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Thread: Pakistan - India relations

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  1. #21
    Senior Member Amjad Hussain's Avatar
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    Re: India’s Pakistan groove

    Crux of this debate is ‘ no trade’ between ‘ India and PAKISTAN be possible without trust and both have no trust becuase both have their legtimate concerns and issues
    Idealogical factor cannt be ruled out when peace lover talk about AMAN KI ASHA ,by the passage of time hosility is being increased.India media is responsible for this increasing hate and hostility between the two states.

  2. #22
    Elite Member sparkling's Avatar
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    India's Pakistan groove‏

    Fresh from a recent Track II event with India, what abides from the engagement are the four ‘Ts’ that make India’s policy towards Pakistan: Terrorism, Trial, Trade and Transit. You could actually club these into two subheads — terrorism and trade — the two planks that India is willing to anchor its engagement with Pakistan on. Oh yes, Pakistan too could add subjects of interest in a proposed agenda for engagement, and the Indians might even give Pakistan a hearing on those, but to them what will Tango will but be based on the two or four that are of prime interest to them. You could else dance a Samba for all they care, or a Flamingo if you please.



    Terrorism first. If the earlier manifestation of their concerns on terrorism centered around Mumbai, and what got officially repeated the world over by them, cross-border terrorism — now has newer mutations. The Line of Control (LoC) takes the prime spot; and this is based around the 2013 spat across the LoC that went on for a better part of 10 months. Without a doubt, the 2003 ceasefire across the LoC was a key confidence-building measure that sustained a sense of normalcy between the two nuclear neighbours, but what remained enigmatic was its 10-month long negation by both sides even as they alternated barbs of fire with words — sans a political or a military objective.

    But then nothing in this historic land of poetic imagination comes without a method. Simply put, the Indians were preparing grounds to pre-empt a speculative induction of the militant groups into Kashmir — a la 1989 — as the war in Afghanistan drew down with the departure of the US/ISAF, raising the possibility that those employed there would soon need to find a newer occupation. Hence, the intended conflation of both cross-border terrorism and the eruption of the LoC, and the obvious coining of it as Pakistan’s preparatory manoeuvre to re-enact and exploit a past Indian vulnerability.

    Without a neutral body to ascertain facts, such allegations fly with little check. Pakistan feels that India violated and vitiated the relative calm on the LoC to make a pre-emptory case for such an apprehension that at best was only speculative and imagined. The fact is that 2014 is not 1989; and the strategic context is a lot different. Incidents of cross-border intrusions are far less and have gone down considerably according to India’s own record of such events; as are indeed recorded incidents of militancy-related violence, which have come down infinitesimally in Kashmir compared to 2003. In this Track II, Herat — where the Indian consulate was attacked on the day that Narendra Modi was inaugurated in Delhi — was consistently repeated as an exhibit of Pakistan’s collusion with terror; without for a moment recognising the possibility of other agents who would rather see any effort at rapprochement change back to confrontation simply to divert Pakistan’s focus away from its operation in North Waziristan. India’s characterisation of Pakistan is not only stuck in a groove, it remains patently insidious.

    On to trade then. Without a doubt, trade is the modern equivalent to familial bonding that used to come with intermarriages among ruling families of competing states. Through such relationships, one bought influence while leveraging stakes. In the India-Pakistan context though, the amount that such trade will add to India’s GDP, by one account, will be minute. That is to reinforce, if you missed the point, that really, trade too is a favour that India makes for Pakistan. The current trade figures of around $2.7 billion will be augmented to a figure of around $10 billion even if all trade is made free and without any accompanying barriers. The experts are quick to point out that this too shall only be the regularisation of the indirect trade that goes on at around $5 billion, through Dubai mostly.

    They also suggest that trade — like water — will find its own course in due time and will regulate in volume depending on the space it finds. ‘Space’ is the operative word here; ‘finding’ it in India is the crux. What will remain a challenge will be to dampen traders’ excitement with producers’ interests, which really means that uninhibited trade will only enrich traders while impoverishing producers. Indian experts sweeten the theory of free trade with the possibility of creating a value chain where all linked can create a specialised niche brought together elsewhere as a product. Translated, it means India will assemble while the rest of the world will provide the parts. It took decades before the European Union reached that level of interdependence, and then with a capacity matrix in technology that more or less mirrored each other. Before that, they became a Union. South Asia, in comparison, remains the least integrated region in the world.

