani Army Chief Gen A.P.Kayani, who lost 139 Pakistani troops in an avalanche at Gayari earlier this year. Many in India, including prolific strategic writers, subscribe to the demilitarization view and a Track II diplomacy initiative has ostensibly been signed.

    What has changed in Indo-Pakistan attitudes towards the region – from the 1949 Karachi Agreement and the 1972 Simla Agreement – that the two countries now suddenly realize they were mistaken in holding on to Siachen all along?

    The genesis of the conflict lies in the Pakistan-sponsored ‘tribal invasion’ of Kashmir after the Partition when what is today Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (***) came into existence. The Line of Control delineated by the UN in 1949 became the Karachi Agreement, which did not clearly mention who controlled the glacier, merely stating that from NJ9842 (a map coordinate) the boundary would proceed “thence north to the glaciers.” UN officials presumed there would be no dispute between India and Pakistan over such a cold and barren region. The 1972 Simla Agreement too glossed over the issue.

    Prior to 1984, neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the area. However cartographic aggression by Pakistan, mountaineering expeditions and counter-expeditions by both countries resulted in a conflict which began in 1984 with India’s successful Operation Meghdoot, during which it wrested control of the Siachen Glacier (unoccupied and not demarcated area). India has established control over all of the 70 km-long Siachen Glacier, its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier. This gives India the tactical advantage of holding the high ground.

    After 1984, Pakistanis launched several attempts to displace the Indian forces from these heights, but with little success. The most well known was in 1987, when the attack was masterminded by Pervez Musharraf (later President of Pakistan) heading an elite Special Services Group commando unit. The Pakistan attack was repulsed and the positions remained the same. Naib Subedar Bana Singh, who in a daring daylight raid, assaulted and captured a Pakistan post atop a 22,000 foot (6,700 m) peak, now named Bana Post, after climbing a 457 m (1500 feet) ice cliff face, was awarded the Param Vir Chakra. He lived, but according to government statistics, 846 other Indian soldiers have been killed on the glacier due to weather and enemy action since 1984.

    There are strategic and tactical reasons why this desolate and bitterly cold, windswept strip of ice is so important to both countries. There is the ideal of a unified Kashmir, of course, and protection of India’s borders, but also the potential domination of Buddhist Ladakh by the Chinese and further infiltration of terrorists from Pakistan if India was to vacate Siachen. Down to brass tacks, however, it is about sovereignty: India cannot let go of such hard-fought and gained territory.

    Demilitarization may seem a noble – or sinister – idea. Recently it was propagated by a group of strategic thinkers with multiple views on how this can be managed. But India must understand the ramifications of such a move:

    First, the Line of Control (LoC) does not have the recognition of an international border. It is disputed, volatile and permanently manned by troops. The Siachen Glacier is simply a glossed over extension of the LoC and the line from NJ9842 to Siachen is referred to as the actual ground position line (AGPL), which is exactly that: you own what you occupy. Here, possession is definitely nine-tenths of the law.

    Second, in the past Pakistan has shown great duplicity in its approach to disputed territory; when expedient it could easily violate a signed agreement and grab and hold these commanding heights. Expelling intruders is more costly than holding these heights; the Kargil adventure illustrates this dramatically.

    Regardless of whether the Track II discussions have resulted in proposals urging for demilitarization of Siachen, there is no substantial national or parliamentary debate on the subject. Signing away such an important tract of territory held at great cost, without a practical dialogue, will be inappropriate and insulting to those Indian soldiers who have held these heights at great cost all these years.

    There have been many suggestions on how such demilitarization can be made foolproof to ensure Pakistan does not encroach on posts vacated by India – including the right to take military action. But in this part of the world, might is right and holding these heights is vital.

    Sometime in the distant future, when the LoC is converted to an actual border, perhaps India can consider a move to demilitarize Siachen. Till then, India simply has to keep holding it.

    Xerxes Adrianwalla is a retired Brigadier of the Indian Army and a regular contributor to Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

    This feature was written exclusively for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. You can read more exclusive features here.


    =================================================


    Solution to siachin is near seems track-2 negotiations worked.Well done PM manmohan singh.we can now look forward for his early visit to pakistan in late november or in early December to seal the siachin deal............................
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    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

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  3. #3
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    Pakistan India
    India-Pakistan CBMs Project:Siachen Proposal

    There was further discussion on the proposal for the demilitarisation of the region and for
    stringent and cooperative monitoring and verification of this. After considerable
    discussion a suggestion achieved consensus which seeks to have these activities occur as
    part of an overall package. Recognising that both countries have a divergence of views,
    it was felt that such an approach is more likely to create forward movement.

    Accordingly, as a part of the comprehensive resolution of the Siachen dispute, and
    notwithstanding the claims of each country, both sides should agree to withdraw from
    the conflict area while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege
    on the commitments. The following clear package of integrated and inter-linked
    stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of the area and delineation of the line:

    • Set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with
    existing Agreements;
    • The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records
    exchanged;
    • The determination of the places to which redeployment will be affected would be
    jointly agreed;
    • Disengagement and demilitarization would occur in accordance with a mutually
    acceptable time frame to be agreed (see Annex 1);
    • Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other
    military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and
    • Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarized
    zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency (see Annex 2).
    In keeping with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration both sides should
    undertake that resolution of this issue is a bilateral matter and that there will be no change
    in the status of the area and also that no personnel of any third country will be permitted
    within it unless cleared by the two countries jointly.Annex 1
    Suggested Time Frame for Demilitarisation
    Schedule for Demilitarisation
    Operational principles:
    • Establish a Joint Working Group to recommend detailed re-deployment and
    oversee implementation of the process.
    • Variability in process is likely due to frequently changing weather conditions.
    Weather forces disengagement to be conducted during the summer season (May –
    September)
    Determination of the place (s) to which redeployment will be effected and the time frame
    to be recommended by the Joint Working Group.
    Mechanism for joint management of the demilitarized zone to be recommended by the
    Joint Working Group.
    Possible Phases of Demilitarisation (with appropriate waste and munitions removal at
    each phase)
    Phase 1: Withdraw medium artillery located near Base Camps (e.g., Dzingrulma, Gyari)
    Phase 2: Withdraw troops and field artillery from Northern, Central, and Southern
    battalion sub-sectors
    • Forward posts, including crew-served weapons posts
    • Declare staging camps where troops from forward positions will transit through in
    the process of re-deployment
    • Dismantle camps after withdrawal
    Phase 3: Withdraw from forward logistics camps on or near the Glacier
    Phase 4: Dismantle remaining logistics camps
    Phase 5: Withdraw from base camps
    Phase 6: Dismantle or convert base camps to scientific/civil use
    Ongoing: Cooperative monitoring and verification of demilitarization (see Annex 3)Annex 2
    Monitoring and Verification of the Demilitarisation
    Overall Concept
    • Monitoring initially, by national technical means
    • Phase 1: Monitoring and verification of disengagement during the establishment
    of the DMZ
    o Verify that posts, logistics centers, and base camps vacated
    • Phase 2: Post-disengagement monitoring of the DMZ
    o Verify that military personnel and equipment do not re-enter the DMZ
    • On an ongoing basis, the primary monitoring and verification mechanisms will be
    both bilateral and cooperative
    Goal is to verify withdrawal and dismantlement of military facilities
    • Visual: The withdrawal from Indian and Pakistani posts within line of sight of
    each other is to be coordinated so each side can observe the activities of the other.
    Ammunition and heavy weapons which cannot be moved immediately will be
    temporarily stored in-place and subject to joint verification and monitoring.
    • Joint Aerial Reconnaissance: A pair of Indian and Pakistani helicopters will
    rendezvous at an agreed location and then fly together along the Forward Battle
    Positions in the agreed sector to visually verify and photographically record
    withdrawal and dismantlement of post or logistics camp.
    • On-site inspection: Both sides have the right to request that its representative land
    by helicopter at a location to confirm withdrawal and dismantlement.
    • Unilateral activities: Both sides should agree not to interfere with the other’s
    national technical means
    Goal of detecting illicit re-occupation of positions within the DMZ
    • Monitoring and verification considerations:
    o Nothing happens quickly on Siachen; logistics and weather drive all
    o The possibility of a quick, stealthy reoccupation, without an air bridge, is
    remote
     Aerial operations are obvious
     Small-scale intrusions are neither significant nor sustainable
    • Monitoring and verification should focus on logistics
    o All Indian logistics flows through Dzingrulma
    o Pakistan has multiple logistics routes through civilian villages
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    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
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    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

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    Pakistan India
    India-Pakistan Military CBMs project
    Phase 1
    Final Report

    I. Introduction
    The India-Pakistan military CBMs project held meetings in Dubai from 20-21 November 2011;
    Bangkok from 23-25 February 2012; and Lahore from 23-25 September 2012. Additionally,
    smaller, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai on 21 April 2012, and Palo Alto from
    30-31 July 2012. This report will summarise the main conclusions of the discussions. Appended
    to it is a proposal on the Siachen issue.
    II. General Political Situation
    The project held several discussions of the general situation, both in the region and bilaterally,
    and how this affects the prospects for progress on the CBM file. It was reported that the
    relationship between the two countries is going through a relatively positive phase. Diplomatic
    and business contacts are improving across a range of issues. At the same time, suspicions
    remain concerning each side’s view of the other’s objectives and alleged actions in Afghanistan,
    and in the area of military doctrines and deployments.
    There has been another round of Track 1 discussions on both conventional and nuclear CBMs,
    but both sides found it disappointing. The 2007 accord “Reducing Risk Relating to Nuclear
    Weapons” has been renewed for another five years. However, there was no progress on other
    proposals to develop new CBMs. In contrast, some participants pointed to lower profile
    examples of confidence-building measures at work between the two countries. For example,
    when there was an inadvertent helicopter crossing of the LOC into Pakistan, the matter was
    managed quickly and effectively.
    Some participants expressed fear that political, technical and doctrinal changes on both sides are
    compressing the time available for decision-making in a future crisis with potentially serious
    consequences. It was felt that crisis mitigation mechanisms beyond the current CBMs are
    needed. This led to a discussion of the growing interplay between sub-conventional,
    conventional, and nuclear issues, with many expressing the concern that they were being linked
    in dangerous ways which will foster escalation in a crisis. The growing pressure of the media
    and other societal changes could make it difficult to resist pressures to escalate in a crisis. This
    led to a discussion over the need to prevent rapid escalation of future crises, and over possible
    CBMs to this effect, which will be reflected later in this report.

    Participants then noted that current political trends in each country do not favour the negotiation
    of far-reaching CBMs and agreements. Each government is preoccupied and is likely to remain
    so for some time. It was noted that the propensity on both sides to "wait and see" dissuades
    either from considering far-reaching changes to its doctrines or policies. Against these points,
    some participants indicated that sweeping changes are underway on both sides, which undermine 2
    the "wait and see" view. It was generally agreed that there is a need to find ways out of the
    present situation whereby each side wants to discuss different things and feels it can wait if the
    other is not prepared to come to the table.
    In this context, it was agreed that the role of Track 2 is not to “track Track 1” but to push ahead
    of it and explore ideas that cannot yet be discussed officially and develop proposals for
    consideration by the official level.
    III. Status of Existing CBMs
    The project reviewed the status of existing CBMs between the two countries. Based on
    presentations from the two sides, it was agreed that the main existing military CBMs are:
    DGMO Hotline
    • Non-attack on nuclear facilities (1988)
    • Advance notice of military exercises and maneuvers (1991)
    • Prevention of Airspace Violations (1991)
    • Link between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (2005)
    • Informal ceasefire along LOC/AGPL (2003)
    • Joint patrolling along the international border and periodic flag meetings. Non
    development of new posts

    Biannual meeting between Indian border security forces and Pakistani Rangers (2004)
    • Advance notice of Ballistic Missile tests (2005)

    In discussions, the following was agreed with respect to each of these CBMs:
    On the DGMO Hotline, it was agreed that this is working well, though thought should be given
    to making sure the interactions through this channel are both more frequent and substantive.
    There was discussion of how the idea of this agreement could be extended to other areas, which
    will be reflected in the following section of this report.
    On the agreement on Non-attacks on Nuclear Facilities, it was agreed that this CBM is working
    well. It was noted that the CBM was agreed before the two sides became declared nuclear
    powers and some wondered if the agreement could be extended to cover military nuclear sites,
    thereby making it into a form of “reassurance vis a vis counterforce” agreement. The majority
    took the view that this is not possible in the present environment and any effort to do so now
    might jeopardise a useful agreement.
    On the Advance Notification of Military exercises and manoeuvres agreement it was noted
    that this CBM works well, but could be improved in its implementation in several ways. There
    was, for example, discussion over whether the levels of notification of exercises (Division level
    exercises) are appropriate in light of military developments since the agreement was signed in
    1991. There was no consensus, but it was suggested that the two sides could review this. Some
    participants questioned whether all relevant commands and officers on both sides were
    sufficiently aware of this agreement, particularly in the Navies and the Air Forces. It was 3
    suggested that the two governments take steps to make sure that the requirements and
    circumstances for such notifications are broadly circulated and written into SOP.
    On the Prevention of airspace violations agreement, there was a lengthy discussion of how this
    CBM might be improved in light of developments since it was signed in 1991. In particular, the
    increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles by both sides was noted, as was the fact that both
    sides will soon likely be using armed UAVs. While most were reluctant to open up this existing
    CBM to further negotiation for fear it might be compromised in the process, there was consensus
    that the two countries could explore whether a separate CBM is necessary to prevent potential
    airspace incidents involving UAVs, drawing upon the form and content of the existing document
    as appropriate.
    On the agreement to establish electronic communications Links between the Pakistan
    Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard, it was noted that the electronic links
    had worked well between 2005 and 2010 and been useful. Despite an agreement being signed to
    continue these links until 2016, they had fallen into disuse. It was noted with approval that this
    situation was corrected recently. In pursuance of the MOU signed between the two countries in
    2005, the DG Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and DG Indian Coastguard have been meeting
    annually. The last meeting was held in July 2012 during which discussions were held on
    maritime issues, particularly working out mechanisms on inadvertent line crossers at sea
    (fishermen).
    On the Informal ceasefire along the LOC/AGPL it was agreed – especially among participants
    with past command experience in the region – that this CBM works quite well. There was
    discussion of the value of formalising the CBM, but many felt that doing so would be difficult
    politically right now and any attempt to do so could risk the CBM itself.
    On Joint patrolling along the international border and the non-development of new border
    posts it was agreed that this CBM works well. There was agreement that the re-negotiation of a
    broader CBM which sets some ground rules for activities along the international border which
    are not covered by this CBM should be explored.
    On the Biannual meeting between the Heads of the Indian Border Security Force and the
    Pakistan Rangers, it was agreed that this CBM works well and should not be changed.
    Finally, on the CBM on Advance notification of Ballistic missile tests it was agreed that this
    CBM should be modified to include cruise missiles (as also recommended by the Ottawa
    Dialogue on nuclear issues).
    IV. Proposed, but not yet implemented CBMs
    Several CBMs which have been proposed between the two sides, but not yet agreed, were
    identified. These are:
    • A Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement;4
    • The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of a
    Communications link between the two navies;
    • Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
    seminars;
    • Mil-to-mil exchanges and “cultural” activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
    visits by military bands; sports teams and adventure activities);
    • Quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC; and
    • Speedy return of inadvertent line crossers.

