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Thread: India’s interest compromised in Siachen

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  1. #21
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Military to Military CBMs

    General

    Military to military CBMs were held in Lahore from 23 – 25 September 2012. They were attended by the following : -

    (a) India
    • Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Shashi Tyagi.
    • Lieutenant General (Retd) Aditya Singh.
    • Lieutenant General (Retd) Arvinder Singh Lamba.
    • Lieutenant General (Retd) BS Pawar.
    • Vice Admiral (Retd) A.K. Singh.
    • Brigadier (Retd) Arun Sahgal.
    • Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal.
    • Ambassador (Retd) Lalit Mansingh (former Foreign Secretary of India).
    • Ambassador (Retd) Vivek Katju.
    • Mr Rana Banerji (former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, India).
    • Mr Ajai Shukla (Journalist).

    (b) Pakistan
    • General (Retd) Jehangir Karamat.
    • General (Retd) Tariq Majid.
    • Admiral (Retd) Tariq Khan.
    • Lieutenant General (Retd) Tariq Ghazi (former Defense Secretary of Pakistan).
    • Lieutenant General (Retd) Sikander Afzal.
    • Air Vice Marshal (Retd) Shahzad Chaudhry.
    • Ambassador (Retd) Riaz Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan)
    • Ambassador (Retd) Maleeha Lodhi.
    • Ambassador (Retd) Aziz Khan.
    • Major General (Retd) Qasim Qureshi.

    Subsequent to the above, a Round-Table discussion was held at CLAWS on 15 Oct 2012 wherein Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal and Capt (IN) Alok Bansal, Senior Felow CLAWS presented their views on the Track II Dialogue process in Lahore. Capt (IN) Alok Bansal was not part of the military to military CBMs but took part thereafter in a track II meeting discussing CBMs over the Indus Water Treaty.

    The discussion at CLAWS was attended by select officers from the Army and members of the CLAWS faculty.

    Lt Gen BS Pawar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

    The third round of the Track II process between retired military officers of India and Pakistan was held at Lahore recently with the previous two rounds being held at Dubai and Bangkok respectively. The two sides have reached an agreement on resolving the Sir Creek and Siachen disputes. The proposals are doable and are awaiting the government’s approval. It appears that the Track II process has the blessings of the Pakistan Army. On Siachen, the Pakistan Army is conscious of the fact that the Indian Army enjoys a tactical advantage and can dictate terms.

    Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

    Track II efforts are nothing new and hundreds of such initiatives have been undertaken ever since the conclusion of the Second World War. A recent example was the Norwegian mission in Sri Lanka. The India-Pakistan Track II has held several discussions of the general situation, both in the region and bilaterally, and how this affects the prospects for progress on the CBM file. It was reported that the relationship between the two countries is going through a relatively positive phase. Diplomatic and business contacts are improving across a range of issues. At the same time, suspicions remain concerning each side’s view of the other’s objectives and alleged actions in Afghanistan, and in the area of military doctrines and deployments. There has been another round of Track 1 discussions on both conventional and nuclear CBMs, but both sides found it disappointing. The 2007 accord “Reducing Risk Relating to Nuclear Weapons” has been renewed for another five years. However, there was no progress on other proposals to develop new CBMs. In contrast, some participants pointed to lower profile examples of confidence-building measures at work between the two countries. For example, when there was an inadvertent helicopter crossing of the LC into Pakistan, the matter was managed quickly and effectively.

    The project reviewed the status of existing CBMs between the two countries. Based onpresentations from the two sides, it was agreed that the main existing military CBMs are:

    DGMO Hotline
    • Non-attack on nuclear facilities (1988)
    • Advance notice of military exercises and maneuvers (1991)
    • Informal ceasefire along LOC/AGPL (2003)


    It was by and large agreed that most of the above CBMs were working well.

    The following CBMs could be further strengthened:-

    Prevention of Airspace Violations (1991)
    • Link between the Indian Coast Guard and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (2005)
    • Joint patrolling along the international border and periodic flag meetings. Non
    development of new posts
    • Biannual meeting between Indian border security forces and Pakistani Rangers (2004)
    • Advance notice of Ballistic Missile tests (2005)


    Several CBMs which have been proposed between the two sides, but not yet agreed, were identified. These are:

    A Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement
    • The development of a Pakistan Air Force-Indian Air Force Communications link and of a Communications link between the two navies;
    • Exchange of military delegations and also participation of senior military officers in
    Seminars.
    • Mil-to-mil exchanges and “cultural” activities (such as: exchanges of guest speakers;
    visits by military bands; sports teams and adventure activities)
    • Quarterly flag meetings between sector commanders along the LOC; and
    • Speedy return of inadvertent line crossers.


    On Sir Creek, Pakistan is willing to forego its claim on the southern line and the dispute is ripe for resolution.

    The following clear package of integrated and inter-linked stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of Siachen and delineation of the AGPL.

    • Set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing Agreements;
    • The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records exchanged;
    • The determination of the places to which redeployment will be affected would be jointly agreed;
    • Disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable time frame to be agreed;
    • Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and
    • Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency.


    It was agreed upon to hold further discussions on crisis stability and terrorism. Beyond military CBMs, it was recognised that intelligence-sharing is a key issue. It should be noted that information is being shared on lists of terror groups which both sides wish to see stopped but cooperation on investigations regarding these groups should be more intensive and transparent.

    Capt (IN) Alok Bansal

    The dialogue on water issues between India and Pakistan was organised by the Atlantic Council, USA and Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This was the first Track II dialogue on the subject and was more of an effort towards breaking the ice. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is a perfect mechanism which has withstood the test of time. Yet, public perception in Pakistan on water issues is quite mis-guided and ill-informed. The common man is not aware of the principles of the IWT and perceives India to be deliberately trying to curtail the flow of water into Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan has seen a tremendous increase in its population and this is an important factor which has led to hardening of stand on the water issue. The mis-management of canals in Pakistan has added to the problem of water management.

    The IWT lays downs conditions for use of river waters for consumptive use, agriculture and for building run of the river hydroelectric power projects. The IWT does not limit use of water for domestic consumption. There is a perception in the Kashmir valley that excessive exploitation of the rivers is leading to the receding of glaciers thereby creating environmental issues. Over the years, land area under horticulture in the valley has increased while that under agriculture has come down. Pakistan’s major concern against India is that the latter does not share information on damming projects on the Indus and its tributaries. On the other hand, India feels that sharing information with Pakistan has led to troubles and delays in implementation of projects on the river waters. For instance, the re-designing of the Salal hydel project on the river Chenab led to silting which rendered the dam useless. The Pakistani objection to the Kishanganga project is on the ground that India is diverting waters of one tributary of the Indus to another – river Jhelum. The Pakistani aim is to prevent the building of hydro-electric projects to stall the economic development of J&K.

    Discussion

    • The argument that Siachen must be demilitarised because of the high costs involved in maintenance of troops and to minimise casualties is flawed. India has to defend its borders and there are other areas also which present a challenge similar to the one experienced in Siachen. It would be setting a wrong precedent if troops are to be withdrawn on such frivolous grounds.

    • Building confidence and trust between the two countries is necessary if India- Pakistan relations are to improve. However, Siachen cannot be a start point for the above process. Withdrawal from the Glacier will not lead to any improvement in ties bewtween the two countries. What can improve the environment is for Pakistan to stop sending terroists into India and to close the 42 terrorist training camps which are supported by state patronage. Unless Pakistan is prepared to give up its policy on supporting terrorist organisations which they maintain as their strategic assets against India, no improvement in relations can take place. Better confidence building can be done by stopping the hostility displayed by the police forces of both countries at Wagah, and by exchanging prisoners, thousands of whom are rotting in each others jails.