    What will interest Pakistan in trading with India is an accompanying treaty on investments that should permit each to invest in other’s economy; to begin with, in preferred areas, before gradually expanding the portfolio of choices. But $10 billion and 0.1 per cent of GDP-rise is not what India is so persistently chasing with Pakistan. To her, trade with Pakistan is akin to breaking into a closed system where when apprehensions are fairly soothed and Indian presence is a matter of fact, the door to riches ‘beyond Afghanistan’ will open. It isn’t only the oil and gas in Central Asia that India will covet, or the market that the stans have on offer; it is the accompanying influence that charts India’s geopolitical rise in the region. It will then compete with China in Central Asia, recreate the magic of a Silk Route relationship, and establish its credentials as a bonafide contender in the larger game of dividends.

    Neither then it is ‘transit’ to Afghanistan alone India so vehemently pursues. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are but ‘two serial keys’ to the grander opening beyond. At this Track II, Pakistan linked what India seeks as ‘deliverables’ to what Pakistan seeks as ‘dividends’. The two henceforth will move in unison. The plate on that count remains hopelessly empty with numerous Indo-Pak issues still begging resolution. Corollary: Pakistan ain’t letting India in on Afghanistan any time soon. It has its interests to secure. ‘Deliverables’ and ‘dividends’ are inalienably linked.

    The writer is a defence analyst who retired as air vice-marshal in the Pakistan Air Force



    Published in The Express Tribune, June 28th, 2014.

  3. #23
    Senior Member Greenstar's Avatar
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    Pakistan United States

    Revival of Pak-India trade talks to be discussed next month

    ISLAMABAD: Commerce ministers of Pakistan and India will meet in Bhutan next month to discuss revival of talks on trade liberalisation.

    A senior official told Dawn that the ministers would me*et on the sidelines of a me*e*ting of the Safta Min*isterial Council on July 24.

    The commerce ministers of Saarc countries will attend the meeting to revive the stalled process of liberalisation of trade in goods and services among member countries.

    This will be the first meeting of Comm*erce Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan with Indian State Minister for Commerce and Industry Nirmala Sitharaman after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in Delhi recently.

    “I will meet the Indian state minister for commerce for resumption of bilateral trade talks,” Mr Khan told Dawn.

    He said all options would be explored for complete liberalisation of trade with India.

    In 2012, Pakistan expanded the list of items tradable with India from 1,918 items to 5,800. Only 1,209 items now remain on the negative list.

    Mr Khan said the Saarc meeting would discuss the resumption of freer trade among the member countries.

    It would also take up the issues of further trimming of the sensitive list, removing visa restrictions, allowing of banking channels and mobile connectivity, he added.

    Pakistan has 936 items on the sensitive list and India 614.

    Published in Dawn, June 29th, 2014

  4. #24
    Senior Member ManojKumar's Avatar
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    India, Pak to discuss fresh timeline for trade liberalization

    ISLAMABAD: Minister for commerce and industry Nirmala Sitharaman will meet her Pakistani counterpart Khurram Dastgir Khan for the first time next month to discuss a fresh roadmap for removing bottlenecks in liberalization of bilateral trade.
    The meeting between Sitharaman and Khan will take place on the sidelines of SAFTA ministerial council in Bhutan on July 24.

    "I will meet the Indian state minister for commerce for resumption of bilateral trade talks," Khan was quoted as saying.

    It will be first high level trade interaction since the BJP came to power.

    An official of commerce ministry told PTI that trade liberalization will be on the top of the agenda when the commerce ministers meet.

    "We missed an early deadline of December 31, 2012 to remove all hurdles in the trade relations. Now the two governments will try to agree on fresh roadmap for it," he said.

    He said India should address concerns of business community in Pakistan regarding non-tariff barriers and other issues which could impact export after trade liberalization.

    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/i...w/37470309.cms

  5. #25
    Senior Member Sinbad's Avatar
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    Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan, India to meet on Aug 25

    ISLAMABAD: Foreign Secretary of India Sujatha Singh and her Pakistani counterpart, Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry will meet in Islamabad on August 25 to carry forward the dialogue process between the two countries.

    Sujatha Singh spoke to Foreign Secretary Chaudhry over the telephone on Wednesday afternoon to confirm the meeting that could lead to resumption of the peace process suspended since January last year — an indication of how difficult the process for normalisation is.

    Foreign Office spokesperson Tasneem Aslam, while giving the details of the telephonic conversation, said it was agreed that the two Foreign Secretaries will meet in Islamabad on August 25 to carry forward the dialogue process.