    On the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement it was noted that this CBM was called for in
    the Memorandum to the Lahore Declaration of 1999. It was further noted that a separate Track
    Two between retired senior naval officers has worked on this for many years and developed a
    proposed text. This was shared with the two governments some time ago and became the basis
    for an official exchange between them. Our information is that the two sides had certain
    observations on the text, but currently the process of developing an agreement for signature
    seems to be stalled. There was unanimous agreement that the two Governments should revisit
    this issue, to find out why the process seems to have stalled and to agree and sign an agreement
    as quickly as possible.
    On The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of
    a Communications link between the two navies it was agreed that this is necessary and that
    CBMs should be put in place to facilitate such contacts. It was agreed that these new
    communications links should not be seen primarily as “hotlines” and that the existing DGMO
    hotline should continue to be the primary channel to serve that purpose in the event of crisis. But
    these new links would facilitate the sharing of information between the Air Forces and Navies
    which is specific to their interests.
    On the Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
    seminars it was agreed that this should go forward as quickly as possible. An agreement to this
    effect should be signed. Exchanges could start at the institutional level with Staff Colleges and
    National Defence University/Colleges, and then be expanded to include specific positions, such
    as Vice-Chiefs. Also, regular face-to-face meetings of the DGMOs could take place, to
    supplement their regular phone calls.
    On Mil-to-mil exchanges and “cultural” activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
    visits by military bands; sports team and adventure activities), there was an in-depth
    discussion. It was noted that this CBM would tend to extend contacts between officers and
    enlisted personnel on both sides. Some wondered if this should be done at this stage at the
    military level before civilian cultural exchanges are on a better footing, while others felt it should
    be. The majority felt that such contacts should go ahead though this CBM requires further study.
    On the quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC, such a CBM is
    under consideration and has been discussed at the official level. This group believes that such a
    CBM will further enhance trust and provide an opportunity to address tactical issues at local
    levels.5
    Finally, on the speedy return of inadvertent line crossers, once again this CBM is
    consideration and has been discussed at the official level. This group believes that such an
    agreement will contribute to the building of trust, to stability, and will help alleviate the hardship
    experienced by those who inadvertently cross the line.
    V. Siachen and Sir Creek
    The project had significant discussions, and developed a proposal on the Siachen issue. The
    proposal is attached.
    On Sir Creek, it was reported that progress has been made in recent years in the form of a joint
    hydrographic survey in 2007 which has established an agreed “ground truth” on the present
    geographical disposition of the area.
    However, there continues to be significant disagreement over where the boundary should be
    located. India argues for a "mid-channel" approach, while Pakistan cites the "green line". It was
    agreed that the difference between the two will have a significant impact on progress of the
    delimitation of the maritime boundary. It is encouraging to note that talks have been going on
    between the two countries on a more or less annual basis. During the 11th round of talks in May
    2011, both sides agreed to exchanged non-papers on Sir Creek. In the 12th round of talks of the
    joint Working Group in New Delhi in June 2012, certain suggestions were made by both parties
    but there was no consensus. Finding a solution to the Sir Creek issue is of paramount importance
    as it has a direct bearing on resolving the maritime boundary.
    It was agreed that the ultimate solution of this issue will be a political question.
    The group will conduct further studies on this issue.
    VI. Crisis stability
    Discussion over this issue revealed a consensus view that crisis stability is a key issue and that
    technologies, doctrines and political/media forces are evolving in ways which compress the time
    available during a crisis for diplomacy to defuse tensions and prevent conflict.
    There was agreement that a useful area for CBMs in the short to medium term is the elaboration
    of a framework for crisis management to provide the two sides with some agreed steps that can
    be taken to prevent a crisis from spinning out of control; referred to by one participant as
    “providing a longer fuse” in a crisis situation. To that end there was consensus that an
    interlocking network of CBMs should be developed which, in the event of a crisis, would:
    • Require a political commitment that diplomats and officials from each side come
    together at the outset of the crisis for discussions on how to resolve it;
    • Require that, in times of crisis, both sides should take no military actions and adhere to
    existing CBMs; and
    • Discussions should begin as soon as possible on new CBMs relevant in these
    circumstances.6

    It was agreed by consensus that discussions should also commence at an early date to review
    existing CBMs, such as the Agreement on Advance Notification of Military Exercises and
    Manoeuvres, with a view to updating them in light of technical and political developments since
    they were first signed.
    Further, it was agreed by consensus that a CBM should be agreed whereby both sides, including
    their respective military establishments, should regularly meet to discuss their respective
    concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures to build confidence in the nuclear
    and conventional fields.
    Some participants argued that the only way to finally overcome these problems is through
    changed mind-sets on both sides as to the possible use of military force, including sub-state
    actors. All participants felt that CBMs should be designed which would seek to constrain the
    possibility that force could be used to resolve disputes. Some felt that one way to resolve such
    issues would be through the creation of a "No War Pact." Others, while not necessarily
    disagreeing with this analysis, believed that changed mind-sets are too far away and that
    managing the existing situation so that conflict does not happen by accident is a more realistic
    goal.
    Participants in this project agreed that this issue requires further study and agreed that the project
    will consider ways to develop mechanisms for crisis prevention and management.
    VII. Terrorism
    Indian and Pakistani participants shared their respective perspectives on terrorism. All
    participants agreed that it was a major issue which needed to be effectively addressed.
    In terms of military-to-military CBMs in this area, there was consensus that one possible
    measure would be real time sharing of information on cross-border movement.

    Beyond military CBMs, it was recognised that intelligence-sharing is a key issue. It should be
    noted that information is being shared on lists of terror groups which both sides wish to see
    stopped but cooperation on investigations regarding these groups should be more intensive and
    transparent.
    Other suggestions included:
    • The creation of a hotline between the interior ministries on terror issues;
    • An effort to revive the SAARC mandated Integrated Regional Data-base on terror;
    • Discussions between respective officials on national experiences on such matters as legal
    frameworks to deal with terror;
    • Greater maritime cooperation on terror; and
    • Exchanges of views between the immigration, border services and customs authorities on
    both sides.7
    It was agreed by project participants that this issue is an important area for future work. Thus,
    they have agreed to carry out a series of intensive studies on various aspects of the question,
    including:
    • Study on the Joint Anti-terrorism Mechanism (what was the experience of negotiating it,
    why did it not succeed at the time and could it be revived and improved today?)
    • Bring together legal and law enforcement experts from both sides to study the legal
    frameworks for dealing with terror and make suggestions.
    • Study on models of regional, bilateral and international cooperation in dealing with
    terror.
    • Study on how to prevent future attacks and what to do to prevent escalation through
    effective crisis management mechanisms should such attacks occur.
    VIII. Conclusion and Way Ahead
    At the meeting in Lahore, the group discussed and adopted this report and further discussed the
    way ahead for its work. It was agreed that this report will be made public in the hopes that it will
    stimulate further discussion of these issues.
    The co-chairs of the process, General Karamat and ACM Tyagi, will provide this report to their
    respective governments.
    The Lahore meeting constitutes the final meeting of Phase 1 of this project. However, the
    participants are of the view that there remains useful work for them to do on issues such as
    terror; Sir Creek; bridging the trust deficit; and crisis stability. They therefore agreed that a
    Phase 2 will be launched and asked the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center of the
    Atlantic Council to undertake to do so.
    The participants expressed their thanks to the sponsors of this process: the Near East and South
    Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University; and the US Institute of
    Peace. They also expressed their thanks to the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center
    of the Atlantic Council for their work in organising the meetings.
    List of participants:
    Co-chairs:

    General Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan Army Retd)
    Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi (Indian Air Force Retd)
    Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal (Pakistan Army, Retd)
    Rana Banerji (former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, India)
    Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry (Pakistan Air Force, Retd)
    Lieutenant General (Retd) Tariq Ghazi (former Defense Secretary of Pakistan)
    Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
    Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army, Retd)8
    Ambassador Vivek Katju (Indian Foreign Service, Retd)
    Ambassador Aziz Khan (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
    Admiral Tariq Khan (Pakistan Navy, Retd)
    Ambassador Riaz Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan)
    General Tariq Majid (Pakistan Army, Retd)
    Ambassador Lalit Mansingh (former Foreign Secretary of India)
    Lieutenant General BS Pawar (Indian Army, Retd)
    Major General Qasim Qureshi (Pakistan Army, Retd)
    Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Indian Army, Retd)
    Ajai Shukla (Journalist)
    Vice Admiral A.K. Singh (Indian Navy, Retd)
    Lieutenant General Aditya Singh (Indian Army, Retd)
    Lieutenant General Arvinder Singh Lamba (Indian Army, Retd)


    ================================================== =====


    Above two posts are track-2 negotiations reports...
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  5. #5
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    Pakistan India
    Three steps to Siachen
    By Arun Kumar Singh


    India and Pakistan have been engaged in military-level Track 2 talks for the past 12 months, with the delegates of the two sides meeting in Dubai, Bangkok and finally in Lahore in September this year. Smaller “sub-group” meetings in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Palo Alto (California) have also featured in the Track 2 process. A number of issues — among them Siachen, Sir Creek, confidence-building measures — were discussed at the meetings, where my participation as part of the Indian delegation brings me to share my take on the issue of demilitarisation of Siachen.

    There are three aspects to the Siachen issue. The first, in my opinion, needs transparent action at the government level. The first aspect is why should India, in the first place, agree to any demilitarisation of Siachen when it holds the dominating high ground on Saltoro Ridge and can command the strategic region, thus preventing a China-Pakistan link up in the region? Why should India vacate Siachen when Indian Parliament has passed a resolution that the entire Jammu & Kashmir (including ****************** Kashmir) is Indian territory?

    Why should India repeat the case of returning Haji Pir Pass when there is a strong possibility that the Pakistan Army will reoccupy the Saltoro Ridge and we will never be able to take it back again? India has lost a total of 814 soldiers in Siachen since 1984, but now due to superior facilities and a better economy, we can remain there indefinitely. So why should the sacrifices of our soldiers be forgotten, and why should we vacate Saltoro Ridge when we hold all the cards? Why should India not link Siachen to other issues like Pakistan-sponsored terrorism? Given its sensitive and emotive nature, I feel that the Indian government would need to answer the question why.

    The second aspect is when should India agree to demilitarisation of Siachen? Here also the Track 2 discussed the political instability and the possibility of early elections looming in India and Pakistan. This question of when can only be dealt with by the next government at the Centre.

    The third aspect, which Track 2 discussed and finally agreed to a proposal, is how to demilitarise Siachen?

    The official Indian stand on delineation and authentication is well known, and the Track 2 proposal has covered these aspects. The Pakistani team were worried that if they agreed to authentication of the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line), India may stop further discussions on Siachen, once the authentication had been carried out. Hence, an “integrated” approach was agreed to.

    The Track 2 proposals for “how to demilitarise Siachen” are “part of the comprehensive resolution of the Siachen dispute, and both sides should agree to withdraw from the conflict area while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege on the commitments”. The Track 2, Lahore “Siachen Proposal” of September 25, 2012, says “the following clear package of integrated and interlinked stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of the area and delineation of the line”:

    * Setting up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing arrangements
    * The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records exchanged
    * The determination of the places to which redeployment would be affected would be jointly agreed
    * Disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable timeframe. (Esta-blishment of a joint working group has been proposed, in a separate annexure.)
    * Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from its area of control
    * Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to for ensuring transparency.