    The resolution of the Sir Creek issue is doable and should be de-linked from having an agreement on Siachen first.
    The Following User Says Thank You to ajtr For This Useful Post: Superkaif

    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  2. #22
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Demilitarizing Siachen: Trading Strategic Advantage for Brownie Points

    The troubled India-Pakistan relationship has been punctuated by four military conflicts and decades-long military face-off across the IB and LOC, the most recent starting in 1984 on Siachen glacier in Ladakh. The illegal ceding of areas of north Ladakh by Pakistan to China, and China’s occupation of the Aksai Chin area in east Ladakh make Siachen glacier a regional strategic flash-point.
    While over the past few months, the Siachen glacier (hereinafter referred to as “Siachen”) has been in the news, recently there has been a flurry of correspondence within the Indian strategic community on its demilitarization, some arguing for and others against it. There is a lobby favouring demilitarization, especially of Siachen, and meetings to discuss it have been held by an India-Pakistan group, the so-called Track-II team, comprising retired military officers and retired diplomats of both countries. Siachen-experienced retired Indian army officers are strongly opposed to demilitarizing Siachen for strategic and tactical reasons. There are no two opinions within Pakistan on this issue, because Pakistan only gains politically, economically and militarily by demilitarizing Siachen. This article examines demilitarization of Siachen without prejudice to demilitarization elsewhere or CBMs between the two countries.

    In a recent diplomatically-savvy initiative, Pakistan army chief General A.P.Kayani “advocated peaceful coexistence with India, adding that the civil and military leaderships of the two countries should discuss ways to resolve the issue” [of] “demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier” [Ref.1]. This initiative, triggered by the loss of 139 Pakistani soldiers killed in an avalanche at Gayari in April, is said to be driven by the need to cover up the long-standing lie sold to the Pakistani public that their soldiers were dying on Siachen facing Indian troops. The fact is that Gayari is in the Siachen region and not on Siachen itself, and there are no Pakistani troops on Siachen because Indian troops occupy Siachen and its commanding heights.
    “Peaceful co-existence” is a strange phrase coming from a Pakistan army chief. Peaceful co-existence can very easily be achieved if the General would order his troops not to violate the ceasefire as is continually occurring, not violate the LOC as Pakistan did stealthily in 1999 around Kargil, and stop training and infiltrating terrorists across the LOC. But what is beyond being strange is that some eminent Indians took up the cue and recommended immediately settling the Siachen dispute by demilitarization. Such a recommendation is innocent of the fact that demilitarizing Siachen clearly involves India losing both strategic and tactical advantage, while for Pakistan it is a definite strategic gain traded off against an insignificant tactical loss. The strangeness does not end there. A former Indian army brigadier even suggested that demilitarizing Siachen was “a low-risk option to test [the] Pak[istan] army’s sincerity” [Ref.2]. The wisdom of taking the “low-risk option” of giving the key of one’s house to a thief to test his self-professed honesty, if at all it is an option, is questionable. Nor would it be an unduly harsh reflection on the Pakistani establishment, sometimes civilian, sometimes military, but always with antipathy towards India. This officer is part of the Track-II team that has agreed upon the modalities of demilitarizing Siachen.

    India has consistently maintained in international fora that Jammu & Kashmir, including Siachen, is a part of India. Hence Indian troops abandoning their posts on and around Siachen and vacating Indian territory to satisfy “peace” initiatives by Pakistan, amounts to India surrendering its sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir, with repercussions on other parts of the LOC.
    Besides, successive army chiefs including the present incumbent Gen Bikram Singh, have spoken strongly against demilitarizing Siachen because it would be strategic and tactical folly of the highest order. Notwithstanding, on April 30, 2012, Defence Minister A.K. Antony informed Parliament that government was holding meaningful dialogue with Pakistan to demilitarize Siachen [Ref.3]. Did Government of India (GoI) respond with unseemly alacrity to the Pakistan army chief’s call to demilitarize Siachen, even going through the procedural formality of informing Parliament? It is a fair bet that most MPs do not know where Siachen is, or what are the national sovereignty and security implications of its demilitarization. Perhaps GoI considers that informing Parliament is concurrence to proceed with talks, even demilitarization.
    In early 2005, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh was preparing for strategic cooperation with USA starting with the Framework Agreement on civilian nuclear energy and the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture. International agreements are always finalized with wide-ranging preparatory discussions between the governments that are entering into agreement. Thus, it can safely be surmised that geopolitical strategic matters would have been discussed between USA and India in the preparatory stages. Perhaps demilitarizing Siachen was discussed at that time, because on June 13, 2005, the Prime Minister told troops at Siachen Base Camp that Siachen would be “converted from a point of conflict to a zone of peace”.


    When governments negotiate, officials of both sides, with clear instructions from their respective governments, meet to work on the nitty-gritty of the negotiations, while the decision makers handle the policy and macro aspects. However, the media reports [Ref.4] that GoI has permitted Track-II negotiations on demilitarizing Siachen “through questionable intermediaries with close ties to Pakistan”. The “questionable intermediaries” are the retired Indian military officers and diplomats who formed the Indian side of the so-called Track-II discussions held in September 2012 at Lahore [Note 1]. The Indian side could not have operated without the knowledge of the Indian government, but it did so without mandate, even signing an agreement regarding the “how” of demilitarizing Siachen without the Indian government’s “whether” and “when” of demilitarization [Ref.5]. Obviously the Pakistani establishment has no trouble at all on “whether”, and “when” is clearly ASAP.
    The mainstream print media has brought out articles that press for demilitarizing Siachen, some even arguing for it “now”, notably by A.G.Noorani [Ref.7]. An immediate riposte to it was not published by any newspaper, but fortunately did get published in niche journals, including one the same day [Ref.8]. This perhaps substantiates the view that “National dailies have refused to publish articles highlighting the enormous strategic disadvantage of withdrawing from Siachen. Similarly, this issue has not been debated on national television. There are rumors that the media is muffling any discussion on Siachen on the instructions of the government” [Ref.4].
    One wonders why the Indian government would want the public to read about the “advantages” of demilitarizing Siachen, without allowing arguments that it may not be in the national interest. This, particularly when demilitarizing Siachen is against the advice of India’s army chief and such an issue of national importance with long-term strategic repercussions has not been discussed in Parliament. This undemocratic and politically devious approach by Government of India has surely set the rumour mills in motion, including one concerning a Nobel Peace Prize.

    Government of India is already engaged in dialogue with Pakistan on demilitarizing Siachen. If the decision to demilitarize Siachen has already been secretly taken, the present dialogue is to decide when to demilitarize. Pulling back troops from Siachen can only commence after written orders are issued by the Cabinet to the army chief. Actually pulling back troops depends upon the military situation, the time of year, preparation of positions to which to pull back, surveillance arrangements, and other operational and logistic arrangements. Only the Indian army can work out the modalities of demilitarization. Therefore the agenda of the Track-II team is meaningless and ACM Tyagi’s statement that the Track-II team has worked out a way to demilitarize Siachen “should the two sides ever agree to demilitarize”, is hollow. Indeed, it leads one to wonder whether the Track-II initiative is meant to force the hand of legitimate decision makers.
    Those who oppose demilitarizing Siachen have questioned the competence of the Indian Track-II members to discuss demilitarization because of not having even visited Siachen. There are also conjectures of personal gain for its members. Words like “treasonable” have been used. Even if true, none of these can be proved at present, and probably never. Therefore it is best to confine the discussion to examining the arguments concerning demilitarization of Siachen in terms of regional and global geopolitics, noting that India’s over-riding considerations regarding Siachen are military and not civilian.
    According to media reports, Pakistan is negotiating or has already negotiated leasing the Gilgit-Baltistan region, which is part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (***), to China for 50 years [Ref.9]. This includes the area Pakistani troops now occupy, facing Indian defensive positions on Siachen. If Indian troops pull out of Siachen, Pakistani or Chinese troops can easily defeat surveillance, as any soldier who has experienced Siachen will confirm, and infiltrate into tactically superior former Indian posts to gain strategic advantage. Re-occupation of these posts by Indian forces will be almost impossible. Chinese presence in Baltistan sets Siachen as a new frontier and possible flashpoint for hostilities between India and China. In the context of China having deployed missile units in Tibet within easy strike range of New Delhi. In this changed geopolitical situation, India pulling back from Siachen would be monumental strategic folly.