    Keeping in view the vision of the two Prime Ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi who met in New Delhi this year, the two foreign secretaries are holding meeting in Islamabad to improve and establish good neighbourly relations, said the spokesperson.

    The two foreign secretaries agreed that the dialogue process between the two countries should be result-oriented, she added.

    Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan TCA Raghavan, meanwhile repeated allegations of violation of ceasefire along the LoC by Pakistani side.

    “There have been attempts for infiltration followed by unprovoked firing,” Mr Raghavan while speaking at an Iftar reception hosted by high commission said, adding that firing from “across the Working Boundary” had resulted in death of an Indian soldier in addition to other civilian casualties.

    Pakistan had earlier attributed the latest Working Boundary incident to “intermittent and unprovoked firing from the Indian side.”

    http://www.dawn.com/news/1121094/for...meet-on-aug-25

  6. #26
    Senior Member Wattan's Avatar
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    Pakistan means business with India, seriously

    Foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India set to meet in Islamabad on August 25 in the neighbouring countries’ latest attempt at improving ties

    Foreign secy denies Indian allegations of LoC ceasefire violations by Pakistan

    ISLAMABAD While rejecting Indian Army’s allegations of infiltration attempts, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry Thursday said that Pakistan would restart work on improving trade ties with India when the two nations’ foreign ministers meet in Islamabad next month.

    Speaking to journalists at the Foreign Office, Chaudhry rejected the allegations levelled by an Indian general Wednesday that their army was fighting the biggest group of infiltrators on the border who crossed the border from Pakistan.

    Sharing the details of his telephonic conversation with Indian Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, Chaudhry said that the matter of recent firing on the Line of Control (LoC) also came under discussion.

    “Our response was that Pakistan has accurate information that firing at working boundary was carried out from across the boundary.”

    TRADE TIES:

    On the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India, the foreign secretary said that both the countries were engaged in a series of discussions to normalise trade relations.

    “When the dialogue process resumes, we hope to build on the work already done in this regard.”

    The foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India are set to meet in Islamabad on August 25 in the neighbouring countries’ latest attempt at improving ties.

    The proposed meeting comes after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif held talks with his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in New Delhi following the Hindu hardliner’s inauguration in May.

    Chaudhry said there were number of issues on both sides for normalising bilateral trade which included “making sure that vulnerable sectors are protected and the issue of the non-tariff barriers in India and the issue of imbalance of trade and certain other infrastructure-related issue.”

    MFN status will mean India that can export 6,800 items to Pakistan, up from around 2,000 at present, and the countries aim to lift bilateral trade to $ 6 billion within three years, officials have said.

    Trade between the two countries is presently around $ 2.5 billion, with Indian exports accounting for $ 1.75 billion, according to the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

    A further $3 billion is thought to be channelled through Dubai, almost all of it in Pakistani imports, though the business community believes that if Pakistan grants India MFN status the imbalance could change.

    http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014...dia-seriously/

  7. #27
    Member Bubbles's Avatar
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    India India

    After Modi's Big Win: Can India and Pakistan Enhance Relations?

    As the new Indian government settles in, questions arise about the future of the Indian-Pakistani relationship—questions prompted mostly by the new Indian prime minister’s history of Hindu nationalism. But a more revealing lens for analyzing this relationship might be to regard it from the perspective of Pakistan. Pakistan’s “dysfunctional civil-military relations” suggest an uncertain political future, leaving India in an essentially reactive role. That dynamic, may have an even more powerful impact than Narendra Modi’s politics.

    Modi’s decision to invite his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to his swearing-in ceremony together with all the other heads of state or government from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, was considered a positive gesture on both sides of the border. The meeting between the two prime ministers was cordial and frank but—to no one’s surprise—not groundbreaking.

    While Pakistani leaders are unanimous and sincere in welcoming warmer relations with India, civilians and military officials have opposing long-term objectives. It is doubtful that the Pakistani military supports such a change for any reasons beyond the narrowly tactical, and in fact will fight fiercely against such a change affecting its territorial claims. Sharif is pursuing an opposite strategy—trying to turn a tactical rapprochement into a more permanent arrangement.

    India is likely to adopt a “wait and see” attitude. While the election of a new government may have elevated resolve to punish Pakistan in case of a terrorist attack, it has not increased India’s capacity to coerce its neighbor into any specific outcome. New Delhi will have to walk a fine line between ignoring Pakistan, which it can’t control and does not need economically, and keeping the door to better relations open enough to provide a real incentive for Islamabad to adopt meaningful new policies—all without making unilateral concessions to Pakistan.