    The concluding paragraph of the Track 2 proposal reads: “In keeping with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, both sides should undertake that resolution of this issue is a bilateral matter and that there will be no change in the status of the area, and also that no personnel of any third country will be permitted within it, unless cleared by the two countries jointly.”

    I have written earlier that Track 2 is not a magic wand, which can solve complicated problems between India and Pakistan. It can only provide some possible solutions for the consideration of Track 1 discussions. The proposals on how to demilitarise Siachen are doable, provided the Indian government answers the questions of why and when.

    The Track 2 teams of both countries have done their job, and now it is up to the two governments to make the next move.

    The writer, a former vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam

    =========================================

    All theses reports suddenly came in with in last 2-3 weeks alone.wat it suggests is siachin is done deal and deal on rann of kutch is also on negotiation.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  6. #6
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    Pakistan India
    Swamy writes to PM opposing any move to demilitarise Siachen
    Press Trust of India / New Delhi
    Janata Party President Subramanian Swamy today urged Prime Minister Manmohan Singh not to accept any proposal to demilitarise the Siachen Glacier.

    In a letter to Singh, he said Track 2 teams comprising military officers from India and Pakistan are learnt to have recommended to the Government to demilitarise Siachen Glacier area where "814 soldiers have died so far".

    "I expect you will not agree to such an abject surrender of a strategic area," Swamy wrote.
    The Janata Party chief also met Defence Minister A K Antony to raise the issue.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  7. #7
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    Pakistan India
    Two nations & a glacier~I
    Beyond Siachen’s ‘Strategic Ego’


    By Abhijit Bhattacharyya
    FIRST thing first; let us note the views on Siachen expressed by two retired soldiers-turned-scholars; a Major-General and a Lieutenant-General. The former finds Siachen to be a “buffer certainly, but strategically irrelevant”. Accordingly, it has only “acquired a strategic ego” but “does not have any strategic significance”. The retired soldier now feels that “the costs of holding glacial heights are huge….Thousands of lives have been lost and roughly 30 Indian soldiers die every year due to harsh weather and killer terrain”. Curiously enough, after stating that “thousands of lives have been lost”, the former two-star general quotes Defence minister Antony’s statement in Parliament in August 2012 to contradict himself “that 846 soldiers have died since 1984”! For the ex-soldier “the bottom line, however, is to bring troops down from Siachen. A compromise has to be hammered out as strategic sense dictates demilitarization”.
    The focus of the retired Lt-General who, by his own confession, “has been part of Track II dialogue with Pakistan” is “murky political atmospherics between the neighbours”. Note the ex-soldier’s unique attempt to equate his own country’s enterprise (of which he has been an integral part for close to four decades) as “murky” thereby putting India at par with a Pakistan that has been hostile ever since 22 October 1947 (Kashmir invasion forgotten?). Perhaps the enthusiasm of the new-found status of a Track II diplomat compels the veteran general to seek a “resolution of the problem of Siachen” as he finds “exciting” a reported “peace overture by the **** army chief Kayani”.
    Post-retirement, the general’s attention appears to have diverted from India’s security to economics as he feels that “for India the estimated annual financial burden of approximately Rs 1000 crore to maintain the desired force levels at Siachen is avoidable”. He refers to it as the “Siachen dispute”.
    Understandably, both ex-servicemen are under a magnetic and mesmerizing effect of Aman ki asha (Hope for Peace) slogan of a group of people who have taken recourse to a “trust-development, trade, migration, visa, tourism, commerce and people-to-people contact” with a country which is being eschewed by the world for being the global factory of jihad, terrorism and fundamentalism.
    O
    ne, however, is not surprised, being a follower of the forces of Indian history and the pathetic (should one say sympathetic!) record of the geographical politico-military history to guard and defend its western and north-western border from Alexander (327 B.C) to Kargil (1999 A.D) and beyond, an area where cross-border terrorists from Pakistan now have put Indian soldiers on tenterhooks.
    In fact one is dismayed to find such an unusually high degree of pacifism and withdrawal in the post-retirement psyche of such senior and decorated soldiers of India. The retired officers need to be reminded that to suggest that Siachen is “strategically irrelevant” makes their views look “hollow and irrelevant” because after 35-38 years of practical wisdom on the hostile terrain their views matter for telling the truth and describing the reality with conviction. And not for parrotting the short-term political slogans at the behest of the country’s non-security amateurs.
    In contrast with the views of the retired generals, the present Army chief, General Bikram Singh, appears crisp, focussed and clear about Siachen’s “strategic importance to India” as it is vital to hold on to current troop positions on the icy battlefield. General Singh is opposed to any troop withdrawal. “We must continue to hold” as Chinese soldiers continue to be “present in ****************** Kashmir”.
    The question, therefore, stands “settled”, albeit temporarily. It is temporary because the image of a pacific India’s vacillation and appeasement politics (which is already well known) will in future cost New Delhi dear. Indeed, border security management has been a case of chronic failure for the Indian ruling class as it has traditionally been adept in dealing with the subject in a cavalier manner. They need to be reminded that security is not to be confused with, or confined to, the urban centres only.
    The territory of India begins with the border and that cannot be left at the will and wishes of God Almighty alone. It hardly needs iteration that no nation in international relations (between sovereign states) can remain vacant or be left as “no-man’s-land” on the basis of “goodwill, good neighbourliness” or for the sake of “peace of our times” etc. The present standoff between Beijing and Tokyo around the remote, sparsely populated and tiny islands in East Asia or the Argentina-UK war over the Falkland Islands in 1982, more than 6000 miles away from London, are only two examples. The advocates of the “Siachen-withdrawal” may argue on the basis of “high altitude casualty” and the resultant “cost-push factor”. Such reasoning betrays a poor understanding of physical geography, geopolitics and the psyche of the hostile people operating around an eternally vulnerable and violent west and north-western frontier.
    The psyche of an element of Indian dispensation should also be examined as it appears to play a vital role to re-shape Indian policy, unlike the days of the strategy-minded Indira Gandhi, arguably the main architect whose signal contribution in reshaping the contours of South Asia has not yet been fully understood, appreciated and appraised. In fact, one is alarmed over developments involving foreign affairs with little concern for India and Indians, entities on which rests the foundation, lives and livelihood of 1.2 billion people.
    This brings us to the legal and constitutional obligations vis-a-vis the honest intent of India’s leadership to bring about a so-called solution of the Siachen “problem” which has often been referred to as “occupied” by India. Let us, therefore, examine Siachen through the prism of the Constitution and Parliament. For the information of those wanting to “bring down troops from Siachen and compromise on the question of “demilitarization”, Article 1(1) of the Constitution stipulates that “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States” and Jammu & Kashmir (within the territory of which Siachen falls) is one of the 28 states which constitute the “membership of the Union & the Territory of India”. Significantly, while defining the “name and territory of the Union”, Article 1(3)(c) clearly stipulates that “the territory of India shall comprise”, amongst other things, “such other territories as may be acquired”. This means that the Constitution is transparent about “acquisition” of “foreign territories”, should the situation so demand, thereby turning it into a “part of the territory of India” under Article 1(3)(c) and by law admitting into the Union under Article 2.
    Since Jammu & Kashmir is a part of India, Siachen automatically becomes a part of the Union of India. Hence any reference to its being “occupied” by India would be void ab initio. One has a simple question to ask. What is the official, legal and diplomatic stand of the Government of India regarding the cartography, political and physical maps and atlases of the world? Does the Government of India recognize or allow import or print of any map or atlas from any quarters with a “cartographic aggression or error pertaining to Jammu & Kashmir”? Has it ever tolerated any depiction thereof as a “divided territory”? Do the Customs officials in charge of import of books (included in which were the iconic Encyclopedia Britannica) and maps through the various ports, airports and land stations allow, or have ever allowed and cleared, such distorted maps? Then why this sudden confusion and contradiction between theory (banning and seizing books/maps/atlas) and practice (proposed withdrawal of border guards from one’s own official territory and professed public/national/international policy)? No doubt Siachen is a high-altitude post; but that is what the army of a nation is maintained and meant for; to guard, to maintain eternal vigilance. That is the “price of liberty”, as succinctly expressed by the legendary Professor Harold Laski.
    (To be concluded)

    The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and a Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  8. #8
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  9. #9
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    The Following User Says Thank You to ajtr For This Useful Post: Superkaif

    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  10. #10
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen Again!

    By Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal




    De-militarisation is a process that consists of several logical steps: ceasefire, authentication, demarcation, withdrawal, re-deployment and verification. It is a concept that formal and informal working groups, researchers and defence analysts have concurred as one of the best possible solutions to the Siachen problem. Reams of paper have been consumed in determining the process and procedures of verification, authentication and lines of redeployment. Ideas have been discussed in official Government to Government talks, Track II meets and think tanks. Use of technology and methodology to map, confirm and monitor have been deliberated upon threadbare, and in some cases, a general consensus has even been arrived at. So where then is the stumbling block?
    On April 06, 2012, an avalanche wiped out the battalion headquarters of the 6th Northern Light Infantry (NLI) at Gyari, located west of the Saltoro Ridge in the Siachenarea, instantly burying 138 Pakistani soldiers and civilians under several feet of snow. The victims included the Commanding Officer, a Company Commander and the Medical Officer.

    Having lost over a hundred soldiers in the unfortunate accident, General Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief was distraught during his visit to the area as any military leader would have been. His remarks in subsequent days, about the demilitarisation of Siachen evoked a fair deal of response from varied quarters.

    A Sudden Change of Heart?
    We fully appreciate the loss of soldiers. In fact, we can empathise completely, having been in similar situations while serving in very high altitude terrain and extreme conditions. For the families of soldiers, be they Indian or Pakistani, the void created by the departure of a dear one is similar howsoever stoically they may attempt to bear it. But these are occurrences that Armies and families are prepared for, fully cognizant of the hazards of service involved.
    So why this sudden change of heart, one may ask. It is certainly not to gain sympathy because the world over, people acknowledge the tragedy and share their concern. It is more as if an incident is being used as an opportunity to stoke the fire once again. It is only coincidental that the timing of the avalanche happens to be two months prior to the scheduled round of talks on Sir Creek and Siachen in June 2012.
    In any number of articles, blogs and television news channels, citizens from different walks of life and analysts agree with the view that the two nations and their armies are engaged in a futile conflict in some of the most inhospitable terrain. They also tend to voice similar opinions about converting the area into a zone of peace thereby reducing the avoidable casualties and decreasing the financial burden. Some go to the extent to say that the area does not have any significance as it lies in a wasteland of snow and ice, where not a blade of grass grows.

    It is necessary therefore, to re-visit some of the salient issues in order to clear misperceptions that may have crept in and clou ded the minds of officials in the Government and people at large.

    The Roots of Conflict
    The name ‘Siachen’, in Balti, refers to a land abundant with wild roses (sia – rose and chen – place or bush of thorns). The Siachen Glacier is located on the eastern Karakoram Range of the Himalayas. The main glacier is sandwiched between the Saltoro Ridge to its West, and the main Karakoram Range to its East. The Siachen glacier is 76 km long, with its width varying from one kilometre to 2.5 km. It is at an altitude ranging from 3,600 m to 5,700 m. The dominating Saltoro Ridge ranges in height from 17,880 to 25,330 feet (5,450 to 7,720m).
    India controls the whole Siachen glacier complex with troops deployed on the Actual Ground Position Line and controls the area from NJ 9842 (the end point of the Line of Control fixed in the 1972 Shimla Agreement) to Indira Col on the Karakoram Range. Pakistan claims the area from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Reaching the Indian Army positions on the Saltoro Ridge, trudging over ice moraines, negotiating crevasses in such rarefied air is a herculean task in itself.
    The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the non-demarcation of the boundary North of NJ 9842. The 1949 Karachi Agreement and the 1972 Shimla Agreement presumed that it was not feasible for humans to survive North of NJ 9842. In July 1949, the UN-led delegation convened an Indo-Pak conference at Karachi to delineate the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Lt .Gen. S K Sinha, who as a junior officer at that time, was the Secretary of the Indian delegation at that conference recalls, “It took us seven days of hectic discussions to delineate an agreed 740 km ceasefire line on a quarter-inch map, from Lalealli in the South to NJ 9842 in the North. No one at that time thought that military operations could take place at the forbidding heights beyond NJ 9842. In any case, the ceasefire line was only something temporary. After plebiscite, it would become easy to be wise after the event. It would have been better if the line beyond NJ 4982 had not been left vague.”



    In the 1970s and early 1980s, Pakistan permitted several expeditions in the general area of the Siachen glacier to reinforce its claim on the area, as the mountaineers were required to obtain a permit from Pakistani authorities. The objective clearly was to create a precedent to assume de facto control over the area. Pakistan also embarked upon a cartographic aggression wherein they tried to establish that the area west of the line joining NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass was a part of Pakistan territory. Based on intelligence reports that indicated the likelihood of the area being occupied by Pakistani troops, India launched Operation Meghdoot on April 23, 1984. Pakistan quickly responded with counter deployments but within a few days, the Indians were in control of most of the approaches to the Siachen glacier. Two passes — Sia La (18,000 ft) and Bilafond La (19,000 ft) — were secured by India while a few heights in the Gyong La (16,000 ft) remained under Pakistan’s control. Both sides have made several attempts to displace each other’s forces but in vain.

    Aggressor Status
    Some try to justify the occupation of the Saltoro by saying that India did not wrest the Siachen, it was unoccupied. That is more of a technicality and could be argued in a court of arbitration, if ever one is constituted. However, the fact is that India is convinced about what was meant in the Karachi and Shimla Agreements and has no doubt whatsoever, that it has only occupied its own territory.

    Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, who was General Officer Commanding, 10 Corps of Pakistan from 1980 to 1984, writes in his book, ‘Pakistan Leadership Challenges’, that they had sent a Company of the elite Special Services Group to occupy Bilafond La in the summer of 1983, which they effectively accomplished. In their report they indicated they had observed some Indian troop activity of the Ladakh Scouts in the Siachen glacier area. Although their Company had to return to base in September as they were not equipped or provisioned for the winter, the Pakistan Army firmed up its plans to deploy forces by May 1984 on the Saltoro. It was a different matter that when their forces reached the location, they found the Indian troops already deployed there. General Dad Khan writes, “This was a great setback for Pakistan. We had obviously failed to appreciate the timing of the Indian move and our intelligence agencies had failed to detect the brigade size force in the area in April 1984.”
    There are some who debate that India’s response to the Pakistani cartographic aggression should have been in similar terms or tackled diplomatically, and not by physical means. According to Lt. Gen. M L Chibber, then Indian Northern Army Commander, routine patrolling by Indian troops had already commenced seeing Pakistan’s motives in the early 1980s. The problem precipitated on August 21, 1983, when a protest note was handed over from the Pakistan Northern Sector Commander stating that the Line of Control joins with the Karakoram Pass and the area west of this belongs to Pakistan. The Indians then swung into action.
    The sequence of events brings out quite clearly that India did not act unilaterally. In fact, on reflection one can say with pride that the Indian establishment displayed sagacity, vision and political will in deciding to go ahead, and to the Indian Armed Forces for executing the mission with professionalism and unmatched courage in the face of adversity.
    During the recent debates in the electronic media, subsequent to General Kayani’s offer of the so-called proposal to resolve the Siachen issue, every Pakistani expert guest on the TV channels prefaced his or her views with, “…India’s aggression and illegal occupation of Siachen in 1984 …” or words to that effect. It is this hurt that they tried to avenge in Kargil in 1999 but failed. This was also evident during the several rounds of Siachen Talks that have been concluded between both countries.

    Significance of Siachen
    General Chibber has succinctly stated that the Siachen glacier is a wedge that keeps the two adversaries apart. If one were to concede the Pakistani view that the line north of NJ 9842 does indeed join with the Karakoram Pass, it would literally amount to the Chinese presence in the Shaksgam valley moving southwards to the Nubra valley. With the reported activity of Chinese troops involved in building projects in Gilgit and Baltistan, the general area right down to the Shyok valley will become a collusive playground and a zone for future exploitation by the Chinese and Pakistanis through the Khunjerab and Karakoram passes.

    Occupation of the Saltoro and Siachen provides a buffer to Ladakh and in military parlance, the much needed depth to important mountain passes that are gateways to Ladakh and onto Kashmir. There are a number of ‘experts’ who point out that it is futile to hold on to the positions on the Saltoro ridgeline because they are important only tactically and has are of no strategic significance. They are obviously unaware of the prevailing conditions in Siachen and the unequal advantage that accrues to a defender deployed in prepared positions on heights at 18,000 feet and above. Whereas no position is ever considered impregnable by a determined body of soldiers, get in touch with a survivor of any such attack that either failed or succeeded, and ask him about his tribulations and his brush with death at close quarters. The professionals in the Pakistan Army are not naïve to have attempted to capture pickets on the Saltoro over and over again despite heavy casualties. If ever there was a tactical gain that was instrumental in providing exponential dividend to a strategic cause, this is one.
    During the 1980s and the 1990s, our positions in the Siachen sector were being developed and the Armed Forces were trying to improve their operational preparedness in terms of weapons, equipment, clothing, logistics, air support or maintenance. The Indian forces are now actually in such a strong, controlling position that they enjoy overwhelming operational and psychological superiority to even put pressure or indirectly influence Baltistan and Shaksgam – in military terms, a threat in being.

    Casualties
    “Why this senseless unconcern for human lives at unforgiving altitudes and extreme climatic conditions?” is a question which is very often asked of military officers. It is generally believed that commanders are so mission oriented that they do not care how many casualties are suffered as long as success is achieved. Nothing could be further from the truth. The relationship and bond that units and sub-units establish while operating in adverse conditions like Siachen can truly be experienced when one physically stays and ‘lives’ there for a period of time. When six to eight soldiers including an officer live together in a fibre glass hut, share food and hot cups of tea, share the loo, see each other’s face morning, noon and night, rope up on a patrol as one team, then they learn to care and live and die for each other.



    Right up the chain of command, there is an urgency to make living conditions comfortable, improve facilities for forward medical treatment and early evacuation, and procuring the best clothing and equipment. Credit must be given to the helicopter pilots of the Indian Air Force and Army Aviation along with their maintenance and support staff who have conducted casualty evacuation operations with unparalleled zeal and casualties, which had always been the gravest concern, have reduced drastically. Operational casualties have become almost negligible after the Ceasefire was set in motion in November 2003.

    Maximising combat effectiveness with minimum casualties is an oft-repeated Army concept of operations. Every life is precious, and units that de-induct from their tour of duty in Siachen without a single or a few casualties consider it a proud professional achievement, especially if their men have suffered no serious cold injuries. Till the mid-1990s, it was not uncommon for units to record fatal and non-fatal casualties ranging from 20 to as many as 50. Since 1984, the Indian Army has suffered well over 1,000 casualties in Siachen. However, the current casualty figure is about 10 per year.
    The armed forces express their gratitude to the many well wishers and sympathisers on TV talk shows, who have displayed concern over the high casualty figures. But then, one need not get unduly sentimental over occupational hazards. There is a job to be carried out and the Army has the mandate to do it and so far, it has not let the nation down. It is a different matter altogether when Pakistani analysts talk of high casualties on the Indian Army as a justification for India to de-militarise the area. Some of them are under a false notion that their willingness to de-militarise is a concession being given to India. While we sympathise with the loss of lives in the recent avalanche at Gyari in ***, as we do in the case of any natural calamity, we should not allow aroused sentiments to overtake logic and reason in resolution of a complex problem. Incidentally, in 2010, Ladakh experienced an unexpected and massive cloudburst in which scores of locals including an entire post of the Indian Army was swept away under colossal mudslides.

    Cost Effectiveness
    Theoreticians and economists simply cannot understand the reason for this so called wasteful expenditure. Now that there is a ceasefire in place and no fighting is in progress, why do we drain our resources on maintaining hundreds of troops on icy glaciers and snow-covered mountains, they inquire. They forget history and the eternal debate on national security vis-à-vis development. Nations grow, prosper and develop when the sanctity of their borders is intact and when their security forces are capable of thwarting external aggression as well as ensuring internal stability. We learnt our lesson within the first two decades of attaining Independence. It has taken us five decades since the ‘Himalayan blunder’ to be somewhat self-reliant, create limited deterrent capability and acquire the status of being economically and militarily confident. Yet India’s defence budget is barely two per cent of its GDP.

    To put things in perspective, the expenditure in Siachen is an integral part of the defence budget. No special allocation is made separately for it. There was a time when we spent a large sum of money to procure special mountaineering clothing and equipment for troops in Siachen that appeared to be disproportionate to the general expenditure for the rest of the Army. The general public is unaware that the Army has progressed manifold in catering for the requirements of its soldiers operating in equally difficult high altitude terrain in both Northern and Eastern Commands. Special rations and special clothing are equally applicable to other areas at similar altitudes.
    Infrastructure in the Siachen sector has developed over the years, pipelines for kerosene and water have been laid and better facilities have been organised in every sphere of activity. Therefore, the expenditure incurred now is more in the form of maintenance and regular improvements. It is not to say that the expenditure is not heavy but more prudent to realise that it is only marginally higher than what the Army budgets for other extreme high altitude areas.
    If one were to ask whether the money has been gainfully utilised and proportionate results achieved, the answer would be affirmative. In fact, the defence of the Siachen sector is so foolproof, that it provides far greater dividends. But a more pertinent question would be, “What would be the effort required in terms of resources in warlike and other material, not to forget the lives that will be lost, if we were forced to recapture these positions?” The answer is short and simple – prohibitive, both in terms of cost and in the number of officers and men who will pay the ultimate price. In 1999, in Kargil, we lost about 500 of our gallant young officers and soldiers in addition to the monetary cost of the conflict. This does not take into account the despondency and despair in the families of the dead and wounded. If at all you draw up a matrix to compute factors or pros and cons, just remember to give the factor of regaining lost positions a proportionally much higher weightage. The bottom line is that national security cannot be measured on cost-benefit ratio scales.

    De-militarisation
    De-militarisation is a process that consists of several logical steps: ceasefire, authentication, demarcation, withdrawal, re-deployment and verification. It is a concept that formal and informal working groups, researchers and defence analysts have concurred as one of the best possible solutions to the Siachen problem.
    Reams of paper have been consumed in determining the process and procedures of verification, authentication and lines of redeployment. Ideas have been discussed in official Government to Government talks, Track II meets and think tanks. Use of technology and methodology to map, confirm and monitor have been deliberated upon threadbare, and in some cases, a general consensus has even been arrived at. So where then is the stumbling block?
    The primary cause of disconnect is the sequence of the process of de-militarisation. Whereas India insists on authentication as the first step, the Pakistanis want the Indian troops to withdraw to pre-1972 positions before any further discussions can take place. Their contention is that demarcation or authentication must follow re-deployment to mutually agreed lines or out of a zone of disengagement. In their scheme of things, in a de-militarised zone it does not matter who was where, for the activity is not restricted to just the line but in the whole zone. The intention is obvious, even to a casual viewer who is not well versed with the nuances of military terms and processes, and that is the Pakistanis do not want to acknowledge the existence of the current locations of the Indian Army on the Saltoro, the Actual Ground Position Line. In some of the rounds of talks on Siachen, despite recognizing the Indian concern, the Pakistani officials have given vent to their frustrations by stating that the Indians were only interested in authentication for establishing their legal and moral claims.
    The benefits of de-militarisation are not lost on any rational thinking person. The area can be transformed into a peace park or a laboratory for scientific experiments,. ; the environment can be protected and mountaineering expeditions can be flagged off. Moreover, casualties can be avoided and the national exchequers of both countries can be eased a trifle. There is, however, a caveat. What if the agreement is flouted and the positions are occupied by the Pakistan Army? There are proponents who advocate that there should be adequate safeguards built into the agreement to include punitive action, if the aggrieved nation so desires. In practice, punitive action is easier said than done, more importantly generating the political will to authorise it.

    If one was to put one’s finger on just one factor that had an overarching impact on the resolution of the Siachen problem, it would be mutual trust or rather, the lack of it.

    The Trust Factor
    The level of mistrust between India and Pakistan in general and the Indian and Pakistani Security Forces in particular is so deep-rooted that it will take the better part of two generations to overturn. The mistrust began amongst the leaders of the two countries and the people, especially those living in the border regions, even prior to Independence. The Standstill Agreement in 1947 and later, the Karachi Agreement of 1949 was violated by Pakistan. General SK Sinha reflects that the MiniMarg area beyond the ceasefire line but South of the Burzilbai Pass was to be kept demilitarised to deny Pakistan infiltration routes into Tilel Valley, that lay North of the Shamsabari Ridge in Kashmir. Pakistan soon violated the clause of MiniMarg’s demilitarisation.
    The trust gorge has only widened as events have unfolded. Starting with the proxy war in 1989, the façade of the Lahore Declaration was smattered by the illegal occupation of Kargil heights in 1999. The alleged role of the ISI in a number of terrorist actions in India would make an exhaustive list. The attack on the Parliament, blasts in many towns and trains and to top it, the Mumbai terrorist attack on 26/11 are bitter reminders. Calibrating the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir, aiding infiltration from many borders, providing financial and moral support to ‘tanzeems’ and sleeper cells in India and unwillingness to expel terrorism from their soil are at the base of the rampant mistrust.
    Yet there are many peace promoters, intellectuals amongst them, who philosophise that India should undertake a unilateral withdrawal from Siachen. There are also some military officers who were hawks while in service but have apparently become doves post retirement. Track II diplomacy does not mean that you give in or give up what is rightfully yours, just to show progress. Many a time, veteran diplomats and analysts justify the compulsions of the Pakistani establishment, saying that Pakistan will have a difficult task in selling the peace to its people or that it will look like a defeat or give them a face-saving option. Why for heaven’s sake? Let the Pakistani establishment explain the ground realities to its people. On the contrary, every Pakistani commentator has held forth a view that Indian forces must withdraw from the area illegally occupied by them in 1984.