    Strategist Gurmeet Kanwal, a member of the Track-II team, suggested an India-Pakistan Siachen demilitarization agreement including a clause that allows either side to take military action in case of violation by the other side [Ref.10]. If Pakistan or its Lessee, China, infiltrates into the demilitarized zone, India will “be at liberty” to take military action to vacate the encroachment. Thus, the “peace” agreement envisages violation, but suggests the remedy of re-opening armed hostilities that end peace! The inescapable fact is that demilitarizing Siachen will gift huge strategic advantage to Pakistan and China at India’s strategic cost, make a strategic coup for Pakistan. Would India consider demilitarizing disputed areas of Arunachal Pradesh to China for the sake of peace?
    India’s strategic alignment with USA following the India-US nuclear deal signed between Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and U.S President George W. Bush dates back to 2005. The 123-Agreement was over-shadowed by the provisions of the U.S Hyde Act which is India-specific, and visualizes India adopting foreign policy “congruent with” USA’s.
    NATO, a U.S-dominated military alliance, concerns the North Atlantic, but it has spread its area of policy and military influence into Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO is now influencing policy further eastward. Simultaneously, the Atlantic Council, a non-profit policy organization headquartered in USA and founded in 1961 to encourage cooperation between North America and Europe, has expanded its area of interest into the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Although it has close connections to influential policy makers within USA it is, by charter, independent of USA as well as NATO. But its activities include consideration of “global challenges [including] NATO’s future” [Ref.11]. Its South Asia Center “provides a forum for countries in greater South Asia to engage with one another on sustainable stability and economic growth in our quest to “wage peace” in the region, and develop links and better understanding among them and members of the Atlantic community”.

    The Track-II talks on demilitarizing Siachen were sponsored and funded by the Atlantic Council. Thus, the Atlantic Council, which has reach to and is influenced by the policy-making mandarins of NATO (including the Pentagon) and the U.S administration, chose the Indian and Pakistani Track-II team members. The averment that the Indian Track-II members have nothing to do with the Indian government raises the question whether Pakistan’s initiative for demilitarizing Siachen has USA’s backing through the Atlantic Council, to persuade India to acquiesce against its national strategic best interests. That could explain the Indian government’s apparent eagerness to demilitarize Siachen and earn brownie points with its senior strategic partner, thus scoring a self-goal with unacceptable and irretrievable strategic costs.
    Article 73 of the Constitution of India empowers the Prime Minister, as the country’s chief executive, to enter into a treaty or agreement with a foreign power. Thus, in 2005, the government went ahead with signing a strategic agreement with USA, without prior discussion in Parliament. Apprehensions that the present government, beset by accusations of weakness, indecisiveness and monumental corruption, may sign an agreement with Pakistan to demilitarize Siachen to divert public attention, may not be unfounded.
    While diplomatic engagement for peace with Pakistan is necessary, compromising national sovereignty and security or territorial integrity is unacceptable. Therefore, it is vital that Parliamentarians carefully consider arguments for and against demilitarizing Siachen without prejudice to CBMs or demilitarization in any other sector, and ensure discussion on the matter before any agreement is signed. If Indian troops are ordered to vacate posts on Saltoro ridge and Siachen that were won at the cost of the lives and limbs of many soldiers, it would amount to devaluing their sacrifices and their families’ pain and suffering, besides being strategic folly.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  3. #23
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Is Congress slyly selling out on Siachen?

    Growing murmurs of disapproval are rising in Indian military and diplomatic circles over the recent Track II diplomacy over the Siachen glacier. Sources say that military veterans are adamant that a settlement can give no advantage to India and would only enhance the bruised status of the Pakistan army within that nation’s public life.

    Moreover, given the China-Pakistan nexus and Chinese presence in the Shaksgam Valley north of Siachen and in Aksai Chin to its east, plus the ISI’s continuing links with terrorist networks in India, there is simply no merit in a retreat from the glacier. Yet it is undeniable that Islamabad has successfully suborned the national consensus on this strategic issue.

    The disquiet relates to the recent military-to-military (actually retired officers) confidence building measures in Lahore from September 23-25, 2012. This was followed by a round table discussion in Delhi on October 15, 2012, where both the Lahore dialogue and the Indus Water Treaty were discussed. Select officers from the Army and members of the CLAWS faculty were present at the Delhi conclave.

    The Lahore Track II meeting was the third such conclave (previous ones having being held in Dubai and Bangkok), wherein both sides reportedly reached an ‘agreement’ on resolving the Sir Creek and Siachen disputes. The apprehension among nationalists is whether the shaky UPA regime is covertly agreeing to American pressure to surrender Indian interests in this strategic sector without taking the Indian public in confidence.

    In a political environment in which citizens and retired veterans alike are demanding unveiling of the true facts behind the military debacles of 1947 and 1962, and public protests over the secret diplomacy that led India to unilaterally surrender the gains of military action in 1965 and 1971 are growing, it is amazing that such furtive manoeuvres persist.

    With American troops slated to leave Afghanistan soon, and Islamabad determined to give New Delhi no space in what it considers its backyard, how can Siachen be discussed in isolation to larger developments in the region? It is admitted that official talks regarding conventional and nuclear CBMs have failed. What can Track II achieve that official talks cannot?

    Military veterans are aghast that the Atlantic Council of Ottawa which broke the news of the Track II accord, had actually sponsored the dialogue, no doubt with the blessings of the American, Canadian and British global policemen who are determined to demilitarise the glacier. A veteran present at the Lahore talks privately told to an interlocutor that the Track II Team was handpicked by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and not the Government of India! The complete expenses of travel and stay were also borne by the Council.

    As senior retired military and diplomatic officers, surely the participants would have known that the Atlantic Council of Ottawa and Atlantic Council of US are extensions of the Pakistani Army which would obviously be funding this so-called diplomacy. So despite the Ghulam Nabi Fai debacle, our people are determined to learn nothing from history, so desperate is the craving for foreign trips in five star comfort. We need to know more about the covert official backing for such talks, if any, in the light of the experience that persons who availed of the dubious hospitality of Ghulam Nabi Fai were appointed by the Union Home Ministry as interlocutors on Jammu & Kashmir.

    Worse, though the Track II groups (that is, individuals selected by the Atlantic Council for unknown qualities) informed the Ministry of External Affairs and the military brass about their meeting and sought some inputs. Some MEA officials did meet them but did not even mention Siachen, nor did the team ask questions on the subject.

    The Military, however, was adamant that it did not favour any demilitarisation. General VK Singh when approached reportedly retorted, “What bloody demilitarisation? Don’t let the @#$%$#@S discuss this. There is nothing to discuss with Pakistan over Siachen”. The new Army Chief General Bikram Singh was equally explicit, “Tell the $##s (in Punjabi) to first stop exporting terrorism. No question of discussing any demilitarisation”.