    Most-Favored-Nation Status

    A year ago, then-candidate Sharif made the normalization of relations with India a central plank of his platform. Hopes were high, therefore, that Pakistan would finally extend India Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status, removing tariff and other trade barriers. Sharif did not spell out any preconditions. But, twelve months later, the issue is still pending. Pakistan is now stipulating that the MFN status will be attributed to India only if New Delhi reopens the composite dialogue, a stalled executive-level negotiation process.

    Awarding the MFN status to India is important in its own right. A substantial part of the business community, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises, seem to fear being overwhelmed by a massive arrival of cheaper Indian products on the Pakistani market. Nontariff barriers to India’s market have also been invoked as a justification for Pakistan’s hesitations. Yet, the Pakistani government continues to insist on the need to facilitate bilateral trade between the two countries. It blames several Indian lobbies (the automobile, textile and pharmaceutical industries as well as the agricultural lobbies) for obstructing the negotiations and maintains that awarding India MFN status would benefit Pakistan.

    However, the MFN issue provides clues to a larger domestic political dynamic in Pakistan. The main political parties support Sharif’s policy. Jihadi organizations, on the contrary, oppose any trade deals with New Delhi as long as Kashmir remains under Indian control. Here, as elsewhere, the jihadis are joined by the military—whose opposition Sharif seems to have underestimated. The nomination of Raheel Sharif as replacement for Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) did not usher a more receptive posture in Rawalpindi. It was the military that insisted that the government take the small- and medium-sized enterprises’ objections to heart. It also lent its explicit support to their cause, warning the Sharif brothers “against making rapid concessions, particularly in the run-up to India’s general election.” In February 2014, Shabaz Sharif, the prime minister’s brother, obliquely accused the military of obstructing trade normalization.

    Awarding the MFN status to India would thus serve the interests of the civilian government, not to mention the country, whose economy would benefit from free trade with India. But such a move would only partly benefit the military. This relative convergence opens some diplomatic and political space that the government can exploit, providing it can keep its relations with the military under control. Yet, a spectacular advance in trade relations between India and Pakistan is unlikely. In the delay, Pakistan, whose economy is in shambles, has much more to lose than India does. New Delhi can afford patience. Its economic future lies in its integration in the global economy, not in any specific trade relation with its South Asian neighbors.

    The Kashmir Dispute

    The situation in Kashmir can be explained from a similar civil-military perspective. The Pakistani army is in no position to challenge India along the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir, since the bulk of its forces are positioned on its western front. The Pakistan military seems bent on curbing any temptation by the civilian government to rush into a detente. To stave it off, it provokes India, to make rapprochement politically difficult on that side of the border.

    Skirmishes in Jammu and Kashmir resumed in August 2013, shortly after the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) told the newly elected prime minister that rapprochement with India was acceptable, but should not proceed too quickly. But the incidents remained limited, so as to avoid any escalation. The appointment of a new COAS, Raheel Sharif, did not alter the military’s position on Kashmir.

    The military’s hardening of its position on Kashmir did not prevent Nawaz Sharif from attending Modi’s swearing in, but the predictable absence of tangible results on the Kashmir issue after Sharif’s trip to New Delhi was used by the military and its allies to attack the prime minister on his return to Pakistan.

    A serious escalation in the military buildup on either side of the LoC is unlikely. The significance of the Kashmir issue does seem to be changing, however. Kashmir has become as much an indicator of the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan as of the Indian-Pakistani relationship. But this evolution does not make a settlement of the issue any less complex and uncertain than it was in the past.

    Indian Perspectives and Options

    For India, the primary question is far less about Islamabad’s irredentist claims on its territory than about the uncertainty of Pakistan’s political future. For many Indian officials across the political spectrum, the lack of a unified Pakistani center of power with a single policy makes meaningful negotiation and settlements impossible. India is, therefore, condemned to remain essentially reactive until Pakistan can resolve the tensions in its foreign policy. True, New Delhi can favor or close any possibility of dialogue. It can also raise the cost of potential aggression. But it cannot coerce Pakistan into any peace agreement against Islamabad’s will. The decision to normalize the relationship belongs ultimately to Pakistan.

    There is real anxiety in New Delhi about the possibility that Pakistan’s security establishment may be tempted to test the new Indian government. In a recent article, journalist Praveen Swami enumerated five possible Indian responses to an attack originating in Pakistan: doing nothing, coercion through Indian-army mobilization along the LoC and the international border, strikes on jihadist training camps, using artillery and infantry along the LoC, and the use of covert means.