    What is the compulsion to resolve the problem in such a hurry? Yes, we certainly need to address the issue and keep it alive as part of the dialogue process. Had the Pakistanis been occupying the Saltoro Ridge, would they have withdrawn from it unilaterally without extracting their pound of flesh? Caution must be exercised in our keenness to convert it into a peace park so as to ease the burden on the exchequer and provide relief to our soldiers. Some film makers spent several days in the Siachen sector trying to understand how our soldiers operate in such hazardous areas. They appreciate the difficulties which our men face and that each tenure of duty takes away years of their lives. Some feel that we must de-militarise the area so that our men do not suffer. Noble thoughts but our well-meaning citizens should not forget the reason for our soldiers going there in the first place.
    The two countries are constantly engaged in the Composite Dialogue process since a long period of time in spite of intermittent breaks due to unforeseen events or political compulsions at home or abroad. Siachen is only one amongst those issues albeit the least intractable. It would be in the fitness of maintaining momentum of the dialogue that both sides focus on those issues that are less contentious such as economic and commercial cooperation, drug trafficking, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields and even the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project. Concurrently, the talks should continue on terrorism, Sir Creek and Siachen.
    The present tone, tenor and unresponsive attitude of Pakistan, especially with respect to the acknowledgement of the Mumbai terrorist attacks and displaying no inclination to cease cross-border terrorism exudes no confidence or trust. Resolution of the Siachen dispute is possible purely on an edifice of trust which has to be built up gradually by both countries through meaningful Confidence Building Measures in letter and spirit.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  11. #11
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen Conflict :Challenges & prospects

    The demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone will act as a confidence building measure of immense importance. For India, it is a low-risk option to test Pakistan’s long-term intentions for peace, suggests Delhi-based defence analyst Gurmeet Kanwal

    The death of about 150 Pakistani army personnel in an avalanche at the battalion HQ at Gyari in the Siachen conflict zone has once again brought to the fore the dangers of the continuing deployment on both sides of the Actual Ground Position Line despite the fact that an informal cease-fire has been holding up quite well since November 25, 2003. Earlier, in mid-March 2007 also five Pakistani soldiers had perished in an avalanche.

    Even at the peak of fighting in the 1980s and 1990s, maximum casualties on both the sides occurred because of the treacherous terrain, the super high altitude – which affects the human body adversely, and the extreme weather.

    The lack of oxygen at heights between 18,000 and 20,000 feet and prolonged periods of isolation are a lethal combination and result in pulmonary oedema, frostbite and other serious complications. Besides, prolonged deployment at such heights takes a heavy psychological toll.

    While these casualties are now better managed due to early evacuation, improvements in medical science and the establishment of forward medical facilities, they can never be completely eliminated. The lack of oxygen at heights between 18,000 and 20,000 feet and prolonged periods of isolation are a lethal combination and result in pulmonary oedema, frostbite and other serious complications. Besides, prolonged deployment at such heights takes a heavy psychological toll.
    The economic cost of maintaining an infantry brigade group at Siachen to guard the desolate super-high altitude mountain passes and approaches leading to them from the western slopes of the Saltoro Ridge has been estimated to range between Rs 3.0 to 3.5 crore per day – Rs 1,000 to 1,200 crore annually. The costs are high because the logistics tail is long, the only road ends at the Base Camp close to the snout of Nubra river where the almost 80-km glacier ends and a large number of infantry posts can be maintained only by light helicopters that air-drop supplies with attendant losses, as recoveries are often less than 50 per cent. The frequent turnover of troops adds to the costs as a battalion can be stationed at the Saltoro Ridge for a maximum of six months.

    Though the Pakistanis are relatively better off due to the lower heights on the western spurs of the Saltoro on which their troops are holding defensive positions and their shorter lines of communication to Dansam and Skardu, the weather Gods have been equally unkindto troops on both the sides of the AGPL. Dr. Stephen Cohen, a wellknown and respected Washingtonbased South Asia analyst, has described the Siachen conflict as a fight between two bald men over a comb. In his view, “Siachen… is not militarily important… They (Indian and Pakistani armies) are there for purely psychological reasons, testing each other’s ‘will’.”

    Both the sides have been finding it difficult to overcome deeply entrenched negotiation mindsets and are unable to look for innovative and creative approaches. India insists that the present forward positions of both the armies on the Saltoro Range along the AGPL should be demarcated after a joint survey so that there is a reference point in case a dispute arises in future. Pakistan’s position is that by suddenly occupying the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier, India violated the 1972 Shimla Agreement and must, therefore, undo its “aggression” without insisting on legitimising its illegal occupation through the demarcation of present positions.

    After Pakistan’s treachery in Kargil in 1999, the Indian army’s advice to the government that the AGPL must be jointly verified and demarcated before demilitarisation begins, is operationally sound, balanced and pragmatic military advice. However, if Pakistan’s military capacity to grab and hold on to vacated Indian positions after the demilitarisation agreement comes into effect is carefully analysed, it will be found that Pakistan is in no position to occupy any of the posts vacated by India.

    At a recent India-Pakistan Track 2 meeting at Bangkok, organised by the Ottawa University jointly with some think tanks, it was agreed by both the sides that the present
    military positions should be “jointly recorded and the records exchanged” as a prelude to the disengagement and demilitarisation process. While this falls short of the Indian demand for demarcation, it is a workable via media and should be acceptable. Dr. Stephen Cohen, a wellknown and respected Washington-based South Asia analyst, has described the Siachen conflict as a fight between two bald men over a comb. In his view, “Siachen… is not militarily important… They (Indian and Pakistani armies) are there for purely psychological reasons, testing each other’s ‘will’.”
    However, India should insist on building a clause into the demilitarisation agreement that in case of the agreement is violated, both sides reserve the right to take whatever action they deem fit, including offensive military measures. Simultaneously with the withdrawal of its troops from the glacial heights, India should create and maintain suitably structured reserves for counter-action across the LoC at a point of its choosing. These reserves would also be handy for intervention on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the border with China should it ever become necessary.

    On the completion of the demilitarisation process, an international “Science Park” could be established at Siachen Glacier to promote the study of Himalayan glaciers and to take regular measurements for monitoring climate change. Dr. Saleem Ali of the University of Vermont, USA, the originator of the ides of the Karakoram Peace Park Initiative, has done some seminal work in this regard and both the governments could benefit from his writing and activism. The Siachen Glacier zone could also be opened up for international mountaineering expeditions in a step by step manner as both the militaries gain in confidence in monitoring and verification. International help would be necessary to clean up the environmental damage caused over almost three decades of conflict and the dumping and disposal of warlike stores in the area.

    The demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone will act as a confidence building measure of immense importance. For India, it is a low-risk option to test Pakistan’s long-term intentions for peace. It is, therefore, an idea whose time has come. Indian and Pakistani leaders need to find the political will necessary to accept ground realities. Trust begets trust and it will be well worth taking a political and military risk to give peace a chance. It is time the Indian government began the process of building a national consensus around this important bilateral measure.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  12. #12
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen Handout: Bartering India's Security?

    Now, by handing out the Siachen glacier, India is giving up its main leverage
    against Pakistan without gaining anything in return. The ‘Siachen egg’ that UPA lays
    in the last days of its reign can emerge as a monster of epic proportions,
    severely haunting national security.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  13. #13
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Two nations & a glacier-II
    Siachen And The Primacy Of Parliament


    By Abhijit Bhattacharyya
    ARTICLE 3 of the Constitution states: “Parliament can by law (a) form a new State; (b) increase the area of any state; (c) diminish the area of any State; (d) alter the boundaries of any State; (e) alter the name of any State”. This implies that neither the government of the day nor the head of the government nor for that mater any retired or serving general or civil servant can suo motu take away the right, privilege and power of Parliament on the issue. Seen strictly from the Constitutional angle, retreating from one’s own territory, even if done in good faith and under an “honourable” bilateral agreement (with or without verbal assurance or written guarantee) would clearly amount to shrinking of one’s own territory thereby altering and changing the boundaries and diminishing the area of the State.
    Several complexities need to be untied. Is retreat from Siachen an “internal adjustment” or will it be done under a “treaty”? If it is an “internal adjustment” inter se of the territories of the constituent States of India, then it would broadly fall under Article 3; but the five acts specified in Article 3 can be executed only by legislation of Parliament and not by the executive without the sanction of Parliament, even though it involves the implementation of a treaty. However, if Siachen is considered to be a “settlement of a boundary dispute” then it cannot be held to be a “cession of territory” thereby nullifying the principle and procedure of amendment of the Constitution involving a cession or part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State. But is Siachen a case of “boundary dispute”? Isn’t it deep inside the map of J & K?
    Hence the Track II diplomats and advocates of such initiatives as “retreat”, “bring troops down”, “resolution of the problem of the Siachen”, “strategically irrelevant” should spell out the actual plan of action. Article 3 is specially relevant ~ “Provided further that no Bill providing for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu & Kashmir or altering the name or boundary of that state shall be introduced in Parliament without the consent of the Legislature of that State”.
    The inherent implication, therefore, emanates from the name of the State (Jammu & Kashmir). Though “Jammu & Kashmir is a State and forms a part of the territory of India”, under Article 1(3) it would be possible for Parliament to increase or diminish the area thereof, to “alter its name or boundaries in the manner provided in Articles 3-4 only if the legislature of Jammu & Kashmir consents”. The status of Jammu & Kashmir “markedly differs” from that of other States. In the case of other States, only the “views” of the legislatures are “ascertained” by the President before recommending the introduction of a Bill relating to these matters, but “in the case of Jammu & Kashmir no such Bill shall be introduced in Parliament unless the Legislature of that State consents”. And the Constitutional definition of Parliament has been given in Article 79 ~ “There shall be a Parliament of the Union which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known as the Council of States” (Rajya Sabha) “and House of the People” (Lok Sabha).
    Therefore, any hasty action or decision may not be conducive at this juncture.
    Siachen is likely to be a headache for the Government of India if it fails to take into account the Constitutional and legal angles. So far we have been experiencing a difference in perception of the military and its civilian masters which has come into play at the behest of a charm-offensive by Pakistan. But it would be disingenuous to delink the Constitutional and legal provisions from various segments like “border, boundary, line of control, frontier” etc so far as Jammu & Kashmir is concerned. The State is very well defined by the Constitution as being a “part of India”.
    As a civilian, one is inclined to believe that Siachen’s tactically advantageous location on high ground can only be ignored by those who have had insufficient exposure to the harsh reality of the ground. Siachen is a part of Jammu & Kashmir which in turn is part of India. Siachen was retrieved in 1984 by the Congress Government of Indira Gandhi. Changing its status, in effect bypassing Parliament after 28 years by the same party that now heads a coalition, though under a different leader, may not be a prudent step, after all.
    Those who are keen to withdraw from India’s own territory (Siachen) thereby shrinking /changing the border should reflect on a recent judgment. On 15 June 2012, Gauhati High Court ruled on a case that sought direction against giving effect to the agreement/protocol signed on 6 September 2011 by the Governments of India and Bangladesh proposing to cede some part of land to Dhaka. According to the petitioners, the law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 845. Reference was made by the President of India under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution that “no part of the territory of India could be swapped merely by an agreement without amendment of the Constitution”. The judiciary’s verdict stands. “The agreement amounts to a cession of a part of the territory in favour of Pakistan; and its implementation would naturally involve the alteration of the content and the consequent amendment of Article 1 and of the relevant part of the First Schedule to the Constitution, because such implementation would necessarily lead to the diminution of the territory of the Union of India. Such an amendment can be made under Article 368. It, therefore, follows that acting under Article 368 Parliament may make a law to give effect to and implement the agreement in question covering the cession of a part of Berubari.”
    Therefore it is only the Parliament that can give or take, change or alter the border and shrink the land of India. This should be noted by the Siachen apologists, including the public servants holding constitutional posts. Peace with an eternally turbulent neighbour cannot be bought about in haste and through appeasement. The law of the land comes first.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  14. #14
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen was accepted as Indian Territory in 1949!
    Claude Arpi

    The Boss of Pakistan says: “It’s time to resolve the Siachen issue”, but what General Kayani forgets is that the Siachen issue was ‘solved’ long ago, in fact, in July 1949.
    I reproduced here an article that I published 7 years ago on the subject.

    Where wild roses bloom
    Once upon a time, a small Yarkandi village stood guarding the entrance of a mighty glacier of the Karakoram range. It was a meeting place for Balti traders to barter their goods with Central Asian merchants.
    One day the Yarkandis decided to visit their southern neighbours; they descended from the glacier, but before returning north, they could not resist taking away a beautiful Balti girl. The offense could not remain unpunished; the Yarkandi village had to pay for its crime.
    The Baltis contacted a local cleric, who gave them a taweez (amulet) to be placed on summit of the Bilafond-la pass. The villagers were told to strictly follow the priest’s instructions and come back via Nubra valley. However, the Baltis performed only the first part of the ritual. After leaving the taweez on the pass, they did not use the Nubra track to return. Legend says that a terrible storm destroyed the Yarkandi village; only a few stones and wild roses remained.
    The priest later explained why the roses did not disappear; his instructions had not been fully followed. Result: Wild roses could still grow in the area. This glacier is known as the Siachen (‘Sia’ is rose, ‘chen’ is place)-the place where roses bloom. This is one of the many myths around the area. But there are also political myths anchored to the 72 km long glacier.
    One such legend is that Pakistani troops are occupying the glacier. If you regularly read the Pakistani press, you are informed that Islamabad is ready to “withdraw its troops from the glacier” if New Delhi accepts to reciprocate. According to Islamabad, “demilitarisation” is the solution. General Pervez Musharraf has even declared that he finds the issue “actually troublesome for both sides and it is an unnecessary irritant which can be resolved”. But the point is that Pakistan does not occupy the glacier and never did (though it did try in 1983-84). Later in 1984, India took full control of the area as well as most of the peaks of the Saltoro range.