    So why did the Government of India let this handpicked group of retired military and diplomatic officers including a self-righteous journalist, go to Lahore and discuss and even agree to demilitarisation? What is the legal standing of this group? It would be in the fitness of things for the Government of India to quickly take an official view on this Ottawa-funded jamboree from the account reportedly furnished to the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, the NSA and the Service Chiefs. There is need to crack down of such potentially harmful ‘private initiatives’.

    It is scandalous that a bunch of individuals selected by a foreign body most likely funded by the Pakistan Army / ISI, with no authority to discuss geo-strategic matters, went and in violation of the Indian constitution and the 1994 Parliament Resolution reiterating claim over the entire J&K State as acceded to India by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947, agreed to demilitarise the Siachen glacier. This, despite being told by the outgoing and current Army Chief, that the matter was non-negotiable.

    According to the gist of the Lahore discussions, Pakistan is reportedly willing to forego its claim on Sir Creek and the dispute can be resolved. Both sides reportedly agreed to set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing Agreements; that present ground positions would be jointly recorded and records exchanged; the determination of places to which redeployment will be affected would be jointly agreed; disengagement and demilitarisation would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable timeframe; prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarised zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency.

    Military veterans aver that India cannot surrender such a strategic height in such a sensitive sector.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  4. #24
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    On being asked if there were efforts being made through track-II dialogue on demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier, Antony said: “No, we are not for that. Our stand on Siachen is very clear and there is no change in our stand”.

    India wants authentication of the present positions. New Delhi has always insisted it will pull back troops only after joint “authentication” of the frontline along the 109-km Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) — the name of the de facto border on the glacier. The AGPL has never been marked on the ground or on any document accepted by both sides.


    If Pakistan violates a de-militarisation treaty, it would enjoy easier access to Siachen, leaving India at a disadvantage. New Delhi wants international guarantee against any violation. Pakistan resists “authentication” as a pre-requisite to de-militarisation.

    The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Main News
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  5. #25
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    STOP, CHIEF
    Sly moves are afoot to withdraw AFSPA from Jammu and Kashmir.

    By N.V. Subramanian

    Whilst military writers are justifiably exercised over suggestions of track 2 peaceniks to pullout from Siachen, their anger must simultaneously focus on the army chief, General Bikram Singh, and his alleged shenanigans with the Jammu and Kashmir chief minister, Omar Abdullah, to withdraw the Armed Forces’ Special Powers Act (AFSPA) incrementally from the state.

    AFSPA provides legal cover to the army in counterinsurgency operations. Under AFSPA, army personnel cannot be prosecuted for their actions without the consent of the Central government, which is rarely given. In J and K (as in Punjab and Assam earlier), it is the army which has contained terrorism. There was a time in the early 1990s when the Centre had given up on the state, when the first of the “pro-azadi” groups had spread its influence rapidly. It is the army which retrieved the situation when Central intelligence failed and the local police sided with the insurgency. AFSPA was amended and applied to J and K, and all told, it has assisted the state to keep on top of the terrorism situation.

    AFSPA has been a bugbear for Omar Abdullah for no other reason than that he has been a failure as J and K’s chief minister and finds it politically expedient to demand its withdrawal. Omar has excellent communications skills but zero vision, in which he resembles the dynasts in power in Delhi and Lucknow. To boot, he has a fiery opposition leader in Mehbooba Mufti of the PDP who has an accommodative relationship with the insurgent elements of the state. When young and misguided Kashmiri stone-throwers two summers ago almost seemed to get the better of Omar Abdullah, another dynast, Rahul Gandhi, threw him a lifeline, on which basis he continues as chief minister.

    Early in his tenure, Omar cooked up a bizarre scheme with the then Union home minister, P.Chidambaram, to hand over the paramilitaries’ anti-insurgency tasks to the local police, which is both mixed up with the separatists and otherwise inadequate for a bigger fighting role against them. Framed-up rape charges against some paramilitary troops in Shopian (later disproved) became the reason to seek the ouster of the paramilitaries from the Valley, nearly bowing to which demand Omar Abdullah and Chidambaram played into the hands of the terrorists, until this writer explained the insidious psy-war (Commentary, “Bad news”, 3 July 2009). Omar Abdullah’s demand for AFSPA’s withdrawal from Jammu and Kashmir has predated that crisis and grown stronger since.

    Omar Abdullah believes AFSPA’s removal would open the Kashmiri floodgates of love and affection for him. Not true. Sheikh Abdullah was an iconic leader of Kashmir, and Kashmiris were willing to forgive him quite a lot. His son and Omar’s father, Farooq, is a bit of a buffoon, with no vision for Kashmir, but he is a genial mixer. Farooq gets on easily with his people, even though they may not agree with his politics. Omar Abdullah, on the other hand, is the least sociable of the Abdullah clan. He prefers running Kashmir with a handful of officials from the safety and security of his chief minister’s bungalow. He is distant with his own party colleagues and has little interaction with the people. There is no connect between Omar Abdullah and Kashmiris. He might as well be administrating the state from Delhi.

    Omar Abdullah knows he is on a very weak wicket in J and K, and that he will be thrown out in the next election. He needs something -- anything -- to befuddle and bamboozle Kashmiris. Kashmiri politicians in their engagements with the Centre have traditionally played the Kashmir card, which in substance means, “After me, the Deluge.” With Kashmiris, these same politicians pose as being anti-Centre. Being politically savvy, the Kashmiris have seen through this game long ago. But Omar Abdullah, all the same, cannot give up posing, and in one of those poses, he wants AFSPA to be rolled back from Kashmir.

    No army chief or field commander has supported Omar Abdullah. In his own inoffensive way, the defence minister, A.K.Anthony, has rejected Abdullah’s demand. In its confused libertinism, the Manmohan Singh government may yet agree to AFSPA’s withdrawal, but the rest of the political class, and particularly the BJP, will object. The strategic community will not stand for it. Faced with a wall, Omar Abdullah seemed to have reconciled to the continued operation of AFSPA, but the appointment of a new army chief, General Bikram Singh, appears to have given him a new unexpected opportunity.

    The chief hurdle that General Singh faced in his appointment was a case of alleged human rights’ violation in 2001 in Anantnag in a place called Janglat Mandi. As a brigadier, he is supposed to have killed a beggar in a false encounter. A relatively unknown J and K NGO filed a PIL against him, which in turn became the basis for a second PIL in the Supreme Court against General Singh’s appointment as army chief, which was rejected. The Kashmir NGO, however, is pursuing its PIL in the state high court, and press reports allege a section of the army is trying to hush the matter in the interest of the chief.

    There is new intelligence that suggests the army chief has allegedly pressed on Omar Abdullah to somehow bring the false encounter case to a closure. In return, General Bikram Singh has reportedly assured that the army will not oppose his demands on AFSPA as before. Except that a crucial army commander who has to author and initiate this changed line has refused, saying that any dilution of AFSPA will lead to a successful terrorists’ disruption of the 2014 general elections in the state, a key aim of Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir issue all over again. General Bikram Singh has allegedly threatened the obdurate army commander with a transfer to a lesser command, but he remains unfazed. The army chief has now plans to get a supine army commander who will agree with his scheme to weaken and eventually remove AFSPA from Jammu and Kashmir.

    All to save his skin.