    None of these options, however, are totally satisfactory. Calculated inaction, for example, characterized New Delhi’s response to the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. This approach earned India goodwill with major powers and brought pressure to bear against Pakistan. No major Lashkar-e-Taiba attack on Indian territory has taken place since then. But even though a restrained strategy paid dividends in 2008, it is highly dependent on third parties, such as the United States.

    Similarly, coercion modeled on India’s 2001-2002 response to the Pakistani-sponsored attack against the Indian parliament, has its drawbacks. India coerced Pakistan into mobilizing its forces along the international border. This response weakened Pakistan’s economy, but also proved very costly for New Delhi. Limited strikes on Pakistani jihadist training camps or shelling targets across the LoC are also possible options, but it is uncertain whether they would produce meaningful results and they carry a high risk of escalation, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons.

    The best guarantee of stability lies, therefore, in Pakistan’s exercising restraint due to its domestic-security situation. The intensification of terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil compels Islamabad to reduce its force levels along the LoC and the international border, heightening its disadvantage vis-à-vis the Indian military and forcing Pakistan to exercise greater caution.

    The Modi government will have to define a level of engagement with Pakistan that is sufficient to prevent the temptation of sponsoring terrorism, but limited enough to force Islamabad to make real concessions in antiterrorism to secure greater gains. Should New Delhi make significant concessions early in the process, the incentive to renounce terrorism as a way of achieving foreign-policy objectives will be nil or limited. The continuation of the back-channel negotiations that walk this fine line could offer, once more, the most effective instrument in advancing the relationship.

    Rivalry in Afghanistan

    But even back-channel negotiations are unlikely to prevent the rivalry from playing out once again in Afghanistan. With the departure of U.S. forces slated for the end of 2016 at the latest, chances are that Afghanistan will again become the backdrop for a proxy conflict because few core interests on either side would be at stake, thus diminishing the risk of a nuclear escalation.

    Both sides deny this possibility. Pakistani officials keep claiming that the era of interfering in its northern neighbor’s internal affairs is over. As evidence of such ostensibly responsible behavior, Islamabad has reached out to its erstwhile foes from the former Northern Alliance, facilitated a reconciliation process between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and cooperated in the Afghan elections, assuring everyone that it did not support any particular group. Some believe, however, that Pakistan is still trying to promote the emergence of an Afghan government it can influence or control, and expedite the return of Afghan refugees to prevent their potentially violent involvement in Pakistani politics. What Pakistan presents as a wholesale reversal of its old strategy is merely a tactical readjustment designed to meet changing realities on the ground. Interference is still a reality, despite some genuine rethinking in some government circles.

    The participation of the Taliban in the Afghan government (or their control of some provinces) is antithetical to New Delhi’s primary goals of preventing the return of the Taliban to power, while also weakening the connection between the Taliban and the Pakistani security establishment. To thwart such an outcome, New Delhi has established around Afghanistan a quasicontainment policy with all of Kabul’s neighbors except Pakistan, and unfailingly supports the Afghan government.

    But the announced U.S withdrawal will inevitably weaken India’s position. New Delhi knows that its support to Kabul will at best slow down the erosion of the government authority. More importantly, the political chaos or even simply the additional tensions that could possibly result from the accusations of fraud in the second round of Afghanistan’s elections will further diminish the legitimacy of the next government at a time when the insurgency is showing a new vigor in the east and the south of the country. So far, Pakistan’s preoccupation with anti-Islamabad militants offers India the best protection against excessive interference in its Afghanistan affairs, but it makes New Delhi dependent on a situation it does not control.

    Conclusion

    Although India and Pakistan officially profess their goodwill towards one another, none of the conditions for a real rapprochement are met.

    Despite Pakistan’s assurances that it is ready to seek an agreement with Modi, as it did under the last BJP government, the consensus between civilian and military is only superficial. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the military is resolutely opposed to all kinds of rapprochement with India. The military still needs the civilian government to break the vicious cycle of economic regression and international isolation in which successive governments (including military regimes) and adventurist policies of the security establishment have locked up the country. It therefore wants the prime minister to improve relations with New Delhi in service of that goal, but to do so without creating the kind of organic links that would emerge from the development of a strong economic relationship. Moreover, peace with India would challenge the narrative that the military’s outsized role in Pakistani government and society is essential to the country’s security, and would, therefore, seriously challenge its influence on Pakistani politics.