    Today, the legend of Pakistan occupying the glacier is even less credible than the Balti girl’s story, but the disinformation continues. The Pakistani President (and his predecessors as well) has been able to spread false propaganda travelling far and wide. Take, for example, a paper published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the US Library of Congress. Titled, ‘Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments’, which was updated on February 14, 2005.
    It shows a map of Pakistan with the entire glacier as occupied by that country. The CRS is supposed to have been created by the US Congress “in order to have its own source of non-partisan, objective analysis and research on all legislative issues”. Indeed, the sole mission of CRS is to serve the United States Congress.
    What an objective and non-partisan service indeed! And of course, nobody in South Block bothers to complain to “our American friends”! It is necessary to make a quick return to the past to understand the history of the LoC and the glacier. Following the ceasefire of January 1, 1949, the military representatives of India and Pakistan met in Karachi between July 18 and 27, 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. An agreement was reached and the Line of Ceasefire (today’s LoC) was demarcated. The last point on the map was known as ‘NJ 9842′. Nobody thought of going further north at that time. The agreement of July 1949, mentioned therefore that the Line extended “thence north to the glaciers” without going into the details. The important point which is often forgotten now has been pointed out by General SK Sinha, the Governor of J&K, who participated in the Karachi negotiations as the ADC to General Shrinagesh, the head of the Indian delegation. Before leaving for Karachi, the delegates had a briefing from Nehru and the Secretary General of the MEA, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who explained the legal position in detail to the delegates. He told them that the resolution of August 1948 “had conceded the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India and as such no man’s land, if any, should be controlled by India during the period of ceasefire and truce.

    This meant that the onus of proof to convince the commission of any factual position, on the date of ceasefire, in any disputed territory, rested with Pakistan. “In the absence of any such convincing proof, and even if India had no troops on the date of ceasefire in that area, the disputed territory should automatically come under Indian control. This convincing and legalistic argument proved a trump card in our hands at Karachi. Based on this, we obtained control of several hundred square miles of State territory where we were not in position on the date of the ceasefire.”
    This position was then accepted by Pakistan and the UN. It remains valid today. Even if not demarcated, the glacier legally belongs to India. More, the area (including the Saltoro range) has been in the physical possession of the Indian troops since in 1984. In the early ’80s, Islamabad had tried to occupy the glacier under the cover of mountaineering expeditions, but the Indian Army intervened in time and took control.
    This was the beginning of the conflict. What disturbs me most is seeing the Indian press biting the Pakistani propaganda bait. Take, for example, a reputed national weekly which regularly publishes the map of Jammu & Kashmir with a different colour for the Siachen¬as if the glacier is were disputed. After the recent dialogue on Siachen between the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan which concluded without any agreement, many newspapers
    spoke of “failure of the talks”. Does it mean that a unilateral withdrawal from the glacier would have been a “success”? General Musharraf likes to quote the Fifth Round of talks in 1989: “Yes, indeed there was an agreement in 1989. And that Agreement was based on reallocation of the Siachen.” This is far from true. The negotiations saw a hardening of the position of the Pakistan military and, finally, the talks broke down.

    However, a communique was issued stating that “both sides would work towards a comprehensive settlement” in future talks. It was conveniently interpreted in Pakistan as meaning that India would unilaterally withdraw from the glacier. India’s position has always been clear: Delhi is ready to concede a redeployment zone for the sake of a compromise; but, as General VR Raghavan who has been involved in the earlier negotiations, wrote: “First, each side should acknowledge its current position before a disengagement commences. Second, there should be a high level of assurance that neither side would breach the agreed formula.”
    This would require mutual verification and surveillance. It is what General JJ Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff, reiterated when he asked Pakistan to accept the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the 72 km long glacier before even talking of ‘redeployment’. But Pakistan today, like 15 years ago, is not ready to admit that its troops are not positioned on the glacier. This is the reason why it refuses to acknowledge the AGPL.
    The Indian negotiators, who have managed to remain “on their ground position” while agreeing to keep the ceasefire and “continue talks in the future”, deserve to be complimented. It is true that the Pakistani intrusions in Kargil ordered by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 have helped New Delhi to better understand the mind of Pakistani leaders. To kidnap a beautiful girl is easy, it is not quite as easy to get her back home.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  15. #15
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    Pakistan India
    India-Pakistan Experts Agree on Confidence-building Measures at Lahore Meeting

    October 02, 2012
    OTTAWA, October 2, 2012 - At a recent meeting in Lahore, Pakistan, a group of retired senior officials, military officers and diplomats have reached a consensus on a number of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). More specifically, they have agreed on a proposal regarding the demilitarisation of the Siachen area, which has been a potential flashpoint between the two countries for many years. The participants in the process adopted by consensus a general report on their work and the specific proposal on the Siachen issue.
    These discussions are undertaken as part of a project on conventional confidence-building, which is jointly organized by the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Centre at the Atlantic Council. The project is supported by the Near East and South Asia Centre for Strategic Studies at the National Defence University and the United States Institute of Peace, with additional support from Stanford University. The participants in this process have decided to continue their work on these matters, and have accordingly asked the organizers to prepare a new round of meetings.
    For further information on this process, please contact the two co-chairs of the discussions: General Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan Army, retired) [email protected] or Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi (Indian Air Force, retired) [email protected].
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  16. #16
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    Pakistan India
    Demilitarization of the Siachen
    Conflict Zone: Concepts for
    Implementation and Monitoring


    Brigadier (ret.) Asad Hakeem
    Pakistan Army
    Brigadier (ret.) Gurmeet Kanwal
    Indian Army
    with
    Michael Vannoni and Gaurav Rajen
    Sandia National Laboratories



    Abstract
    Pakistani and Indian militaries have been occupying the Siachen Glacier and surrounding
    regions for decades. Although a cease-fire is in place, continued occupation carries the
    risk of an inadvertent conflict, which could escalate into a full-fledged nuclear-backed
    confrontation. Political and military analysts in Pakistan and India now question the
    strategic significance of the Siachen Glacier and agree that under the right circumstances,
    military withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier region would not adversely affect either
    state. The difficulty lies in conducting the withdrawal in such a way that neither side feels
    vulnerable, and in maintaining the demilitarization in a way that can be verified. In this
    paper, the authors who have both held command responsibilities in the Siachen Glacier
    region present a process for conducting and verifying the demilitarization of the Siachen
    Glacier region. The authors discuss the role of monitoring and verification tools and their
    relevance to this border zone of conflict.

    Executive Summary
    The Siachen Glacier and adjacent regions—a part of the larger territorial dispute between
    India and Pakistan that has its origins in the 1949 Karachi Agreement—has been
    occupied by the Pakistani and Indian militaries since 1984. The conflict has its genesis in
    the formulation of the cease-fire line in the 1949 Karachi Agreement. The text defines the
    cease-fire line in this area as running to map coordinate NJ 9842 and “. . . thence north to
    the glaciers.” The line was never demarcated. The Indian interpretation is that the current
    line of control (LOC) should run northeasterly from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro Range to
    the Chinese border. The Pakistani interpretation is that the LOC should run from NJ 9842
    straight to the Karakoram Pass (KKP) on the Chinese border. Both nations have incurred
    heavy economic costs and casualties in this conflict. Both nations recognize the benefit of
    ceasing the conflict and demilitarizing the area. An informal cease-fire has held in
    Siachen and Kashmir since November 2003. Prior to the current cease-fire, combat
    consisted of small-scale clashes during the summer and the exchange of artillery fire.
    Aircraft have not played a combat role. Talks were first conducted during 1986–1998,
    and were restarted in 2004 as a topic in the Composite Dialogue.
    The goal of this study is to develop a practical process for military disengagement in the
    Siachen conflict zone, leading to demilitarization. It draws on international precedents for
    establishing demilitarized zones (DMZ) as well as India-Pakistan precedents, such as the
    successful Chumik Glacier disengagement in 1989. It assumes that political consensus
    will eventually be reached and focuses on the operational steps necessary to implement
    disengagement and subsequent monitoring and verification. Disengagement must be
    based on general adherence with the Simla Agreement and be without prejudice to
    current or future agreements associated with Pakistan’s and India’s borders with China.
    An outline of the disengagement strategy developed by this study follows:
    Step 1: Formalize the current cease-fire understanding. It would be of value
    formalize the current informal cease-fire agreement. Communication links
    between the Indian and Pakistani brigade and division headquarters should be
    established.
    Step 2: Establish an Uninhabited Zone (UZ) around the Siachen Glacier and
    the Saltoro Range (see Figure 9 in the main report for maps). No military
    personnel, stores, or facilities, nor any civilian residents are permitted in the UZ.
    Under the agreement, neither country will have administrative control of the UZ.
    No aerial overflight is permitted unless part of an agreed monitoring activity. The
    UZ established by the agreement is to be without prejudice to the Pakistan-China
    Border Agreement of 1963 and the known position of India. It does not affect
    India’s current patrolling in area under its control east of KKP. After the UZ has
    been fully established, the temporary presence of personnel in the UZ is permitted
    for the following activities:
    • scientific research by international organizations
    • restoration of the environment on the Siachen Glacier by international,
    Indian, and Pakistani staff
    • entry by licensed, agreed international mountaineering expeditions

    Step 3: Establish a Civilian Zone (CZ) bordering the Uninhabited Zone (see Figure 9
    in the main report). The CZ has two parts: one part east of the UZ (administered by
    India) and one part west of the UZ (administered by Pakistan). Civilian residents and
    activities are permitted, but no military or paramilitary personnel or facilities are
    permitted except under the following circumstances.
    • Aerial overflight to monitor the agreement is permitted subject to agreed rules.
    • Military or paramilitary forces may enter the CZ to perform relief operations
    associated with natural disasters.
    • Personnel providing administrative support and physical security to
    monitoring activities are required under the conceptual agreement.
    • Military or paramilitary personnel may continue to provide social services
    (e.g., medical, communications, and road construction) to the civilian
    population if those services were part of their duties prior to the agreement.
    Adverse weather makes disengagement feasible only during the summer season. The
    Indian opinion that two to three summers are needed contrasts with the Pakistani opinion
    that only one summer is necessary. The major steps in disengagement are:
    Step 1: Withdraw medium artillery located in base camps. The withdrawal of
    artillery could potentially be implemented very soon after completion of the
    agreement even if this is during the winter.
    Steps 2–4: Redeploy from Northern, Central, and Southern sectors
    respectively.Forward and fire support posts
    o Declare interim assembly camps where troops from forward positions can
    concentrate, rest, and prepare for the next movement
    o Dismantle interim assembly camps after withdrawal
    Step 5: Withdraw from logistics camps on or near the glaciers
    Step 6: Dismantle logistics camps
    Step 7: Withdraw from base camps
    Step 8: Dismantle or convert base camps to scientific or civil use
    After the DMZ is established, a secondary expansion of the DMZ, called DMZ-2 (see
    map in Figure 10 of the main report), along the demarcated LOC to where the line
    crosses the Shyok River would be a significant confidence-building measure. The
    establishment of the DMZ does not depend on the acceptance of this proposal, but it
    would set a precedent for future steps along the LOC. This establishment of DMZ-2
    could occur during the summer following the completion of the establishment of the
    primary DMZ.
    The conceptual disengagement agreement has two phases of monitoring and verification.
    First, the process of implementing disengagement will need to be monitored to verify that
    military personnel have departed and agreed facilities have been dismantled according to
    the agreed schedule. Second, after the DMZ is established, it is necessary to conduct
    long-term monitoring to verify that military personnel and equipment have not re-entered.
    Monitoring the Disengagement Process
    In this process, on-site monitoring will play a primary role and remote sensing will play a
    secondary role. A temporary facility should be established near the LOC where face-to-face flag meetings can be held near the village of Siari (just west of where the LOC
    crosses the Shyok River).
    Visual Observation in Place. The abandonment of forward posts within line of sight of
    each other is to be coordinated so each side can observe activities of the other.
    Joint Aerial Reconnaissance. To confirm the abandonment of positions that are not
    within line of sight, a pair Indian and Pakistani helicopters will rendezvous at an agreed
    location and then fly together over the agreed sector to visually observe and
    photographically record withdrawal and dismantlement of posts. During a Joint
    Reconnaissance Flight, both sides have the right to request its representative land at a
    location within the sector to confirm withdrawal and dismantlement for facilities.
    On-site Inspections. Scheduled visits to confirm the abandonment and dismantlement of
    base camps with road access will occur through the exchange of escorted observers.
    Long-Term Monitoring of the DMZ.
    The goal of long-term monitoring is to detect illicit reoccupation of positions within the
    DMZ. Monitoring to verify demilitarization of the Siachen conflict zone will need to
    continue until there is a comprehensive political settlement. The temporary facility for
    Flag Meetings at Siari should be considered for expansion into a Joint Monitoring Center
    (JMC) to support the function of the DMZ.
    Illicit reoccupation could occur either by insertion of forces using helicopters or
    infiltration on the ground. The former is not a serious concern because such activities
    would be easily detectable and the requirement to establish an “air bridge” would be a
    major burden. Given these considerations, the focus of monitoring will be on groundbased logistic routes using a combination of remote monitoring, remote sensing, and onsite inspection. Given the terrain, there is only a small number of routes that India and
    Pakistan can use for logistics. Supplies are shipped from depots to base camps in or near
    the proposed DMZ. India uses a single base camp at Dzingrulma. Pakistan has a base
    camp at Askole (northern sector) and at Goma (central and southern sectors). At the base
    camps, supplies are broken into smaller loads and moved to forward logistic camps and
    posts by helicopters, jeeps, pack animals, and porters.
    Remote Monitoring: Sensor-activated systems would be placed at Access Control Points
    to be established at Chumikchan on the road to Dzingrulma, Dansam on the road to
    Goma, and near Askole. Reports would be transmitted to the JMC.
    Remote Sensing: Regularly scheduled aerial overflight of the DMZ with photographic
    and thermal imaging equipment is to be conducted using paired aircraft or a jointly
    crewed single aircraft. There would be an option to request an unscheduled flight to
    resolve questions of compliance that might arise. Commercial satellite imagery would
    play a supporting role with more frequent collection of images.
    On-site Inspection: Scheduled on-site inspections of facilities in the UZ and CZ that have
    been converted to scientific use and former military facilities in the CZ that provide
    social services will be conducted.
    Many strategic analysts in South Asia now question the strategic significance of the
    Siachen Glacier. Political will and innovative approaches are necessary to stop the
    conflict in Siachen. This study concludes that disengagement is operationally feasible.
    Clearly, the demilitarization of Siachen is an idea whose time has come.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  17. #17
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    Pakistan India
    The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government
    -- Lt. Gen. Prakash Chand Katoch

    " Individuals must give up the delusions of what has been rightly called “the Gujranwala School of Foreign Policy” — the delusion, namely, that while others have failed, I will succeed because I am manifestly more sincere, because I am from that part of the sub-continent ".