    General Bikram Singh has been bad news for the Indian Army from the start. That it would get so worse still comes as a surprise. Next you know he will signal a withdrawal from Siachen. This man must be stopped.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  6. #26
    Senior Moderator Superkaif's Avatar
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    Thanks for all the info. My personal feelings are more people have died on this rock due to accidents and avalanches than combat. I hope both nations join and embrace peace on this rock. Nothing to gain by flexing military might.
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  7. #27
    Member fateh71's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Superkaif View Post
    Thanks for all the info. My personal feelings are more people have died on this rock due to accidents and avalanches than combat. I hope both nations join and embrace peace on this rock. Nothing to gain by flexing military might.
    Agreed, the principle is reciprocated. but details need to be sorted out. We can not afford another Kargil, and absolutely absolutely can not afford to read more Kargil war like threads
    The Following User Says Thank You to fateh71 For This Useful Post: Superkaif


  8. #28
    Senior Moderator Superkaif's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by fateh71 View Post
    Agreed, the principle is reciprocated. but details need to be sorted out. We can not afford another Kargil, and absolutely absolutely can not afford to read more Kargil war like threads
    Both sides of the border has its fair share of war mongerers and we cant control their aggression and patriotic desires - however the majority never want an occurrence like the loss of those soldiers a few months back on BOTH sides of the border. Of course drawing up the do and donts are something for our chiefs to sort out but i genuinely dont think this rock is worth it...

  9. #29
    Senior Member Dash's Avatar
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    Pakistan Pakistan
    If I may suggest, that this being a very very informative thread posted by ajtr on Siachen, it may be made sticky as Siachen News Thread under Kashmir forum. And any worthwhile information about Siachen may be posted there.
    The Following 2 Users Say Thank You to Dash For This Useful Post: ajtr,ManojKumar

    Last edited by Dash; 17th November 2012 at 14:21.

  10. #30
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    “Siachen Track II Forum” on a treacherous trek



    The Track II strategy is a conspiracy hatched by Pakistan to make its sinister scheme appear transparent, non-partisan and credible, to evict Indian troops from Siachen which Pakistan desperately needs but cannot snatch it from India by force

    Having suffered several defeats and dismemberment at India’s hands, Pakistan should seek peace more eagerly than India. Ironically and illogically, however, it is India that has always been at the receiving end while Pakistan has been getting away with her audacious mischiefs, outright anti-India tirade and perpetrating attacks deep inside India through proxy squads of terrorists trained, equipped and financed under a well organised military system. At last count, over 42 training academies—more mildly called ‘Camps’—are currently running in Pakistan and POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) even when, in a grotesque development, some of India’s very own revered strategists including a former Air Force chief have been easily convinced by their Pakistani counterparts to coax the Indian Army to depart from Siachen as a step towards peace. Called “Track II Forum”, they are a group of retired military brass from Pakistan and India seeking ‘demilitarisation’ of the Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battlefield, held by Indian troops since 1984. Ever since, the Pakistan Army has tried to dislodge the Indian troops and capture Siachen but in vain.

    Or is it the other way round? Prime minister Manmohan Singh was once quoted in India Today (14 May 2012) thus: “Siachen is called the highest battlefield where living is very difficult. Now the time has come that we make efforts that this is converted from a point of conflict to the symbol of peace.” The report went on, “Sources in the government say the prime minister has endorsed the Siachen talks on demilitarisation. For him, they say, the world's highest battlefield—and a snow-capped symbol of the Indian Army’s enduring sacrifice—comes without the baggage of Jammu and Kashmir and forward movement (read demilitarisation) would mean creating the right atmosphere for talks derailed by the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. Demilitarisation is his CBM (confidence building measure) offer to Pakistan.” The Indian military viewpoint has always been unambiguous and steadfastly against any ‘demilitarisation’ of Siachen. The government, in all fairness, must respect and accept this professional opinion from the country’s military authorities responsible to defend these borders rather than yielding to pressure or blackmail from invisible quarters.

    What is perplexing is that the proposal to demilitarise Siachen is said to have germinated in secretive parleys among some very senior military veterans—Indians and Pakistanis—organised as “Track II Forum” under the aegis of “Atlantic Council of Ottawa” and “Atlantic Council of US” (latter headed by Shuja Nawaz—a close confidant of Gen Kiyani) at exotic locales in the world. The Forum flaunting themselves as angels of peace, promise to replace animosities and the age-old trust deficit between India and Pakistan with peace, friendship and cooperation. ‘Demilitarisation’, a euphemism for ‘withdrawal’ or ‘abandonment’ of Siachen by India, is the first step they have proposed while remaining quiet on far more serious issues affecting daily life of millions of people on both sides of the border.

    Siachen, at an altitude of 22,000 ft, has nothing to sustain life. All it has is scarce oxygen, chilly winds, icy gorges, debilitating fog, sleet, snow and temperature sinking to minus 50 degree Celsius. No birds fly there, no plants grow, no flowing streams—only frozen glaciers, no life whatsoever! Yet, the gallant Indian soldiers stand here to keep vigil throughout the glacial expanse in sheer defiance to nature and enemy. Even in these adversities, Indian troops holding these dominating heights enjoy a tactical advantage which renders it impossible for the Pakistan Army to wrest control of “key terrain features” in this area by fighting. But Indian occupation of these features denies Pakistan Army the freedom to encroach into Indian territory and stake claims subsequently as is evident by Pakistan’s persistence on delineating the LC (Line of Control) from NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass. The Track II ‘demilitarisation’ proposal, therefore, is Pakistan Army’s silent attack by other nobler looking means to capture the strategically important objective in the region. If this were not so, why are they ignoring to address a host of other higher priority issues hampering normalisation process? Siachen being a desolate uninhabitable tract has no bearing on trade, industry, transport or any other human activity to affect life in Pakistan. Why then is it given such a prominence for normalising relations between the two nations? Since early 2004, even the opposing forces of the two countries have remained largely quiet in this region. Why should a quiet, tranquil Siachen be a cause of anxiety to Pakistan at this stage? Far from being an innocuous peace drive, the move is loaded with Pakistan’s strategic move to unhinge and upturn Indian defences in the region without military manoeuvre.

    The vital strategic significance of Siachen is further heightened when viewed in relation to the LC that should justifiably run north from NJ9842 to the vicinity of the Wakhan Corridor, the western extremity of the original state of J&K ceded to India by the Maharaja genuinely and legally, as also the proximity of Shaksgam Valley illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.

    Also, it is the strategic value of these dominating heights that stand between a Pak-China link-up. There are rumours that part of upper Gilgit-Baltistan has been leased by Pakistan to China for a period of 50 years. Presence of Chinese troops and labour in the Baltik region lend substance to these inputs. Imagine a geography that would conjoin Xingjiang, Shaksgam, POK (Baltistan), Aksai Chin and Tibet while Siachen is left bereft of Indian troops. If and when that happens, it would be tantamount to ceding areas north of Khardung La range to Pakistan putting life in the Nubra and Shyok Valleys at their mercy and opening floodgates for unhindered infiltration into Ladakh. Indian positions in Ladakh, Leh and Kargil would also be under serious jeopardy. Siachen in its present state stands formidably to deny Pakistan and China such strategic advantages besides asserting India’s sovereign authority over her territory in the region where border, LC or AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line) is yet to be authenticated.

    If they were indeed promoting peace and friendship between India and Pakistan, there were other urgencies and priorities that should have caught the attention of Track II Forum. Siachen is not harming Pakistan in any way yet, whereas the terrorist training camps in Pakistan have been bleeding India. The Forum is strangely quiet on this issue. Why are they also not asking Pakistan to expatriate the terrorists and criminals wanted for their crimes in India and now roaming about freely and honourably in Pakistan? Why are they not seeking an undertaking from the Pakistani authorities to stop anti-India tirade at international forums?