    Still, it is clear that the military is no longer politically omnipotent. The relative unity of the mainstream political parties on the issue of noncooperation with the military limits the latter’s capacity to manipulate politics. This opens some space for the government to maneuver, including in relations with India: Nawaz Sharif can initiate a rapprochement with India provided it does not lead to the abandonment of any of Pakistan’s traditional claims.

    On the Indian side, Modi does not consider Pakistan a priority. India would benefit from better relations with Pakistan, but its economic future does not depend on it. Yet all previous attempts to ignore Pakistan ended up with the resumption of terrorist attacks, a situation that India wants to avoid, not least because a possible escalation into even a conventional conflict with Pakistan could impede the new government’s program of economic reform.

    Pakistan, although the weaker of the two actors, controls to a large extent the evolution of the relationship. But the choice facing Islamabad involves more than its bilateral relations with India. Pakistan must decide between joining the development bandwagon, or becoming increasingly marginalized in the international community. Making this decision will require that Pakistan speak with a single voice, including both the government and the security establishment. Given the configuration of Pakistan’s polity, only a consolidation of democracy in the country will allow for substantial improvements in the relationship with India. But this will be, at best, an incremental process.

    Bilateral relations are, therefore, likely to fluctuate between periods of appeasement and occasional crisis. There is little chance of a major conflict, but the worsening of the security situation on both countries’ fringes in Afghanistan and Kashmir could revive the risk of terrorism, possibly in connection with violent extremism.

    Frederic Grare is senior associate and director of Carnegie’s South Asia Program. His research focuses on South Asian security issues and the search for a security architecture. He also works on India’s “Look East” policy, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s regional policies, and the tension between stability and democratization, including civil-military relations, in Pakistan.

    http://nationalinterest.org/feature/...1050?page=show

  8. #28
    Think Tank 1Badmaash's Avatar
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    India-Pakistan relations

    Relations between India and its historic rival Pakistan have deteriorated sharply in recent weeks, especially after India’s government, now led by the Hindu supremacist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), cancelled a much anticipated meeting between the countries’ Foreign Secretaries.

    Last month saw a dramatic rise in cross-border firing along the Line of Control (LoC) that separates the Indian- and Pakistani-held sections of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The cross-border shelling has resulted in at least a half-dozen deaths and terrorized villagers on both sides of the LoC.

    By the beginning of last week, Indian government and military officials were issuing a barrage of threats against Pakistan. On a trip to Kashmir, Amit Shah, the BJP President and a close confidant of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, pledged that India would give Pakistan a “befitting reply” if all cross-border firing did not cease.

    ...

    That India’s actions constitute an attempt to rewrite the “ground rules” for Indian-Pakistan relations is openly conceded by the Indian media and by government officials in off-the-record remarks.

    “That there is a discontinuity in India’s approach is exactly right,” observed C. Raja Mohan, an Indian foreign policy expert, in his Indian Express column. “The Modi government is now saying there is no place for the Hurriyat in the peace process with Pakistan. Delhi’s new approach is a bold gamble, to say the least.”

    A senior government official told MailOnlineIndia that the decision to cancel the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting had been “made at the highest level” and was aimed at establishing “new ground rules” for India’s relations with Pakistan. With a Modi-led BJP-government in power in New Delhi, it would not be “business as usual” between the two nuclear-armed states, said the official.

    ...

    Since taking the reins of power, Modi and the BJP have repeatedly signaled their intention to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. This has included highlighting their conception of India as the natural leader and regional hegemon of South Asia and accelerating the Indian military’s “modernization” program.

    In this the BJP government is taking encouragement from Washington’s courting of India. The Obama administration has responded to Modi’s election by intensifying its longstanding campaign to woo India, so as to harness New Delhi more tightly to its drive to isolate and strategically encircle China—the so-called “US Pivot to Asia.”

    India’s new government is also manifestly trying to exploit the grave crisis currently rocking Nawaz Sharif’s government, calculating that concessions can be extracted from it when it is on the defensive. With the encouragement of Pakistan’s military-security establishment, which resents Sharif’s attempt to assert greater control over foreign and national-security policy, Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the rightwing Canadian-based Islamic cleric Tahir-ul Qadri and his Pakistan Awami Tehrik have mounted weeks of protests challenging the legitimacy of Sharif’s 15 month-old government.

    ...