    Arun Shourie - Indian Express : " Third-class governance can’t give first-class response to terrorism " - 02 Aug 2006

    Third-class governance can’t give first-class response to terrorism - Indian Express

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India


    The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government


    Prakash Chand Katoch


    13 October 2012


    [The Indian government is acting against the interests of the country by surreptitiously agreeing to a deal with Pakistan according to which it will withdraw troops from Siachen Glacier, the command of which gives India immense strategic advantages.]


    India is committing a historical strategic blunder by quietly agreeing to Pakistan’s demand for withdrawing from Saltoro Ridge in Siachen glacier. The Indian public and parliament have been kept in the dark. A backroom deal has been concluded through questionable intermediaries with close ties to Pakistan.

    Since November 2011, militaries of both India and Pakistan have held several rounds to boost confidence building measures. These meetings were held in Dubai (20-21 November 2011), Bangkok (23-25 February 2012) and Lahore (23-25 September 2012). Additionally, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai (21 April 2012) and Palo Alto (30-31 July 2012). In the Track II round held in Lahore in September this year, India and Pakistan signed an agreement to demilitarize Siachen despite the grave reservations of some members of the Indian delegation. The members who expressed reservations include a former ambassador, a former intelligence officer and two former officers from the Army and the Navy.

    The decision to de-militarize or rather withdraw from Siachen has been taken arbitrarily at the highest political level disregarding strong objections by successive army chiefs including the current chief, Gen Bikram Singh. He has even made a statement to the media opposing demilitarization of the glacier. The agreement mainly includes: setting up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, the map coordinate south of the incompletely demarcated disputed territory; joint authentication of present ground positions; determination of places for redeployment; disengagement and demilitarization in mutually acceptable time frame, and cooperative monitoring of activities to ensure transparency.

    The agreement states that re-occupation cannot be done speedily. This is absurd as it negates India’s ability to use helicopters for lightning occupation. This gives Pakistan a huge advantage because the western flanks and glacial valleys of the Saltoro ridge are controlled by Pakistan. They do not have snow during summer and can be reached under cover of darkness and of bad weather on foot. The provision for technical surveillance is a red herring because of the tough terrain and extreme weather. It is important to remember that because of these conditions even the US with all its technical resources was surprised by India’s nuclear tests of 1998.

    The Indian government briefed the Lahore Track II Team to keep in mind the army’s stand that further talks would only be taken up “after” positions of both sides were authenticated on ground. The Indian Army’s concerns have clearly been ignored. The strategic importance of the Saltoro Ridge, especially in relation to Gilgit-Baltistan, Northern Areas, Shaksgam and Wakhan Corridor has been systematically obfuscated by a government that retains far too much of power over electronic and print media. The government has carried out a massive public relations exercise using gullible television channels to transmit the message that Siachen has no strategic significance. At one point, one so called expert claimed that India holds the Karakoram Pass, which is a blatant lie. National dailies have refused to publish articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen. Similarly, this issue has not been debated on national television. There are rumors that the media is muffling any discussion on Siachen on the instructions of the government.

    The selection of Indian delegates who visited Lahore was incongruous. None of them had served in the Siachen, not even the six army officers who were part of the delegation. The negotiating team did not bother to visit the conflict zone despite months of parleys with Pakistani officials at beautiful locations. Two former military officers in the delegation are infamous for their political connections. It is rumored that the Air Force four star officer is to be rewarded with an ambassadorship or governorship while the one star army officer is to be given another bag of carrots for towing the official line.

    It is surmised that the government is aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize to recover the legitimacy that it has lost after a succession of scandals. The Indian military has been castrated and is not allowed to state its views. Veterans who oppose de-militarization are denied media forums. It is inconceivable that any other major power would shut its military out of decision making and discourse the way India is doing at the moment.

    Jehangir Karamat, the former army chief heading the Pakistani delegation, understands the strategic significance of Saltoro unlike his Indian counterparts. Under his leadership, Pakistan has grabbed the strategic opportunity to attain all its key goals.

    The Atlantic Council of Canada that acted as the peace broker has promptly put out the news on the net. Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani strategic analyst who heads the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the US, has close relations his Canadian counterparts. More worryingly, he has close ties with the Pakistani military and is said to be a trusted advisor to both Gen Kayani and Gen Musharraf. Indians have long distrusted the Atlantic Council, which is perceived to be in bed with the Pakistani military and which has never really concluded its Cold War love affair with Pakistan. It is incredible that India should agree to the Atlantic Council as a mediator as it is unlikely to be a disinterested party and, as per the old adage, Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion.

    The Line of Control between India and Pakistan was originally drawn on a 1:250,000 map with a thick sketch pen without military advice. This has left an ambiguity as to the location of any given point on this line to the tune of about a hundred meters. Furthermore, the line does not follow ridgelines creating a source of constant and persisting hostility and acrimony. The same thick pen may be used once again in Siachen to devastating effect. A withdrawal from Siachen would facilitate further Pakistani incursions into Kashmir and put Ladakh, the Buddhist part of the state, under threat.

    Gen Pervez Musharraf, the former Pakistani president and army chief, mentions in his autobiography, ‘In The line of Fire, that he was planning to put a battalion on Saltoro Ridge. Indian officers preempted his move. Since 1984, Pakistan has been trying to control Siachen. Pakistan invaded India in 1999 to control Kargil and cut off Siachen. Pakistan is attempting to eradicate its strategic disadvantage through both military and non military measures. People in Shia dominated Baltistan, the place close to Siachen Glacier, are being forcibly converted to Sunni Islam. The Pakistani state often sponsors Shia massacres. The idea is to create a strong base for Pakistani troops to advance from when they make their next move.

    If India withdraws from Siachen, the new defense line will need additional troops. The new number will be many times the number of troops holding Siachen presently and the costs to the exchequer will increase exponentially. The joint agreement innocuously says in Annexure II, “small-scale intrusions are neither significant nor sustainable”. This is absurd. Small scale intrusions can easily take place undetected in areas devoid of snow during summer months. They can then be staging posts for infiltration. The Indian army lost the flower of its youth in 1999 when Pakistani troops intruded to take the heights in Kargil. With no defense line in Siachen, Ladakh will be open to infiltration. Irregulars and members of the Taliban will be able to cross into territory that belongs to India while Pakistan will deny culpability for ‘non-state-actors’. Gen Musharraf once declared that there would be many more Kargils in the future. Withdrawing from Siachen will make the general’s declaration a reality.

    The public and the parliament have the right to ask the government why the Siachen issue has not been debated publicly and in the parliament. What exactly has Pakistan done to earn Indian trust? Has the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir been dismantled? Has any progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks? Has the government forgotten that Pakistan has repeatedly double crossed us? During a visit by a delegation from Pakistan to discuss confidence building measures, why was the Pakistan Army breaching the ceasefire? Why is the Pakistan arming and stoking insurgencies in India? Why is the Pakistani intelligence trying to revive terrorism in Punjab? Why do American think tanks repeatedly state that Pakistan is the most dangerous place in the world?

    What does India gain from giving away Siachen?
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prakash Chand Katoch is a veteran Special Forces Lieutenant General whose last assignment in his 40 years army service was Director General Information Systems. An MSc in Defence Studies from Madras University and Post Graduate from National Defence College, he has authored over 160 articles on international relations, strategic affairs, national security, military, technical and topical issues in various magazines and journals. A leading Defence expert, he is a visiting fellow in foreign Think Tanks and contributes regularly for Indian and foreign publications. Active in seminars at both national and international levels, he has vast experience in special operations, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, high altitude / jungle / desert warfare.

    1. He holds the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence at the USI of India and is authoring a book on “Special Forces of India.”

    2. Has been contracted by the Centre For Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi to author a book on “Netcentricity and Indian Military.”


    The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.







    ================================================== =====================

    AN E-MAIL FROM LT. GEN.(RETD) P.C. KATOCH IN A VETERANS' GROUP :


    Dear All,

    I had occasion to discuss the Siachen De-militarization Issue with Air Chief Marshal Tyagi (Retd) today during a break in the National Security Seminar at the USI. ACM Tyagi as you know was the Co-Chair of the Track II Team whose agreement with their Pakistani counterparts at Lahore to demilitarize Siachen was put on the net first by Atlantic Council of Ottawa that broke the news to the world, particularly Indians. Given below is the gist of our conversation.

    1). To my query as to how the Track II Team was selected, he said that each and every member was individually selected by Atlantic Council of Ottawa and not by GoI. He has no idea how Atlantic Council of Ottawa got these names.

    2). Queried about the source of funding, his response was that the complete expenses at various locales including in Pakistan were borne by Atlantic Council of Ottawa (implying travel, stay, meetings, the works which obviously would be five star). I then asked him if he knew that both the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and Atlantic Council of US are actually extensions of Pakistani Army and funds would obviously be coming from the Pakistani Military / ISI. He said “so be it” but their job was only dialogue.

    3). I then asked him which government officers briefed the Track II Team and what exactly was the content of such briefings? He said that it is the Track II Team that asked for briefing from MEA and the Military. The MEA briefing was largely about the visit of our Foreign Minister to Pakistan and this briefing had NO mention of Siachen, and the Track II Team also asked NO questions about Siachen (rather strange !). In the briefing by the Military, the Military categorically stated they did not want demilitarization from Siachen.

    4). I further asked when the MEA did not give any directions for demilitarization and the Military was categorically against it, why did our Track II Team agree to demilitarization? He responded that this was their individual view. I expressed astonishment why such an agreement was signed in the first place. To this, he said no one affixed their signatures and it was not an agreement but really an account of what was discussed. I pointed out that the document talks of 'agreement' and not 'record of discussion' but he insisted there was no agreement.

    5). I asked him what the de-briefings were after the various meetings. He said there were no de-briefings but a report was sent by the Track II Team to the Raksha Mantra, MEA, NSA and Service Chiefs (some other members maintain that after each visit the Track II Team did get in touch with MEA and Military representatives).

    6). I asked him why the Indian public has been kept in the dark and why not put out a statement in the media. He said that my article had already done that.

    7). He then asked me whether I still consider their actions as “treason”? I replied I was more convinced now that without any directions by MEA towards demilitarization and our Military firm on NO demilitarization, this “Private Body”, as stated in his e-mail, had still gone ahead to discuss and agree to withdraw from Indian Territory in violation of both the Constitution of India and the 1994 Parliament Resolution reiterating that entire J&K is part of India. He then said he had erroneously mentioned “Private Body”. Actually, they were “individuals” in their own private capacity. When I pointed out that he was the Co-Chair, he said he had acted in his individual capacity and had absolutely “no control” over the other Track II Members. Their conversation was akin to the discussion he was having with me. I said I do not agree as the two are hardly comparable when a strategic issue like withdrawal from territory is being discussed at international level with a military heavy Pakistani body. His response was that I was welcome to my views and he would not like to continue the discussion any further. At that juncture he also said the he had received some questions by someone called Devasahayam but he was not going to respond to any questions from any quarter. I had other questions but the conversation had ended abruptly.


    You may draw your own conclusions from the above including examining why an organization like Atlantic Council of Ottawa funded by the Pakistani Military /ISI would spend millions to hold conferences in different exotic locales and with what aim. It is not without reason that the Supreme Court of Pakistan recently ordered the Pakistani Government to take legal action against General Mirza Aslam Beg and General Asad Durrani for distributing millions of rupees among politicians to rig the 1999 general elections while both held the appointments of Pakistani Army Chief and Director General ISI respectively. There is definitely more to this murky affair than meets the eye.

    I am sending this e-mail to you as you have been keenly watching this development and so would your friends in your own groups, many of whom have joined the debate on the net.

    Warm regards.

    Prakash.

    Bharatkalyan97: The Siachen Story: Himalayan Blunder by India’s Government -- Lt. Gen. Prakash Chand Katoch
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  18. #18
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Dear Air Marshall Tyagi,



    I have read the communications between you and Lt. Gen Katoch and have also received several emails on the subject. I am afraid your response to Gen Katoch is unsatisfactory and in fact confirms our worst fears. Your contention: “We were not appointed by any Government Agency nor do we have anything do with the Govt of India” does not make any sense whatsoever. Since when territories of sovereign India have become ‘real estates’ for private individuals belonging to two different countries to trade, negotiate and arbitrate upon?