    If ‘demilitarisation’ of Siachen were logical and prudent in the Track II reckoning, there would be no logic or prudence for India to hold geographical features anywhere along the Line of Control by the same reckoning. With in-house calls for withdrawal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act from J&K already gaining eloquence, it is not impossible to foresee that vacating Siachen would ultimately trigger a demand for the Indian Army to ‘demilitarise’ J&K. By that corollary China would perhaps be the first to seek ‘demilitarisation’ of Arunachal Pradesh. It seems Track II Forum has big future and can plan their exotic jaunts in style!

    Some Indian delegates in the Track II Forum are ducking questions and, bereft of argument, some of them brazenly conclude saying, “Siachendemil... it is my personal opinion? You may agree or disagree with it but in my retired capacity, I am free to express whatever I feel!” That is sad and grossly wrongly held notion. Agreed that retirement frees you from the rules and norms that restricted your “free and frank” expression, but the position you held before demitting office has given you an identity and status that conveys credibility and influences public opinion.

    Personal opinions of personalities who become publicly recognisable should not be loosely tossed around under the plea of one’s fundamental rights. Even on retirement, military leaders cannot relinquish in life their commitment to “the safety, honour and welfare” of their country and violation of this Chetwodian virtue should be viewed most seriously. The Track II proposal to ‘demilitarise’ (which actually means abandoning) Siachen is not only wrong but a treacherous proposal that smacks of some conspiracy hatched to inflict significant damage through apparently innocuous means and cunning machinations.

    Ideally, entire the Indo-Pak border and Line of Control/Actual Ground Position Line should be demilitarised. Maybe one day it will happen too. Perhaps by now both the countries would have achieved such good neighbourliness only if Pakistan had not betrayed India’s trust every time we moved closer to peace and friendship. Given the history of frequent betrayals, infiltration, cross border terrorism and Kargil, India would vacate Siachen at her own peril. Pakistan cannot afford to evict the Indian Army from its dominating positions at the Earth’s highest battlefield militarily. The Track II strategy therefore is a conspiracy hatched by Pakistan co-opting Indian veterans and journalists under the aegis of so-called Atlantic Council of Ottawa to make their sinister scheme appear transparent, non-partisan and credible to evict Indian troops from Siachen which Pakistan needs desperately but cannot snatch it from India by force. An army that is used to planning and executing coups to topple governments seems to have also perfected yet another art of launching quiet warfare in the garb of cool diplomacy to evict the Indian Army from its defences! It is therefore highly expedient for the India Army to consider and include such unconventional machinations and “diplomatic manoeuvrings” as factors while planning war-games to be able to see beyond what looks apparent in our enemy's posturing.

    Peace and good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan or between India and China are very much needed and would be a welcome scenario any day. Sadly, these relations have been far from peaceful or good neighbourly with a history of more blood flow than trade and trust across borders. India’s initiatives for peace and friendship with Pakistan have almost always been betrayed even while agreements were being drafted or formally signed. Prime ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif were celebrating peace at Lahore when the Pakistan Army was busy infiltrating to capture Kargil and cut off Siachen. Peace parleys for confidence-building measures were going on between the two countries when Mumbai 26/11 killings happened under the aegis of Pakistan Army/ISI. Yet, people on both sides of the border need and deserve peace and there is ample scope for cooperation to benefit from each other in numerous fields.

    But peace cannot be begged. To be lasting, it has to be negotiated from a position of strength, honour, dignity and mutual trust.

    To read more articles by the same writer, please click here.


    (Col Karan Kharb is a military veteran who commanded an Infantry battalion with many successes in counter-terrorist operations. He was also actively involved in numerous high-risk operations as second in command of the elite 51 Special Action Group of the National Security Guard—widely known as ‘Black Cat Commandos’. He conducts leadership training and is the author of two bestsellers—“Made to Lead” and “Lead to Success”—on leadership development that have also been translated into foreign languages).

    =============================================

    Lot many IA veteran are writing about track two negotiation in some not so much well known media with MSM on both side keeping tight-lipped silence on this subject........Question it raises...
    1.Why only indian army veteran are writing about track-2 on siachin?And behest of whom they are writing?
    2.Is it that GOI and IA are not on same page on siachin or are there 2 groups with in GOI with matters concerning pakistan?
    3.Why msm is silent on both side?
    4.Why There is no official confirmation from both GOI and GOP on track-2?
    5.What is the inside information these IA veterans have which made them suddenly raise the red flags.
    The Following User Says Thank You to ajtr For This Useful Post: ManojKumar

    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  11. #31
    Senior Member ManojKumar's Avatar
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    ajtr - ive been reading through this thread and i must say i didnt know about this subject and its been a good source of info. Many thanks
    The Following User Says Thank You to ManojKumar For This Useful Post: Dash


  12. #32
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Pakistan India
    Mapping the changes in Pakistan




    By Ajai Shukla
    Business Standard, 22nd Jan 13

    During my travels in Pakistan last week, I could hardly miss the stark difference between Indian and Pakistani reactions to the killing and mutilation of two Indian soldiers on the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K. Oblivious to Indian jingoism, the Pakistani press covered, minute-by-minute, the Anna Hazare style reality show that was Canada-based cleric Tahir ul-Qadri’s challenge to that country’s political establishment.

    This is a metaphor for a changing Indo-Pak dynamic. For decades, India looked inward while Islamabad tom-tommed the looming India threat. Today as Pakistan, while lurching toward a form of democracy focuses mainly on its burgeoning internal challenges, India increasingly obsesses about the terrorist threat from across the border. This even as the tide of Pakistan-fomented violence recedes and Indian police and intelligence officials shift focus to disaffection within the country.

    But the fortuitous outcome of Pakistan’s single-minded focus on Tahir ul-Qadri’s so-called Long March was that New Delhi’s tough response to brutality on the LoC went almost unnoticed in Pakistan, allowing Islamabad (which has little appetite for roiling the waters) to settle for a pro-forma response. This avoided an acid exchange of tit-for-tat statements that would have united Pakistan’s divided anti-India constituency.

    But that was luck, not design. New Delhi, which views Pakistan in the context of an outdated and intellectually lazy narrative of implacable hostility, needs a clearer understanding of a rapidly changing Pakistani playfield. The most important transformation relates to Pakistan’s most powerful organisation, the army; and the evolving relationship between Pakistan’s five key institutions, viz the army, the polity, the judiciary, civil society and the media.

    While the India threat remains a convenient drum for the Pakistan Army to beat, especially when New Delhi issues hawkish statements, General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi is increasingly focused on the tribal areas of the north-western frontier, now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. As Pakistani generals admit, their ill-conceived juggling act --- which involved fighting the radically anti-establishment Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (the “bad Taliban”), while backing the Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network (the “good Taliban”) --- has become unsustainable because of close linkages amongst jihadis. Tanzeems in the tribal area now coordinate closely with groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Lashkar-e-Toiba that are embedded within the Punjab heartland.

    With the tribal areas already aflame, the generals worry that Taliban success in Afghanistan would inevitably blow back into Pakistan, first into the tribal areas and from there into the heartland.

    Hasan Askari Rizvi, a perceptive observer of the Pakistan Army, explains, “The army fears that Afghan Taliban success would embolden the Pakistani Taliban. Through their links with extremist groups in Punjab, this would raise terrorism, radicalization and extremism across Pakistan. Taliban success would also galvanize the Deobandi and Wahabi madrassas that do not today support the Taliban actively, like they did in the 1990s. The army believes that this would make the internal security situation in Pakistan unmanageable.”

    This apprehension provides a crucial window for an Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Afghanistan. While both sides regard Afghanistan as a zero-sum game that has no winners, this gloomy outlook on a post-2014 Afghanistan could be brightened through a political initiative, preferably through back channels, to address both sides’ concerns. An agreement between New Delhi and Islamabad could backstop a mutually beneficial stabilization of Afghanistan.