    Not only are Indo-Pakistani relations highly explosive, intertwined as they are with communal relations and internal power struggles in both countries. US imperialism’s push to reassert its strategic hegemony across Eurasia is dangerously destabilizing all inter-state relations.
    http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014.../bjpi-s01.html

  9. #29
    Member Hadeed's Avatar
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    Pakistan Pakistan

    Re: India-Pakistan relations

    modi knows very well that he cannot deliver,he is just going to use this "indo-pak conflict" to divert attention from corruption,stagnated economy and other problems.

  10. #30
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    Re: India-Pakistan relations

    what does his turn toward Japan mean for Pakistan's relations with some of our... less friendly neighbors?

  11. #31
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    Re: India-Pakistan relations

    Quote Originally Posted by 1Badmaash View Post
    India’s new government is also manifestly trying to exploit the grave crisis currently rocking Nawaz Sharif’s government, calculating that concessions can be extracted from it when it is on the defensive.
    Flawed argument. A weak government in pakistan will never concede any benefit to India in kashmir issue since that will further weakens the government. A tough stand and rhetoric has been traditional tool for pakistani leader to muster the mass support.

    However this movement (if I can call it so though more of an anarchy) was also one f the reason why talks were called off. Uncertainty in leadership means no value in dialogue.

  12. #32
    Senior Moderator Superkaif's Avatar
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    US to back efforts towards improvement in Pakistan-India relations

    WASHINGTON: The United States will back efforts that help improve relations between South Asian neighbours Pakistan and India, the State Department said Tuesday.

    Broadly speaking, we will support any efforts between the two countries to improve the relationship, to talk about the issues directly, State Department Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf said the daily briefing.

    She was responding to a question regarding the exchange of letters between prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi in the wake of devastating floods in in the disputed Kashmir region.

    In answer to a question about any United States assistance for Pakistan in flood relief, the spokesperson said she would check the latest updates but indicated the US would be ready to help as she added obviously, we have a number of resources (to assist), if called upon to do so.

    http://www.dawn.com/news/1130968/us-...ndia-relations

    USA talking nonsense.......again?

  13. #33
    Banned alihamza's Avatar
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    Re: US to back efforts towards improvement in Pakistan-India relations

    The US is not interested in mediating between India and Pakistan. Towing the Indian line, which does not want the US to interfere in India-Pakistan relations.

  14. #34
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    India-Pakistan Relations


    Felt the need for separate thread to discuss news related to ino-pak relations and news items pertaining to both countries.

    India resigned to ‘holding pattern’ with Pakistan

    With the SAARC summit only a week away, and India and Pakistan still unable to agree on talks about talks, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with his Pakistani counterpart on the sidelines of Thimphu will have the limited but important aim of preventing further deterioration in an already fraught relationship, Indian officials say.

    “What we are really looking at is a holding pattern”, a senior official told The Hindu, using the aviation industry phrase for when an aircraft circles around an airport at a fixed altitude awaiting clearance to land. “It is clear that they are not ready to move forward. Nor, quite frankly, are we, until we see some movement on the issues we have raised".

    Pakistan wants nothing short of the resumption of the composite dialogue. It has refused to invite Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao to make a return visit to Islamabad nearly two months after its foreign secretary, Salman Bashir, came to Delhi, unless India accepts this condition. On its part, India says resumption is not possible till more is done on the terrorism front but is willing to discuss “humanitarian and other issues”. Under the circumstances, said the official, the best Dr. Singh can hope for from his Bhutan meeting with Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani is to keep alive the idea of engagement, even if Islamabad is not in a position to deliver on terrorism or discuss the possibility of incremental steps forward.

    “It’s sad, really, because there are lots of little things that you could do together even now”, the official said. Indian proposals on enhancing cross-LoC trade have not been answered and meetings of business chambers from both sides have not been held. Though the Indian side has not helped matters with its non-tariff barriers, the official said Islamabad’s reluctance to let the chambers meet means solutions to the complaints of Pakistani businessmen cannot be found.

    The official mentioned the ongoing visit to India of Pakistan’s population minister, Firdous Ashiq Awan. “We indicated to them that if they wanted, we were ready to build in some political content to her visit. But they were not interested. Our sense is that nobody in their system wants to take the risk of engaging with India”, he said. The official also mentioned Pakistani interior minister Rehman Malik’s recent meeting with visiting Indian journalists. “He was willing to brief them on how the trial of 26/11 suspects has progressed. But [Indian high commissioner] Sharad [Sabharwal] has not heard from him about this since September.”