    Your adverse reference to Gen Katoch and Kunal Verma cannot be countenanced. While the former was Siachen Brigade Commander the latter has written a fine, well-researched and illustrated Book on Siachen which I have read from cover to cover. Besides being patriotic citizens, they are also emotionally attached to the Siachen Glacier.



    Be that as it may, in order to clean up the air and provide an opportunity for you and your Track II colleagues to explain things, I herewith pose 12 Questions which I would like you to respond ASAP:



    i. Who appointed the Track II Team, who are the members and what are their credentials and what is their service record in the Siachen area?

    ii. Who briefed the Track II Team – NSA, Defence Secretary, MoD, MEA?

    iii. Did the Track II Team visit Siachen before inking the agreement?

    iv. Was the decision of Track II Team unanimous? If not on what authority the dissent was suppressed-PMO, NSA, Defence Secretary?

    v. Decision to demilitarize Siachen has grave military consequences. Were the three Service Chiefs consulted on this? If not why not?

    vi. This issue has serious strategic, deployment, logistics, demographic, displacement, cost and time implications for the Army. Were they consulted and the matter discussed with the Northern Army Commander? If not why not?

    vii. After ‘demilitarisation’ what measures will be required to check terrorist infiltration (including Taliban) and how effective will it be as compared to our defences and counter infiltration forces in Kashmir Valley?

    viii. Is it merely a Track II initiative? If so why were the members briefed by Government officials before the Lahore meet? Were they not told that this team is “as good as Track I”? Does it not make it official?

    ix. NSA is stated to have briefed the leader of the Track II Team and one/two members separately? If so why? To firm up a secret deal?

    x. The whole process, particularly signing of the Track II agreement was kept under wraps and one came to know of it only through the Website of a foreign agency. Why this secrecy?

    xi. On whose orders did some select members of Track II Team along with Ambassador KC Singh, justify the agreement at a meeting in India International Centre on 3rd October?

    xii. Most importantly, why was such a major decision not discussed in Parliament and in Public? Has the President of India been kept informed?


    Awaiting an early response. I am copying this mail to Gen Katoch and Kunal



    M.G.Devasahayam IAS (Retd)
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  19. #19
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Withdrawal from Siachen – a manifestation of Prithviraj Chauhan syndrome!
    By Maj Gen Mrinal SumanIssue
    Net Edition | Date : 06 Nov , 2012

    Siachen is in the news again.Having served at the glacier, one is aware of the ground realities. It is being suggested that ‘demilitarization’ of the glacier will act as a catalyst to foster friendly relations between Indian and Pakistan. To be honest, one has not heard of a more convoluted and outlandish logic.
    Demilitarization of an area implies withdrawal of the opposing military forces from the designated area with an agreement that neither side would undertake any military activity till the resolution of the conflicting territorial claims. Thus, demilitarization necessarily entails withdrawal by both the sides from the disputed area. The area becomes a de facto frontier between the two nations.

    In the case of Siachen, Pakistan has no presence on the glacier – not even a toehold. Their positions are well west of the Saltoro Ridge. If they are not present on the glacier, the question of Pakistani withdrawal just does not arise. Therefore, demilitarization of Siachen means unilateral withdrawal by India and nothing more.
    It is understandable for the Pakistani military to use the term demilitarization as it wants to continue deceiving its countrymen that it is occupying part of the glacier. However, it is simply preposterous for Indian strategists to speak in terms of demilitarization and thereby mislead the public. They should be honest and refer to the proposal as ‘unilateral vacation of Siachen by India’.

    ‘Demilitarization of Siachen will assure Pakistan of Indian sincerity in resolving contentious issues and help bring about a reduction in Pakistan’s hostility towards India. Both countries can live peacefully thereafter’ is the commonly touted argument of the Indian advocates of the withdrawal.
    The above logic is absurd and farcical.
    It is based on three phony contentions. One, it is for India to convince Pakistan of its good intentions and not the vice versa. Two, a placated Pakistan will shed its enmity and be a good neighbour. And three, Pakistan should be trusted to honour its commitment.

    Over the last six decades India has tried various measures to convince Pakistan of its sincerity to develop a rancor-free relationship. India has never coveted Pakistani territory. It stopped short of re-conquering the whole of Jammu and Kashmir and went to the Security Council. It gave back the strategic Haji Pir Pass as a goodwill gesture in 1965 and returned 96,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War after the war in 1971. It has never trained and sent terrorists into Pakistan to create mayhem.
    As a matter of fact, India’s over-indulgence and conciliatory gestures has emboldened Pakistan into considering India to be a soft state and increased its intransigence and hardened its anti-India attitude. While the Indian leadership was trying to break ice through ‘bus diplomacy’ in 1998-99, Pakistani military was busy planning the notorious Kargil incursion.

    As regards the second issue of changing Pakistan’s mindset, it is nothing but self-delusion. Pakistan’s shedding of hostility towards India and adoption of a friendly stance would amount to the negation of the two-nation theory, the raison d’être for its very existence. A nation born out of hatred needs hatred to feed itself on for continued sustenance and to justify its existence.
    Issues like Kashmir and Siachen are merely a manifestation of Pakistan’s infinite hostility towards India. Were India to hand over Kashmir to it on a platter and withdraw from Siachen, Pakistan will invent newer issues to keep the pot boiling. Pakistan cannot afford to shed its antagonism towards India as that would amount to questioning the logic of its very creation.

    Coming to the third premise, can Pakistan be trusted not to undertake clandestine operations to occupy the Siachen heights vacated by trusting Indians? Who can guarantee that? Remember, deceit is a part of Pakistan’s state policy.
    Independent Pakistan started its track record with treachery. Despite having signed a ‘stand-still agreement’ with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan unleashed Pashtun marauders on the hapless Kashmir valley with the active participation of Pak army. Breaching undertakings given to the US, it surreptitiously used American equipment to launch a surprise attack on Kutch in April 1965.

    Even before the ink had dried on the Kutch agreement, Pakistan was back to its perfidious ways. Covertly, it infiltrated its forces into Kashmir, expecting a local uprising against India. Under the Tashkent agreement, Pakistan promised to abjure the use of force to settle mutual disputes and adherence to the principles of non-interference. However, Pakistan continued its proxy war through its notorious secret agencies. Sanctuaries and safe passage were provided to underground elements of North-Eastern India.
    Under the Shimla Agreement, Bhutto had given a solemn verbal undertaking to accept LOC as the de facto border. Instead, true to its perfidious nature, Pakistan redoubled its efforts to create turmoil in India. In addition to regular terrorist attacks, it never misses an opportunity to embarrass India in every world forum.
    Finally, India has been repeatedly duped and cheated by Pakistan. What has Pakistan done in the recent past to earn another chance to be trusted? Has it arrested and deported all terrorists? They are roaming free in Pakistan spewing venom against India. Pakistan is colluding with China by bartering away territory in Gilgit-Baltistan. One is not aware of a single step taken by Pakistan to assuage Indian feelings and earn its trust.

    Pakistan is adept at achieving through negotiations what it loses in war. The current dialogue on Siachen is an extension of the same subterfuge. Indian soldiers shed blood to gain military ascendency, only to see their hard fought gains being lost through the misplaced zeal of some self-proclaimed advocates of peace.

    We should never forget that deceit, betrayal, duplicity and perfidy are synonym with Pakistan. Therefore, any Indian who suggests vacation of Siachen should be treated as an anti-national element and tried for high treason. Enough of Prithviraj Chauhan syndrome. He repeatedly trusted Ghori and set him free; only to be captured and blinded later on. Pakistani text books portray Ghori as an ideal leader whose exploits should be followed.
    It is time India learns.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  20. #20
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    Pakistan India
    Siachen: What is the strategic or diplomatic rationale for demilitarization?

    The government hasn’t spoken about it. The opposition seems to be oblivious to the goings on. The print and electronic media have chosen to remain silent. But the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank in its Press release on 02 Oct 2012 announced that a group of retired senior officials, military officers and diplomats of India and Pakistan “have agreed on a proposal regarding the demilitarization of the Siachen area”. The project it appears had been “jointly organized by the University of Ottawa and the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council”.

    No one seems to know if this Track 2 effort had been undertaken at the behest of Government of India, Pakistan or some other third party. However one of the team members has confirmed that the team had received briefings in New Delhi from Government officials. It appears that India and Pakistan have been engaged in military-level Track 2 talks for the past 12 months, with the delegates of the two sides meeting in Dubai, Bangkok and finally in Lahore in September. Smaller “sub-group” meetings in Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Palo Alto (California) have also featured in the Track 2 process. All these meetings, the move of both the teams back and forth would have cost some money. Who footed the bill? Was it India, Pakistan, Atlantic Council, or the University of Ottawa? What was the interest?

    Is it a normal practice in diplomacy for a foreign think tank sponsored Track 2 team consisting of individuals selected by the sponsoring agency to be briefed by Government officials? Is it appropriate for the team to go to an inimical foreign country and agree on demilitarization or to agree on the modalities for demilitarization of an area which it had been holding for years without the Government deciding on the very basic question whether to withdraw from the position or not? Or has the Government taken a decision to withdraw from Siachen without taking the Parliament or the opposition into confidence? Which of these are true? The people of this country have a right to know the truth.

    Three countries have interest in areas in and around Siachen. This aspect will have a major bearing on the strategic importance of Siachen and India’s decision to demilitarize the area (See map). The areas concerned are the Northern Area, Gilgit, Baltisatan, Saltoro, Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin. The Gilgit and Baltistan located to the immediate west of Saltoro is a part of Pakistan with majority Shia population. Pakistan is actively considering a proposal to lease the region to Beijing for 50 years. The Sakshgam valey immediately to the North of Saltoro has already been ceded to China by Pakistan illegally. Xinjiang lies to the immediate North of Sakshgam. Aksai Chin which is occupied by China lies to the South East of Sakshgam Valley.

    The Nurba Valley and Ladakh leading to J&K are hemmed in on three sides by Baltistan, Sakshgam Valley and Aksai Chin. If the proposal to lease the Gilgit – Baltistan area goes through and India withdraws from Siachen, all the three areas right up to Xinjiang will be under Chinese control.

    The Karakoram Highway which runs through these areas connects China's Xinjiang region with Pakistan's Northern Areas across the Karakoram mountain range, through the Khunjerab Pass. China and Pakistan are also planning to link the Karakoram Highway to the southern port of Gwadar in Balochistan through the Chinese-aided Gwadar-Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi. The Karakoram Highway passes through an area where China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come as close to each other as 250 kms and has its own strategic importance and significance to India.

    Looking at the map in the context of the above, does anyone have any doubt as to which of the three countries would benefit the most by vacating Saltoro? Is Pakistan trying to help their all-weather friend to be able to dominate the entire area to the North of our areas of interest? Saltoro ridge acts as a separator between Pakistan (Baltistan – Gilgit) and China. Do we want them to link up by demilitarizing the area? Doesn’t vacating Saltoro threaten the security of Nubra Valley?




    The entire country believes that the Military is occupying Siachen because it belongs to it and rightly so. The 1972 Shimla Agreement clearly stated that from the NJ9842 the boundary would proceed "thence north to the glaciers." This implies that Saltoro ridge is well within Indian Territory. Is it necessary for a country to go and sign an agreement with a neighboring country for unilaterally withdrawing its forces from its own territory? What are the compulsions warranting India to concede to Pakistan’s demand for withdrawing from Saltoro ridge? Even assuming that the agreement provides adequate safeguards against Pakistan occupying Saltoro ridge after India’s withdrawal, does the agreement provide any guarantee against China occupying the Saltoro ridge and threatening India especially after the Baltistan – Gilgit areas have been leased to it by Pakistan? Would we not run into another mess should China choose to say that it has nothing to do with the agreement signed between India and Pakistan?

    Withdrawal from Saltoro and Siachen would threaten Ladakh and will expose important mountain passes that are gateways to Ladakh and onto Kashmir to the aggressor including terrorists. Will that not require establishing a fresh defence line along the Ladakh Range to successfully defend our areas of interest? What will be the requirement of troops for such a venture and at what cost? Has an appraisal of the military requirement in the event of demilitarization of Siachen been obtained from the Army Chief? How will such a withdrawal impact our security in relation to the Karakoram Highway?

    As experienced in the past, aren’t issues such as cross border terrorism in J &K, terrorist training camps across, funding and arming terrorists in J&K to destabilize the country much more serious than Sir Creek or Siachen? Why then are we being soft on Pakistan by agreeing to unilaterally withdraw from Siachen while Pakistan continues to aid and abet terrorism right inside our country? Has Pakistan done anything in the past to exhibit its sincerity or to be able to trust them? Have we sought any guarantees or quid pro quo in the other major areas of our concern?

    Is the Government of India prepared to give a guarantee that the Indian Army would not be required to recapture Saltoro ridge should Pakistan or China occupy the position after India vacates it or if Indian soil is threatened? If not, would the soldiers of the Indian Army be forced to shed blood for a mess up by the arm chair politicians and bureaucrats who are least concerned with war fighting or its cost to human life and to the country?

    Lack of strategic culture and the worth of a non-professional generalist bureaucracy is showing up once again. Were the Service Chiefs parts of the decision making process in whatever role that the Government had played in the Track 2 diplomacy? Isn’t the military a concerned party? Why then are they not part of the decision making process?

    It only goes to prove that our bureaucrats and politicians would never hesitate to shed your blood for their stupidities and ambitions.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

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