    Top generals who have retired from the Pakistan Army say it would be willing to support such a dialogue. Asked why GHQ did not signal its changed attitude, these officers retort that the Pakistani Army’s changing attitude towards India will never be reflected through public pronouncements, so New Delhi should not hold its breathe waiting for those. Instead India should scrutinise Islamabad’s recent public positions, which are broadly cleared by Rawalpindi.

    The Pakistan army’s current low-key posture does not mean that it has ceased to be the country’s most powerful institution. But while it continues to exercise political influence, its methods are getting subtler because of the rise of balancing forces. These include an activist judiciary and a media that has given voice to a previously disempowered civil society. These alternative power centres make it difficult for the army to envision single-handedly managing Pakistan.

    Also deterring the Pakistani military from assuming more visible power is its understanding that the Pakistani economy is in trouble. GHQ possesses significant economic expertise, not only from managing its own considerable commercial empire but also because the generals study international thinking on Pakistan and interact reguarly with foreign experts. Currently, the economic mess can be blamed on the politicians; but not if the army assumed power.

    And so the generals watched as Tahir ul-Qadri held the government to ransom, occupying an Islamabad square with 50,000 followers (he had promised four million). The fiery chief of the Tehrik Minhaj-ul-Quran had hoped to paralyse the capital, forcing the army to move in. But this hope was belied and the polity joined hands, forcing him to climb down and sign an agreement that had been offered to him a week earlier. This was a triumph for democracy, even though the politicians who sealed the deal were hardly men of spotless reputation. In earlier times, many of them would have asked the Pakistan Army to intervene.

    Interestingly, even as Pakistan’s military dims its public profile, New Delhi has taken to citing the Indian Army as the basis for its policy positions. In choosing not to sign a Siachen Agreement (wisely, but that is another debate!), New Delhi holds up the army’s objections as a fig leaf. In hardening its condemnation of Pakistan after initially soft-pedalling the recent LoC incident, the government took its cue from the army. A disempowered Indian military probably basks in this show of concern, but it would do well to remember that in the aspects that really matter --- e.g. long-term strategic planning; equipment modernisation; and soldiers’ welfare --- the military remains out in the cold.


    ==============================================

    Col.Ajay Shukla has been part of track-2 negotiation team and has recently visited lahore for track-2 negotiations.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  13. #33
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Lt Gen Katoch nails the lies of Track II - Track II Unexplained.

    A recent article in a prominent Indian daily last week talked of non-state actors who bring nations closer and the Ottawa Dialogue; the now well known issue of ‘Demilitarization of Siachen’. This has been promptly put on a blog by participants of Track II saying “Track II Explained”. But this can hardly be end of the story. There is plenty that is ‘unexplained’ about this particular Track II.

    There is no doubt that Track II processes have their relevance and they do have government level interaction, briefings and debriefings.
    Much has happened since the India-Pakistan Track II agreed to a proposal to ‘Demilitarize Siachen’ in September 2012 and the press release by the Atlantic Council of Ottawa hit the web on 02 October 2012. Acquiescence by the Indian members of the Track II to withdraw from Siachen was naturally met with amazement and shock in India. Prior to this agreement of the Track II at Lahore in September last, articles and TV discussions came up portraying that Siachen was strategically irrelevant. The government chose to remain tight lipped and continues with that stance albeit in the aftermath of furore post the Atlantic Council of Ottawa press release, a panel consisting of two members of the Track II Team under a former Ambassador and Secretary MEA (who had nothing to do with the Track II Team but is known to be close to the political hierarchy) made efforts to justify withdrawal from Siachen at India International Centre but were shocked at the unanimous opposition from the audience including from a former Army Chief and journalists. Why this former Ambassador and Secretary MEA tried to justify the proposed withdrawal from Siachen and on whose instructions remains a mystery.

    There is no doubt that Track II processes have their relevance and they do have government level interaction, briefings and debriefings. To this end, they do provide significant inputs that facilitate the Track I dialogue while not being binding on the latter. This is an accepted norm. Track II dialogues can also be at multiple levels, even simultaneously. However, this particular Track II agreement raises several questions that require clarifications and transparency.

    Interaction with the participants reveals that none of them is aware as to how they were selected, who sponsored them and who the Indian coordinator was. The Co-Chair described the status of the Track II Team as a “Private Body”, later changed to “Group of Private Individuals” over whom he had no control. Significantly, Indian members of the Track II Team comprised eight former Indian Military officers out of the total eleven members. While the meetings were held over a period of months, one member stated in an article that for once the bureaucrat members were in the backseat and the former military members in the forefront. Surprisingly, not one of the former eight military officers had served in Siachen and the team made no effort to visit the area under discussion despite months of parleys. This raises a question mark on the motive of the Indian coordinator who gave these names to Atlantic Council of Ottawa. Was it by design?

    Surprisingly, not one of the former eight military officers had served in Siachen and the team made no effort to visit the area under discussion despite months of parleys.
    The Indian Co-Chair of the Track II Team maintains that the MEA briefing made no mention of Siachen and no questions were asked by any members with regard to Siachen. The logic being given is that the Track II Team took upon themselves to work out “HOW” Siachen can be demilitarized without going into “WHY” and “WHEN”, which is laughable. Forget net assessment, every young military officers know how a military appreciation is done, what its nuances are and what factors need to be considered to arrive at the logical course of action.

    The logic, therefore, can hardly be bought; a body of “Private Individuals” working out without any higher direction whatsoever ‘HOW” Siachen should be demilitarized. Who was the driving force in this body of private individuals on which the Co-Chair admits he had no control and what was the motivation? What are the participants hiding? Why has the Indian Co-Chair clammed up and refusing to take any questions? Additionally, if only “HOW” was being looked at then vital issues like Pakistan sponsored terrorism and the China factor were obviously not discussed or discussed in most perfunctory manner.

    The press release by Atlantic Council of Ottawa is totally silent on China. Terrorism is supposedly discussed but was it discussed in relation to Demilitarization of Siachen (Thereby Acquiescing and legitmizing Pakistani Terrorism) – that this will facilitate Pakistan launch Kashmir Valley like proxy war in Ladakh with dire consequences to our national security? It is not without reason that Musharraf had declared “There will be many more Kargils”.

    The vehemence with which the participants were articulating that Siachen has no worthwhile strategic significance has blown off with the wind especially after the anger faced during the hurriedly organized panel discussion at the India International Centre in early October 2012. Participants now admit individually that Siachen (read Saltoro Ridge) indeed has great strategic significance, admitting this even in interactions with military wings of political parties post the public furore. What then was the motivation for our Track II Team to ignore the strategic significance of the Saltoro Ridge particularly with China sitting in our territory in Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin and Pakistani and US media indicating Pakistan is leasing out Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50 years, plus the fact that withdrawal from Saltoro would open the floodgates of infiltration into Ladakh by Pakistan’s state sponsored non-state actors.

    Why was the Track II Team ignoring the reality of the strategic significance of Siachen? Why was the advice of every former Army Chief and the present one that India should not withdraw from Siachen ignored?
    A former military officer cum journalist participant even as late as 12 April 2012 was passionately vindicating India’s right to hold on to Siachen on national TV; that India should never withdraw from Siachen because of its strategic significance. What happened in just five months to make him do a 180 degrees turn. Why was the Track II Team ignoring the reality of the strategic significance of Siachen? Why was the advice of every former Army Chief and the present one that India should not withdraw from Siachen ignored? What was the role of the Indian coordinator and his mentors in making the Track II Team adopt such stance? What are the participants hiding?