    But if the prospect for gains in Thimphu is close to zero, not meeting Mr. Gilani, or meeting him too perfunctorily, could actually damage relations between the two countries, another official said, explaining the Prime Minister’s dilemma. The Pakistani side has a similar assessment of what is at stake. Neither side is looking for a joint statement but some minimum preparation is considered necessary. “Both of us know the drill”, the senior official said. Asked for his assessment, a senior Pakistani diplomat said it was likely that the two foreign secretaries would hurriedly sit down before their principals meet to sketch out the ground rules.

  15. #35
    Forum Administrator bilalhaider's Avatar
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    Re: India-Pakistan Relations

    Quote Originally Posted by aryavart View Post

    Felt the need for separate thread to discuss news related to ino-pak relations and news items pertaining to both countries.
    Thread merged with old thread.
    The Following User Says Thank You to bilalhaider For This Useful Post: Superkaif


  16. #36
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    Re: Pakistan - India relations

    No plans for Nawaz-Modi meeting in New York: FO

    ISLAMABAD: The Foreign Office has confirmed that there is no meeting scheduled to take place between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the UN general Assembly in New York.

    Speaking to Dawn, Foreign Office spokesperson Tasneem Aslam said the premier, accompanied by a small delegation, will address the United Nations General Assembly on September 26.

    She said Adviser to the PM on Foreign Affairs and National Security Sartaj Aziz, Special Assistant to the PM Tariq Fatimi, Foreign Secretary Azaz Ahmed, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US Jalil, Abbas Jilani and Pakistan’s Permanent Envoy to UN Ambassador Masood Khan are members of the premier’s delegation.

    According to the spokesperson, the premier’s visit is only for three days, starting from September 24-26, and he will return to Islamabad from New York on September 27.

    "It is not a bilateral visit; however on the sidelines of the United National General Assembly, the premier is expected to hold bilateral meetings with many world leaders," she remarked.

    The spokesperson confirmed that no meeting has been planned between US President Barack Obama and PM Nawaz.

    However, PM Nawaz Sharif will co-chair the UN peacekeeping summit, along with US Vice President Joe Biden and a few other world leaders.

    On the other hand, Modi will have his hands full on his first official visit to the US where he is expected to carry out more than 50 engagements during his short trip.

    Modi is scheduled to meet top world leaders, make a speech at the UN General Assembly, and interact with CEOs of the Fortune 500, including American business tycoon and former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

    Modi is also scheduled to meet with top American political figures, including Obama, former US President Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Indian-American South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley among many others.

    Modi's engagements come as a contrast to PM Nawaz's first official visit to the US where he was only able to meet with US Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, CIA Director John Brennan and US President Barack Obama.

    http://www.dawn.com/news/1134048/no-...in-new-york-fo

  17. #37
    Member Ahsan Bin Tufail's Avatar
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    Re: Pakistan - India relations

    Peace with India is an absolute necessity. Pakistan has big problems but there are reasons for me to believe that India don't want true peace with its neighbors especially Pakistan just like Israel. So we have to act very smartly. Unfortunately, our current leadership is far less capable for this task. We need to order things at home before taking any adversaries. I have a firm belief that even today Muslims are as strong as they were in the past if they set their internal affairs right.

  18. #38
    Senior Member Felix's Avatar
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    Re: Pakistan - India relations

    Relations as always are brittle to say the least. Stressed and sensitive especially with the border issues.

  19. #39
    Think Tank Muse's Avatar
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    Re: Pakistan - India relations

    Quote Originally Posted by Ahsan Bin Tufail View Post
    Peace with India is an absolute necessity. Pakistan has big problems but there are reasons for me to believe that India don't want true peace with its neighbors especially Pakistan just like Israel. So we have to act very smartly. Unfortunately, our current leadership is far less capable for this task. We need to order things at home before taking any adversaries. I have a firm belief that even today Muslims are as strong as they were in the past if they set their internal affairs right.
    You were making sense then
    even today Muslims are as strong as they were in the past if they set their internal affairs right
    Are you talking about Pakistan? If yes, What are Pakistan's internal problems?

  20. #40
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    Re: Pakistan - India relations

    Quote Originally Posted by Muse View Post

    Are you talking about Pakistan? If yes, What are Pakistan's internal problems?
    Very strong deviation from the teachings of Quran and Sunnah, lies, Rampant corruption, illiteracy, unemployment etc. Yes, as far as military power is concerned, I think if we can develop an ICBM than that would be sufficient to end foreign intervention in our internal affairs at least for a limited time.

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