    Musharraf admits in his autobiography that India pre-empted the occupation of Saltoro Ridge by Pakistan – Pakistan’s planned move was obviously for strategic reasons and not to establish a winter retreat. The fact that Pakistan launched the Kargil intrusions to cut off and grab Siachen has been pooh-poohed by many in India. Now Lieutenant General, Shahid Aziz, former Corps Commander of Lahore recently wrote about Kargil in his blog saying, “The whole truth about Kargil is yet to be known….. It was a total disaster….. We didn’t pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence ……Our clearly expressed intent was to cut the supply line to Siachen and force the Indians to pull out…… There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers ……… the boys were comforted by their commander’s assessment that no serious response would come…. Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though the General (Musharraf) publicly denied it.”

    Here, the fact that the Track II agreement is only a proposal and not binding on Track I is not the issue. That Pakistan considers its high powered Track II Team as good as Track I is also not the issue. The issue is that for eternity, Pakistan will quote this military heavy Indian Track II having agreed to withdraw from Siachen. More significantly, this can also be exploited by the politician-bureaucrat mafia within India that is working at cross purposes to India’s national interests. Why are we calling slimy Musharraf time and again for leadership summits when he is a fugitive in his own country and has been stabbing us repeatedly? Why are the anti-India Hurriyat members given access to the Pakistani Embassy including every time some Pakistani official comes to Delhi? Why is the this bunch given visas to go and meet the mullah-terrorist Hafiz Saeed when India has been exhorting Pakistan to indict him as the mastermind of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack of 2008? Why is the IB funding the Hurriyat, with what purpose and why without reference to the Army?

    It may be recalled that the FBI caught on to Ghulam Mohammed Fai only in 2011 after he had already pumped in some $350 millions funded by the ISI into US over several years for moulding perceptions in Pakistan’s favour with regard to Kashmir.
    Why is the Centre mute to anti-India activities in states, one example being total inaction on non-bailable warrants issued against Akbaruddin Owaisi way back in 2009? Why has the government been fooling the public since 2010 saying the Maoist insurgency will be over in two-three years? Coming back to Siachen, why such a decision was taken by the Indian members of the Track II Team and with what motivation remains a question mark.

    As per the Atlantic Council of press note, militaries of both India and Pakistan held several rounds to boost confidence building measures, these meetings having been held in Dubai (20-21 November 2011), Bangkok (23-25 February 2012) and Lahore (23-25 September 2012) and that additionally, working group meetings took place in Chiang Mai (21 April 2012) and Palo Alto (30-31 July 2012). These were followed by the meeting in question in Lahore on 23-25 September 2012. Given the five star culture of such meetings, the expenditure involved would have been enormous. Were the decisions of the participants influenced advertently or inadvertently?

    It may be recalled that the FBI caught on to Ghulam Mohammed Fai only in 2011 after he had already pumped in some $350 millions funded by the ISI into US over several years for moulding perceptions in Pakistan’s favour with regard to Kashmir. Obviously, ISI would have transferred such funds through several fronts and not directly. In the instant case of the Track II, an agreement to withdraw from Siachen without any governmental direction to the effect (as maintained by participants) and in direct contrast to military advice not to demilitarize raises serious questions. Silence and lack of transparency only reinforce apprehensions.

    What exactly has Pakistan done to deserve this largesse – killing and threatening Panchayat members in J&K, failing to punish perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack, continuing its proxy war to destabilize India, arming Indian Maoists through the LeT, blatantly denying ISI and LeT links despite solid evidence given by David Headley in 2011, what? Hopefully, the recent barbarianism by Pakistan at least should open the eyes of the blind men. Yet, participants of the Track II have been harping that Demilitarization from Siachen is “doable”. Well, so are whole of Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh and much more – all doable if one is prepared to pack up one’s bags, move back and vacate our own territory.

    Silence and lack of transparency only reinforce apprehensions.
    Coming back to the Track II, a much wider debate on the above issue is definitely warranted. To this end, the United Services Institution of India offered its premises to the sponsors of the Track II for holding a discussion on the issue along with the Track II Team, giving them opportunity to also interact with a wide cross section of scholars, diplomats, military personnel etc. However, this has been declined by the sponsors saying “the process is well established and it would be disruptive to change it now” (The contours of hand-over has already been decided). Strangely, all meeting of this Track II have been held abroad including at Lahore in Pakistan. Was this by design to not let the Indian public get the whiff of what was cooking?


    The Indian public deserves answers including whether we have moles in the establishment working for foreign intelligence agencies, which is not new. An open public debate including with the sponsors and the Indian members of the Track II Team is certainly warranted, not on a pliable TV channel but at an autonomous Think Tank like the United Services Institution of India. While the sponsors may shy off the suggestion, what about a wider debate within the county minus the sponsors? Will the government at least speak up now with Pakistan having bared her fangs?
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  14. #34
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    "Siachen is a strategic location - it is an important area which is under our occupation - it is our area - on its east side Akasi Chin and Korakuram ranges fall and on western side there is Pakistan area of Gilgit-Baltistan," he said.

    The Army commander claimed that Pakistan had number of times tried to enter into negotiation over it but whenever there are issues of agreement, the country does not comply with it.

    "There can be no talks if they do not agree the line (of control) - where till we occupy, the land should be made permanent," he said.
    Significant Chinese presence in PoK: Lt Gen Parnaik - Hindustan Times
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  15. #35
    Member Munir's Avatar
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    There is no chance for the Indians to push in to Pakistan ever again. The difference will be that this time the battles will be fought without direct presence of military cause there are so many medium long range tactical wepoamns added by Pakistan. So that in mind you understand why the Indian army is shouting and crying.

  16. #36
    Senior Member KingKong's Avatar
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    I dont see how their interest has been compromised when in reality the people there dont want them and what little Kashmir they have is under occupation

  17. #37
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by KingKong View Post
    I dont see how their interest has been compromised when in reality the people there dont want them and what little Kashmir they have is under occupation
    Its all about track -2 negotiations on siachin and sircreek all these writers are laminating about
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

  18. #38
    Elite Member contract killer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Munir View Post
    There is no chance for the Indians to push in to Pakistan ever again. The difference will be that this time the battles will be fought without direct presence of military cause there are so many medium long range tactical wepoamns added by Pakistan. So that in mind you understand why the Indian army is shouting and crying.

    Whats make you think that India dont have those long and medium range missiles? And for what Indian Army is shouting and crying?

  19. #39
    Elite Member contract killer's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by KingKong View Post
    I dont see how their interest has been compromised when in reality the people there dont want them and what little Kashmir they have is under occupation
    It is not little...........

    Indian = 43%
    Pakistan = 37%
    China = 20%

  20. #40
    Senior Member ajtr's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by contract killer View Post
    Whats make you think that India dont have those long and medium range missiles? And for what Indian Army is shouting and crying?
    Indian leadership like indian men dont have spine to press the button.Their mardanigi works only in Raping women in bus and on roads or beating the anti Rape protesters with lathis.but when they meet their equals on border they squeak and hide into their holes.
    Last edited by ajtr; 27th January 2013 at 17:57.
    Main tere naseeb ki barish nahi Jo tujh pe baras jaon
    Tujhe taqdeer badalni hogi mujhe panay ke liye....!!!!

    मैं तेरे नसीब की बारिश नहीं जो तुझ पे बरस जाऊं,
    तुझे तकदीर बदलनी होगी मुझे पाने के लिए ....!!!!

    'میں تیرے نصیب کی بارش نہیں جو تجھ پہ برس جاؤں
    تجھے تقدیر بدلنی ہوگی مجھے پانے کے لئے

    "I'm not the rain of your fortune that i'll fall on you.You've to change your fate in order to get me."

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